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FINAL REPORT

of

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba

Submitted
September 30, 1982

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THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

F I N A L R E P O R T

Submitted to the President of the United States

and to the Secretary of State

on September 30, 1982

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12323 of September 22, 1981

President's Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba

Room 3254 NS
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Phone (202) 632-2087

September 30, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Last September, you announced an important new foreign policy initiative of undertaking a program of radio broadcasting to Cuba in order to provide the Cuban people with accurate information about their own government's policies and actions.

I am pleased to transmit to you, under cover of this letter, the Final Report of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, which contains the Commission's recommendations on radio broadcasting to Cuba, as required by Section 2(e) of Executive Order 12323 of September 22, 1981. The White House announcement and the Executive Order are included in the Report as Appendices A and B.

The Report is dated August 17, 1982 because it was prepared then to meet the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the Commission's recommendations on the issues involved. The Report assisted the Committee in reporting out the proposed radio broadcasting to Cuba legislation (H.R. 5427). This bill, which was passed by the House of Representatives on August 10 by a vote of 250-134, was reported out favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 9 and is now awaiting action by the full Senate. The text of the Final Report remains that submitted to the Committee on August 17 but footnotes have been added to reflect developments since then and changes in the proposed legislation which were not taken into consideration when the Report was prepared.

The Commission recognizes that radio broadcasting to Cuba is the logical extension of an important concept begun with the establishment of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty more than thirty years ago. As the result of its deliberations, the Commission concludes that Radio Marti would fill an important informational void created by more than twenty years of censorship and control of the Cuban media by the Castro

The President,
The White House.

government. Because of that control, the Cuban people are not only denied the fundamental human right of free access to information and ideas but are largely unaware of their government's mismanagement at home and adventurism abroad. The purpose of Radio Marti would be to provide the Cuban people with the information needed to make informed judgments on their government's policies and actions.

In view of the importance of this peaceful foreign policy initiative, the Commission expresses its strong hope that the 97th Congress will vote to enact the proposed Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act and will provide appropriations to permit the Executive Branch to put Radio Marti on the air as soon as possible. I hope the attached Report will prove helpful in implementing your important initiative.

Sincerely,

F. Clifton White

F. Clifton White
Chairman

Enclosure:
Final Report.

FINAL REPORT

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FINAL REPORT

I. SUMMARY

The members of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba were appointed in January 1992, 1/ with a mandate to develop a recommended plan for radio broadcasting to Cuba. Based on research conducted by the Commission staff, information provided by the State Department and other government agencies, testimony and materials received in open meetings, and its own deliberations, the Commission has concluded the following:

-- The concept of government-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba by a surrogate "home service" along the lines of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), delivering impartial news and information and designed to provide the Cuban people with the accurate information needed to make informed judgments on their government's policies and actions, is both sound and important.

-- The already incorporated but non-operational Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., patterned after RFE/RL, Inc., is the most appropriate vehicle to conduct such broadcasting, using the name "Radio Marti."

-- Oversight and supervision of federal grants to RBC, Inc. might best be lodged in the Department of State during the initial start-up phase; thereafter, an informed choice for oversight could be made from among several options, including the International Communication Agency (ICA), the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), or a separate, new agency.2/ The Commission recommends that its term be extended for a period not to exceed one year from the effective date of legislation authorizing and funding RBC, Inc., so that it can make further specific recommendation on permanent oversight authority based on Radio Marti's first year of operation. 3/

-- Credibility is crucial and to be credible, the programming of Radio Marti must be accurate and impartial.

1/ Two additional members were appointed in June and August.

2/ If H.R. 5427, now before the Congress, is passed, direct supervision and oversight of Radio Marti will be assigned to the Board for International Broadcasting.

3/ In view of the oversight role assigned to the BIB by H.R. 5427, Commission recommendations would pertain not to permanent oversight but to other aspects of Radio Marti's operation.

-- In order to reach the majority of Cubans effectively, broadcasting should be conducted on the AM band. The Commission recommends that Radio Marti operate on one basic, well-established frequency on the AM band. 4/ Although 1040 kHz has already been identified and assigned as the frequency for Radio Marti, the selection of a frequency may have to be repeated if proposed legislation passed by the House of Representatives is adopted and passed by the Senate. This process would ensure that the most appropriate frequency for Radio Marti is chosen, while taking into account the interests of U.S. broadcasters.

-- Cuban interference with U.S. AM broadcasting has been a growing problem for many years. While Radio Marti may be made the scapegoat for Cuban interference, the Commission believes that abandonment of Radio Marti would certainly not eliminate nor probably even reduce such interference now or in the future. The Commission recommends that the Department of State keep the door open to opportunities to address the interference problem through diplomatic channels.

-- The Commission considers the Administration's request of $10 million for first-year funding to be reasonable. 5/ Effective coverage of Cuba will require two transmitters, one located at a Caribbean site. Effective programming will require a sizeable, well-trained professional staff because of Radio Marti's unique research and development requirements, including the need for extensive information gathering.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. Commission's Authority

The White House announced on September 22, 1981 its intention to begin radio broadcasting to Cuba, establishing a radio service to be called "Radio Marti." The text of the White House statement is at Appendix A.

4/ This is not meant to exclude the possibility of considering the use of other bands (including short wave) to supplement the AM band, as provided for in Section 3, Paragraph (d)(3) of H.R. 5427.

5/ Since the decision to seek first year funding for FY 83 (not for FY 82), additional analysis by the Department of State indicates that approximately $12 million would be a more realistic budget figure if all one-time start-up costs ($6.9 million), as well as first-year operating costs, are to be included. The Commission concurs.

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba was established by Executive Order 12323 of September 22, 1981 (see Appendix B). The functions of the Commission are to "develop a recommended plan for radio broadcasting intended for transmisson to Cuba" and to "examine issues related to effectively carrying out such a plan for radio broadcasting to Cuba. These shall include, but not be limited to, possible program content, information gathering, writing and editing needs, staffing requirements, legal structure for a broadcasting organization, proposed legislation, sample budgets, and the location, structure and function of possible broadcasting stations."

The President appointed ten members of the Commission on January 19, 1982, with F. Clifton White as Chairman. An eleventh member was named in June. 6/ A list of Commission members is at Appendix D.

The Commission held closed meetings on February 5, March 2, March 30 and May 3. Open meetings were held on March 2, March 30, and May 3. 7/ The open and closed meetings scheduled for April 16 were postponed to May. Summary minutes of these meetings, together with testimony received, may be found in Appendix E.

Chairman White testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 3 and the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance on May 10. He also testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 1, as did Senator Stone. Copies of these statements are in Appendix F.

B. The Concept Behind Radio Marti

The Commission believes that radio broadcasting to Cuba is the logical extension of an important concept begun with the establishment of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty more than thirty years ago. Radio Marti would fill an important informational void created by more than twenty years of censorship and control of the Cuban media by the Castro government. Because of that control, the Cuban people are not only denied the fundamental human right of free access to information and ideas but are largely unaware of their government's mismanagement at home and adventurism abroad.

6/ Executive Order 12366 dated May 25, 1982 increased the number of Commission members from 11 to 12, and a twelfth member was named in August.

7/ Open and closed meetings of the Commission were also held on September 30.

The Administration has proposed the creation of Radio Marti as part of a general foreign policy effort to increase the domestic cost of Cuban adventurism and to moderate Cuba's foreign policy. The purpose is to provide the Cuban people with the information needed to make informed judgments on their government's policies and actions so that they may be better able to hold their government accountable. The Commission strongly endorsed this concept at the outset.

The Commission believes that the proposed name of the broadcasting entity, Radio Marti, is entirely appropriate to the concept outlined here. Jose Marti, the Cuban liberator, was indeed sometimes a critic of the United States. But he was always passionately dedicated to democracy and freedom, to the truth, and to the independence of Cuba from foreign dominance from whatever quarter. This credo should be mirrored by Radio Marti. Marti is a symbol of a free Cuba to Cubans of all political views, and Radio Marti should emulate those values.

C. Previous Broadcasting to Cuba

The Commission reviewed the history of U.S. broadcasting to Cuba in an effort to draw lessons for Radio Marti. The U.S. once maintained a clandestine radio station, Radio Swan and later Radio Americas, which broadcast extremely partisan views, information and material designed for short-term psychological effect. Those broadcasts ended in the 1960's. From the early 1960's until 1974, the Voice of America broadcast a Cuba-oriented daily program called Cita con Cuba ("A Date with Cuba"). It was taken off the air in 1974 because the United States Information Agency considered that its general Spanish language broadcasts sufficiently covered that agency's specific information objectives in Cuba.

The Commission's review served to reinforce the conviction that Radio Marti should be an overt activity with full Congressional approval and that it be, from the beginning, a long-range, non-confrontational effort clearly identified as a U. S. Government-sponsored activity. Radio Marti must not be, nor appear to be, identifiable as an emigre undertaking nor as reflective of any partisan view or perspective. Rather it must be objective, non-partisan and thoroughly reliable so as to earn for itself a reputation as fully credible.

D. Interim Report and Recommendations

This Final Report affirms the Commission's earlier Interim Report of May 23, 1982, adds to it additional information received and casts most of its preliminary conclusions and recommendations in final form. It does not make a recommendation concerning legislation because the Administration submitted proposed legislation to authorize radio broadcasting to Cuba to the Congress before the Commission's members were appointed. If its mandate is extended, the Commission intends to make additional recommendations based on one year after Congress authorizes and funds Radio Marti. 8/

III. FINDINGS

Based on statements submitted at its open meetings, information it requested, and its own deliberations, the Commission has made the following findings.

A. The Need for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

For decades the United States has found radio the most effective means at its disposal to provide the truth to the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have proven their worth in this effort. Yet in Cuba itself, Communist propaganda has no similar competition and there is no alternative view of the Castro government and its actions. Radio broadcasting aimed specifically at Cuba would provide such alternative views.

Communism well understands the power of ideas and devotes enormous resources to propagating its ideology and view of events with considerable emphasis on radio broadcasting aimed at specific countries. The Soviet Union outspends the U. S. by 7 to 1 in the area of international broadcasting and information. The Soviet Union and its Caribbean client, Cuba, outbroadcast the U.S. in Latin America by a ratio of 5 to 1 in terms of hours on the air. Radio Moscow is retransmitted to Latin America from Cuba, and Cuban radio propaganda echoes Radio Moscow themes. Cuba alone broadcasts 280 hours a week to Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. even lags behind some of its Western allies in broadcast hours around the world, but especially in the Caribbean, an area of strategic concern to the U.S.

8/ The Commission would make recommendations on the implementation of Radio Marti based on progress as of the date to which the White House extends its term, should this occur.

Some critics have questioned whether Radio Marti would find an audience among the Cuban people, claiming that the Cuban population is largely antagonistic toward the United States. Statements by Cuban officials, including several by President Castro, indicate that the Castro government is very concerned about the effect Radio Marti could have on the Cuban people. This suggests that the Cuban people, and especially the young (44% are under 20, 66% are under 35), may be a more receptive audience than those critics are willing to admit. Other critics argue that any news from a U.S. Government source is suspect in Cuba. Yet, Cuban officials themselves readily admit to listening to the VOA because it is comprehensive and accurate.

Other critics have suggested that Cuba is a more open society than generally believed, that the range of information available in Cuba may be greater than recognized, and that there is wider political participation and greater freedom of expression than assumed. But, according to several Cuban analysts, the recent increase in mass organizations, the Mariel exodus, the ascendency of hardliners among top-level decision-makers, and the implementation of a new, tougher penal code in November 1979 are all evidence of a decreased liberalization of Cuban society since early 1980. The "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" submitted to Congress under this Administration and the last document how little free expression and political freedom exists in Cuba.

According to the 1979 Human Rights Report, "all political, economic, social, and cultural activities are under close control of the Communist Party. No political opposition is allowed. The press is owned and controlled by the Party apparatus. Freedom of speech is severely circumscribed." The 1979 Inter-American Human Rights Commission Report on Cuba noted that "the legal system in Cuba prevents free expression and any expression of disagreement with the socialist system. There are individuals who are in prison for the mere fact of having expressed their opposition to the system." According to the 1981 Human Rights Report, "All group activities in Cuba are controlled and monitored by the Communist Party and political block committees." While Radio Marti can do little about the limited outlets for expression in Cuba, it <u>can</u> significantly increase the availability of information to the Cuban people. Like RFE and RL at the beginning, Radio Marti will need to carefully establish its credibility and earn its audience. Whether people live in Gdansk or Havana, those in a closed society thirst for more information.

Artistic autonomy does not exist in Cuba. Infringement of intellectual freedom is accomplished through a Cuban form of "social realism" which punishes by law any "ideological deviation." Writers, filmmakers, educators and artists face the choice of conforming, departing or facing imprisonment. The large number of Cuban intellectuals resident abroad testifies to this fact. No dissent is tolerated. Likewise, while the press in Cuba may not always cover events in the same manner, story lines are predetermined and criticism of the Revolution or national issues is not permitted. American newsmen and others who have visited Cuba report that there is no non-communist printed material available to the public.

The Communist Party is the only legal party. "Citizens have some limited participation in discussion of local issues such as transportation, sanitation, and crime prevention, but only at the local level." (1980 Human Rights Report) But there is no serious debate of national issues. These are precisely the issues which Radio Marti will try to cover.

The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) at its 37th General Assemby in Rio de Janeiro in October 1981 resolved "to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially IAPA members, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective."

For these reasons, the Commission believes there is a need for Radio Marti.

B. Broadcasting Entity

The Commission believes that the Voice of America would not be the appropriate broadcasting entity for Radio Marti. The Charter granted to the VOA by the Congress in 1976 mandates the Voice to serve as a window on America, projecting American society and institutions and explaining U.S. policies. The VOA charter does not contemplate a surrogate "home service" like Radio Marti. The Commission, therefore, believes that Radio Marti should follow Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in maintaining a separate identity and operation from those of the VOA.

The absence of an appropriate existing broadcasting entity suggests that a separate corporate entity patterned after RFE/RL, Inc. is required, particularly if it would enhance the credibility and efficiency of Radio Marti. Such an entity, called Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. (RBC, Inc.), already exists. RBC, Inc. was incorporated as a private non-profit corporation in the District of Columbia in September 1981, and was recognized as a tax exempt organization by the Internal Revenue Service in January 1982. Pending the enactment of Federal legislation, RBC, Inc. has remained essentially a non-operational corporate shell.

C. Oversight

The Commission recognizes that if broadcasting is to be conducted by a separate, non-profit corporate entity, formal governmental supervision and guidance will be necessary. While federal oversight need not extend to the minute details of daily management and operations, the Commission believes that close guidance on content (to ensure a balanced, credible broadcast) and careful supervision of expenditures of federal grant money are essential. For RFE/RL, Inc., the Board for International Broadcasting now performs this oversight role. For RBC, Inc., the Commission believes that the four logical entities to which oversight responsibility could be assigned are: 1) an independent agency, 2) the Department of State, 3) the International Communication Agency (ICA), or 4) the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB).

1. Independent Agency: The scale of operations contemplated may be insufficient to warrant creation of a separate agency. The establishment of an independent board could be excessively complex and costly.

2. State Department: Since State provides RFE/RL with continuous policy guidance, it should perform a similar role for Radio Marti. However, State is not now structured to provide the permanent day-by-day supervision of Radio Marti required.

3. ICA: ICA has a global view and considerable regional Latin American expertise and experience both directly and through the Voice of America. But Radio Marti should be kept separate from the VOA, as its mission and structure are sharply distinct.

4. BIB: The BIB would seem to be a logical supervisory agency given its experience with managing RFE/RL. But, because the BIB is regionally oriented at all levels, grafting a much smaller Latin Amerian activity to its Europe-oriented board and management could cause serious problems. As indicated in recent BIB Annual Reports, the BIB has been experiencing board/management problems in recent years, so that an added responsibility like Radio Marti might be unwise, particularly if the BIB must adjust to the changes introduced by the Pell Amendment at the same time.

Legislation proposed by the Administration to the Congress specifies the State Department as the temporary grantor of federal funds and supervisory authority for Radio Marti, pending the statutory designation of an appropriate federal granting and oversight agency. The Commission considers this a sensible arrangement until Radio Marti is fully operational. The Commission would prefer to defer recommendation on a permanent oversight agency until one year after Radio Marti has been authorized and funded by Congress.9/

D. Technical Questions

1. Broadcast Band

Examination shows that neither FM nor TV broadcasts would be feasible from U.S. sites to Cuba with adequate reception there, since each requires line-of-sight transmission. Furthermore, FM and TV listenership is not as broad as in the U.S.

While a shortwave signal could readily reach Cuba, few would hear it. In Europe or the Soviet Union, availability of short wave receivers is almost universal. In some countries (e.g. the USSR) short wave is sometimes used for domestic broadcasting. In Cuba, on the other hand, short wave is not used for domestic broadcasting. There are no reliable estimates on the number of short wave receivers in Cuba. The Commission has consulted a variety of sources, including the VOA, the FCC and the intelligence community. Logic and all

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9/ If H.R. 5427, now before the Congress, is passed, direct supervision and oversight of Radio Marti will be assigned to the Board for International Broadcasting.

available information indicate that short wave receivers are not widely held in Cuba. Cubans who arrived in the U. S. in 1980 also reported this. One American expert on Cuban broadcasting who visited Cuba in 1981 has recently reported in comments submitted to the FCC that since the Revolution short wave sets have become very difficult to acquire in Cuba; authorities even disable short wave receivers when they can. Short wave could thus be expected to reach only the government and Communist Party officials and a few others with old or informally acquired sets.

The AM radio band (medium wave) is what the Cuban government uses to reach its own populace. Cuba maintains an interlocking system of five national AM networks, each with local transmitters registered with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The Cuban Government even rebroadcasts on the AM band those Soviet short wave broadcasts which it wants to be widely heard in Cuba. The 1981 edition of the World Radio and TV Handbook reports 2.12 million radios in Cuba. Virtually all are likely to be AM receivers, most being inexpensive transistor models. If Radio Marti is intended to reach the general Cuban populace, the man and woman on the street or in the field, it would appear that only AM can reach them effectively.

While the International Radio Regulations state that "in principle" the AM band is for domestic (national) service, in practice the AM band is used extensively by international broadcasters throughout the world. Some of the principal users are the BBC, Deutsche Welle (West Germany), Radio Moscow, Radio Havana and the VOA. RFE also operates an AM transmitter in Germany to broadcast to Eastern Europe.

2. Frequency

When planning for Radio Marti began, the Federal Communications Commission was asked in September 1981 to recommend a frequency for its future use. In conducting a frequency search, the FCC considered three criteria: (1) minimization of interference from Radio Marti to U.S. domestic stations; (2) maximization of service from Radio Marti over Cuba; and (3) minimization of interference from Radio Marti to other stations in the Western Hemisphere.

All 107 commercial channels in the AM band were reviewed to assess usability. It was determined that approximately three U.S. Class 1A clear channel frequencies, one of which was 1040 kHz, showed greatest promise. Through computer analysis it was determined that 1040 kHz met the criteria noted above to the greatest extent. These studies did not take into account Cuba's plans to use 1040 kHz since Cuban had not notified the International Frequency Registration Board of this intent at the time the FCC made its recommendation.

The FCC formally identified 1040 kHz as the recommended frequency for Radio Marti in a letter dated October 29, 1981. The NTIA formally assigned it for use by the U.S. Government in January 1982. Therefore, Radio Marti's use of 1040 kHz would be entirely legal. In fact, U.S. use of 1040 has already been accepted by the ITU on List B of its frequency assignment plan.

H.R. 5427, passed by the House on August 10, establishes a specific procedure and specific criteria to be followed in making a final selection of a frequency for Radio Marti, taking into account the interests of U.S. broadcasters. If this procedure becomes law, a new determination of a frequency for Radio Marti would be required.

The Commission has received and considered proposals that Radio Marti use a frequency off the regular AM commercial broadcast band. The Commission believes this would be unwise for several reasons. Some inexpensive transistor radios have limited tuning capability and cannot pick up transmissions outside the normal range of 535-1605 kHz. In addition, the fringes of the AM band, 525-535 kHz and 1605-1705 kHz, are largely allocated to other uses by international regulations to which the U.S. is a party. Finally, since the off-band frequencies are not covered by international agreements, the U.S. would have weaker ground for complaint under international law against possible Cuban jamming. 10/

10/ The ITU Radio Regulations indicate that off-band frequencies are not to be used until after a 1986 Regional Conference to plan the use of the expanded AM radio band. Nevertheless, the use of all possible radio frequencies should be considered, as required by Section 3, Paragraph (d)(3) of H.R. 5427.

3. Cuban Interference and Jamming

The Administration's proposal to establish Radio Marti has generated concern that Cuba may retaliate by jamming Radio Marti and by increasing interference with U.S. broadcasters.

Jamming: The Cuban government could try to jam the reception of Radio Marti broadcasts in Cuba by locating a number of low powered transmitters (1 KW-10KW) at appropriate points, probably along the north coast. This could be done at moderate cost with partial effectiveness. In the past twenty-three years, however, Cuba has seldom jammed the VOA. Jamming is rarely fully effective, and the Commission would expect it to enhance the credibility of Radio Marti for the Cuban people. Jamming would probably have little effect on broadcasters in the U.S., including stations using the same frequency as Radio Marti.

Interference: During the course of its public hearings the Commission was made acutely aware of the problems for U.S. broadcasters caused by interference from Cuban broadcasts. This Cuban interference is in violation of both the letter and the spirit of international treaties or agreements to which it is or has been a party. It is a serious problem which should be addressed jointly by the Federal Government and the broadcasters. Cuban radio interference with American broadcasts on the AM band, caused by transmitting radio signals, frequently at high power, on the same frequencies used by U.S. radio stations, is not new. It has been going on for at least 15 years, affecting primarily stations in the southeastern United States, especially Florida, as indicated by the Florida broadcasting associations in their statements to the Commission.

In the mid-1960's, the Castro government embarked on a program to redesign its domestic AM broadcasting system and to initiate broadcasting directed toward the United States and other neighboring countries. New Cuban plans to increase significantly the number and power of its AM radio stations to meet both internal and external requirements were announced in 1979 as part of a five-year plan and were submitted to the International Frequency Registration Board of the ITU in May 1980. Were Cuba's plans to be implemented, its stations would cause greatly increased interference to U.S. broadcasters.

Cuba's current inventory of operating and proposed radio stations includes two high-powered stations using 500 KW transmitters, announced in 1979. One 500 KW station began broadcasting in the fall of 1981 (but not at full power) on 1160 kHz, the same frequency used by KSL of Salt Lake City, which has experienced serious interference as a result. This interference ceased in July 1982. 11/

The Cubans told U.S. officials in August 1981 that the other 500 KW station would utilize 1040 kHz, the same frequency used by WHO in Des Moines. However, Cuba has never broadcast and is not now broadcasting at high power on 1040 kHz.12/ Cuba's plans to use 1040 kHz, as well as a number of other frequencies which would cause interference to U.S. stations, have not been accepted by the ITU, which instead accepted use of 1040 kHz by the U.S. in November 1981.

Cuba's broadcasting plans were made known well before the U.S. announcement in September 1981 that it intended to establish Radio Marti. They cannot be considered, therefore, as retaliation against Radio Marti. The problem of increasing Cuban interference is a separate and distinct issue which will remain whether Radio Marti goes on the air or not.

While recognizing that there is some degree of risk from Cuban interference on any frequency selected for Radio Marti, the Commission believes this contingency should not deter the United States from implementing its plan to put Radio Marti on the air.

How will Cuba react to Radio Marti?

Cuba may do nothing: The VOA has been broadcasting to Cuba for 23 years and Cuba has rarely tried to jam these broadcasts.

11/ On August 30, 1982, while the Radio Marti bill was being considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, interference was experienced again for approximately a four-hour period. At the same time, Cuban interference was also monitored on 570 kHz, 670 kHz, 1040 kHz and 1380 kHz. Cuban transmissions were also said to be on 650 kHz. Except for 1040 and 1160 kHz, all these frequencies had been listed on Cuba's broadcast plan filed with the ITU beginning in 1979. The 1040 and 1160 frequencies were listed in the bloc frequency shift proposed by Cuba but rejected at the ITU's Rio Conference in late 1981.

12/ Cuba broadcast at high power on 1040 kHz for approximately four hours on August 30, 1982.

Cuba could jam: Low-powered transmitters could be used to block reception of Radio Marti's signal in Cuba, if the Castro government wants to prevent the Cuban people from hearing Radio Marti. Such jamming would not fully prevent reception of Radio Marti in Cuba.

Cuba might try counterbroadcasting: President Castro in an April 1982 speech suggested Cuba might counterbroadcast. This could consist of a so-called "Radio Lincoln" appealing to minorities in the U.S. Cuba used this approach in the early and mid-1960's. Whether such broadcasts might cause interference in the U.S. would depend on the frequency used and the power of the signal.

Interference: Blocking reception of Radio Marti by creating radio interference through counter-broadcasting makes no sense. Were Cuba to use high power and an omni-directional antenna on 1040 kHz, it would cause interference not only with Radio Marti and WHO but also with radios on that frequency in several neighboring countries including Mexico, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Grenada, with which Cuba wants good relations. If Cuba were to use a highly directional antenna on 1040 kHz, Radio Marti might still be heard in Cuba depending on where the Cuban antenna is targeted.

National Association of Broadcasters Study: A study by the National Association of Broadcasters released in March 1982 indicates that over 200 U.S. radio stations in 32 States would experience interference and reduced listening areas should Cuba fully implement its proposed inventory of broadcast facilities. The U.S. stations listed in the NAB study would not be affected by Cuban interference in the manner projected unless Cuba operated its full inventory of stations at maximum power and under ideal conditions. Some of the stations listed exist now but many others are proposed and may not be built. Further, many of the existing Cuban stations do not broadcast at the power shown in the Cuban plan. Bearing in mind the limitations of Cuba's electric power generating system, which is dependent on increasingly scarce imported Soviet oil, it is doubtful that Cuba will put all the stations listed in its plan on the air or at the power indicated. Thus, although theoretically possible at some time in the future, such "maximum" interference may not occur.

How to Address the Interference Problem: The 15 year old problem of Cuban interference, now assuming national proportions, needs to be addressed as an issue separate from Radio Marti, as suggested in H.R. 5427. That Act includes the following provision: "It is the sense of the Congress that the President should establish a task force to analyze the level of interference from the operation of Cuban radio stations experienced by broadcasters in the United States and to seek a practical political and technical solution to this problem."

The Commission notes that Section 6 (a) of H.R. 5427 authorizes the Board for International Broadcasting to compensate U.S. broadcasters for expenses incurred in mitigating the effects of Cuban Radio interference. The estimate that compensation payments could exceed $40 million, submitted by the Congressional Budget Office, appears to be exaggerated and highly speculative. This estimate is based on compensation costs of $100-200 thousand projected for each of the 200 AM radio stations identified by the National Association of Broadcasters study as affected by Cuban radio interference if Cuba should implement fully its ambitious plan to build a variety of new, high-powered radio stations. Since many of these stations may not operate at the power indicated, or may not even be built, the $40 million figure is clearly high.

While the Commission is well aware of the problem of Cuban interference and the need to deal effectively with it, it believes that any plan to compensate U.S. broadcasters should be the result of careful analysis of the problem and its impact, in view of the technical complexity and question of precedent involved. The task force called for by H.R. 5427 to deal with the interference problem, as provided for in Section 6 (b), may be the logical body to address the question of compensation as well.

Some members of the broadcasting industry told the Commission that the U.S. should seek to resolve the interference problem through negotiations. Unfortunately, the record of past attempts to negotiate this issue with Cuba indicates that Cuba may not be ready for meaningful negotiations. State Department officials and industry representatives reported to the Commission that the Cubans showed no flexibility or real interest in accomodation during several bilateral talks in 1981.

The State Department has indicated it would continue to explore all possible means to address the problem. It is working with the NAB and others in the industry to develop a position acceptable to U.S. broadcasters should the opportunity for talking seriously to Cuba about this present itself. While endorsing these efforts the Commission feels strongly that Cuban interference and Radio Marti are separate and distinct issues, and should be addressed as such.

4. Transmitters

Two medium wave transmitters would be required for full coverage of Cuba with a strong signal, one for western Cuba, including Havana, the other for the eastern half of the island. The best location for the first transmitter would be in south Florida as close to Cuba as possible. Eastern Cuba, the most heavily populated part of the island, cannot be reached effectively by AM broadcasts from Florida, except for some scattered night-time service. Consideration would therefore have to be given to establishing a second transmitter site in the Caribbean.

The Commission considered proposals that Radio Marti use VOA's AM transmitter at Marathon Key in south Florida. The Commission found, however, that prime time would not be available for broadcasting Radio Marti programs on this facility. The Commission has heard from Cubans themselves that if Radio Marti is to succeed, it must broadcast on prime time, i.e. in the early morning before the Cubans go to work and in the evening after they return. According to the VOA, the Marathon transmitter and its other transmitters planned for the Caribbean will be fully utilized during prime morning and evening hours, precisely when Radio Marti programs should be broadcast. Nor would there be significant financial advantage to co-locating VOA and Radio Marti transmitters in the Caribbean since each would require its separate directional antenna arrays, the most costly element of these systems.

The Commission also considered proposals that Radio Marti use commercial stations in the U.S. and in Caribbean countries to broadcast Radio Marti's programs, and found such an approach not feasible either. Because of their distance from Cuba, insufficient power, and antennas which are not designed for broadcasting to Cuba, U.S. stations can be heard in only limited areas of Cuba and cannot provide blanket coverage, as envisaged for Radio Marti. Moreover, commercial stations are often identified with positions that are too partisan either to serve U.S.

interests or to be credible in Cuba, whereas Radio Marti would be non-partisan. Finally, commercial stations might also be reluctant to give up prime time for Radio Marti, since this might affect their own commercial viability. The cost to Radio Marti, therefore, for leasing this prime time might be quite high.

As with VOA facilities, the use of commercial stations would not result in substantial savings, particularly if Radio Marti can use other government facilities which may be available. Separate office space, studios and regional bureaus will still be needed for Radio Marti. The costs of programming, operations and administration, which would amount to about 90 percent of the overall operating budget, would be the same regardless of transmission facilities used.

Clearly, U.S. commercial stations do not offer a real alternative. The Commission agrees with the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, which in a statement submitted to the Commission stated that "commercial operations are a poor substitute for the proposed Radio Marti."

Information is not available on which radio stations in Caribbean countries can be heard in Cuba. There is no reason to believe that any such stations would be willing to broadcast to Cuba on our behalf.

5. Offices

Because close policy and operating guidance is essential, consideration was given to locating RBC's headquarters and main studio near the oversight agency in Washington. Radio Marti's non-partisan image would be enhanced by locating its primary programming operations outside areas identified in the American and Cuban public minds with partisan ethnic groups.

The Commission believes it would be desirable for Radio Marti to have two small regional bureaus in New York and Miami. New York is a major news center, including such news sources as the United Nations, where Cuba conducts much of its diplomatic business, and in Miami, recognized as a major center of news for and from Latin America.

E. Programming

In Cuba, government propaganda has no competition, and allows no alternative view of that country and its actions. Radio Marti should serve as a surrogate "home service" providing the Cuban people with comprehensive and objective news about Cuba and Cuba's role in the world.

The Cuban economy is dependent on the Soviet Union for over $3 billion annually in economic assistance, 25% of Cuba's GNP. Cuba's long term economic prospects are bleak. Cuban health services are frequently praised; yet the failure of the public health system to deal effectively with exotic diseases imported by Cubans who have served in Africa, the Middle East and Central America is blamed by the Cuban government on alleged foreign plots. Recurrent plant health problems caused by mistakes made by Cuban officials are also blamed on foreign sources.

Cuba claims to be non-aligned and independent; yet there are six to eight thousand civilian Soviet advisers there and two thousand Soviet military advisers. Cuba publicly supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet intervention in Poland. Cuba votes more consistently for Soviet positions in the United Nations than even most Eastern European Soviet satellites. Yet the Cuban people do not know how this has hurt Cuba's position in the Non-Aligned Movement. Casualty lists of Cubans killed in Africa are not published in Cuba; the dead are buried in Africa and the wounded treated in Eastern Europe. Guerrillas armed, trained and supported by Cuba interfere in sovereign countries and attempt to overthrow governments from Colombia to Guatemala, yet the Cuban people are not aware of Cuba's deep involvement and commitment of resources.

This suggests certain themes that could be addressed by Radio Marti:

-- mismanagement of the economy since 1960.

-- The Revolution's record of broken promises in improvements in standard of living and, the availability of housing, foodstuffs, consumer goods, etc.

-- Examples of how economic mismanagement and the allocation of scarce resources to foreign adventurism exacerbate the daily hardships and shortcomings experienced by the Cuban people.

-- Comprehensive news focusing on developments such as the repression of workers in Poland, the Soviet subjugation of Afghanistan, the Cuban military role in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen.

-- Cuba's increasing economic dependence on the USSR.

-- The privileged status of a ruling elite despite a commitment to egalitarianism.

The primary target audience should be the general public, with particular emphasis on youth. Special segments should also be designed for select sub-groups such as government employees, the military, blue collar workers and farmers. "News and views" should be the core of programming, but care should be taken to assure an objective, sophisticated approach tailored to the existing Cuban milieu, and to avoid harsh, strident or obviously ideological presentations or concepts to which the average Cuban cannot relate.

To attract and keep the audience for the news and views segments, Radio Marti should also be entertaining, while seeking to fill voids left by Communist censorship. For example, radio dramas are extremely popular throughout the Caribbean, yet the most popular ones (often Colombian or Venezuelan) are not broadcast to Cuba. Properly selected series might be aired, with the advertising "spots" used for commentary. Popular American and Latin "Top 40" hits are not aired in Cuba, yet Cuban youth are as enamored of their generation's rhythms and songs as are their counterparts elsewhere. Music should play a major role. Baseball is a national passion, but the World Series is not heard well. Much of the very best classic and modern Spanish and Latin American literature, drama or poetry is not now available to the Cuban people.

But before final decisions are made on programming, those responsible should carefully consider the results of a survey of Cuban radio listening habits and preferences, financed by private funds and expected to be completed by the end of August. 13/ This survey, drawn from a random sample of the 125,00 Cubans who came here in 1980, is intended to determine radio listening tastes, not political views. Once Radio Marti is on the air, future programming will need to be adjusted to respond to feedback of listener reactions in Cuba.

F. Information Gathering

A wide variety of sources of information on Cuba which are not available to the Cuban people would be available to Radio Marti. To take advantage of these sources Radio Marti should have: (1) monitoring and selective transcribing of Cuban radio and television, as well as

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13/ As of September 30 the survey had not yet been made available to the Commission.

monitoring of Prensa Latina and other Cuban publications; (2) speedy access to coverage of Cuba by leading Latin American newspapers, magazines and radio-TV networks, and by the Western wire services represented in Cuba such as Reuters, AFP and EFE and (3) an expert corps of full-time correspondents to provide concise reporting and analyses on major international developments of interest to Cubans, as well as to fill in gaps and to track down inconsistencies in wire-service and other coverage of Cuban-related developments.

It should be noted that while reporting by the Western wire services of developments in Cuba is distributed world wide, it is not available to the Cuban public. Nor does most news related to Cuba's involvement in Central America and Africa reported by these wire services reach the Cuban people.

As in the case of RFE and RL, travellers returning from Cuba would be another source of valuable information on developments there. Radio Marti's bureaus in Miami and New York could help collect this.

6. Budget and Personnel

To launch Radio Marti, a budget of $10 million in FY 82 and $7.7 million in FY 83 has been submitted to Congress by the Department of State. Of the $10 million for the first year, $4.2 million has been proposed for engineering, $3 million for programming, and $2.8 million for administration. Included under engineering expenditures are $1.2 million for one-time acquisition costs for an antenna, transmitter and related equipment at the South Florida transmitter site, and approximately $1 million for headquarters and studio facilities. Virtually all of the $7.7 million recommended for the second year is for programming and administration, with full-year personnel costs making up nearly $5 million. Of the 168 positions recommended to be filled in FY 82, 148 would be related to programming requirements.

The Commission does not consider the budget request of $10 million for first year funding as unreasonable.14/ The cost of establishing Radio Marti cannot be compared to that of a commercial station for domestic broadcasting. Radio Marti's costs would include not only expensive four-tower directional antennas but also high personnel and administrative costs related to its heavy research and program development requirements.

14/ Since the decision to seek first year funding for FY 83 (not for FY 82), additional analysis by the Department of State indicates that approximately $12 million would be a more realistic budget figure if all one-time start-up costs ($6.9 million), as well as first-year operating costs, are to be included. The Commission concurs.

Reduction of the funding level from $10 million to the $7.5 million authorized by the House for first-year funding would require corresponding reductions in either construction and start-up costs or operations. This may mean postponement of the second transmitter site in the Caribbean ($1.9 million), which is needed to reach eastern Cuba, or cuts in research and program staffs, or reductions in broadcast time.

With the need for specialized programming tailored specifically for the Cuban people, Radio Marti will be required to establish a specialized news service and to research and write much of its own material. Programming-related positions include editors, commentators, analysts, writers, correspondents, researchers, translators, technicians, etc. Personnel should be drawn from the ranks of professional broadcasters and newspersons, with special emphasis on hispanic, including Cuban, experience. While it will be essential to include staff with knowledge of Cuba, and to use Cuban voice talent, Radio Marti should be perceived not as a Cuban exile activity but rather as an objective, non-partisan effort.

IV. Recommendations

A. Goals

The Commission supports the Administration's intent in estabishing Radio Marti as explained in Section 2 of the proposed legislation, namely that:

(a) it is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) consonant with this policy, Radio Marti in its planned broadcasting to Cuba should be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas to the people of Cuba and in particular accurate information about Cuba; and

(c) such broadcasting by Radio Marti, operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards, would be in the national interest.

The specific goals of Radio Marti should be to:

-- provide a reliable source of information concerning Cuba's domestic and international policies and actions now lacking to the Cuban people;

-- provide the information necessary for the Cuban people to make informed judgments on these policies and actions and to try to hold their government more accountable;

-- provide news and analysis that is not manipulated by the state but is objective, accurate, credible, relevant and timely, as well as a full range of radio programming, including sports, music and entertainment,

Radio Marti should not:

-- broadcast propaganda or provocations;

-- be designed to tell the Cuban people about the United States, a service performed by the VOA.

Radio Marti should espouse no single specific political, economic or religious point of view. It should have no relationship to any political party or exile organization; nor should it identify with any opposition group or groups, political party or organization. Radio Marti should be committed to respect for human rights and to the principles of democracy, including freedom of opinion, the rule of law, and nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, class, or nationality. It should be nonsectarian, defending freedom of religious faith and observance for all creeds. It should be committed to the free movement of people and ideas among nations, and to the peaceful negotiation of international conflicts. Radio Marti should subscribe to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as expressed in the United Nations Charter. The purpose of Radio Marti should not be to incite a desire within the Cuban people to leave their country. Nor is Radio Marti intended to incite Cubans to revolt against their own society.

Recognizing that it will take a long time for Radio Marti to develop a wide audience which looks to it for credible news, it is conceived as a long term strategic effort intended to help the Cuban people hold their government accountable for its actions. As such, Radio Marti must, whenever possible, maintain a steady course essentially unaltered by short term tactical considerations. It should not be considered a "bargaining chip" nor should its policies and perspectives be subject to abrupt shifts. It should have a perspective insulated from partisan viewpoints and reflective of the long range, U.S. national interest.

Recommended program policy guidelines for Radio Marti, modeled on those of RFE, are set forth in Appendix I.

B. Broadcasting entity

Adopting the view that a separate corporate entity patterned after RFE/RL would enhance the credibility and efficiency of the broadcasting organization, the Commission endorses the establishment and use of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc.

Once the Senate passes authorizing legislation, the Commission also recommends that RBC, Inc. be activated to perform certain planning functions, using private funds until appropriations are available. To do this Radio Marti should hire key personnel to begin planning for programming and future recruitment.

C. Oversight

The Commission recommends that the State Department be the temporary grantor of federal funds and oversight authority for RBC, Inc., pending the statutory designation of a permanent federal granting and oversight agency, as provided for in the legislation proposed by the Department of State. 15/ The oversight agency should exercise effective control over Radio Marti's operations to ensure that the Executive Branch's instructions and limitations are met. The Commission considers this a sensible arrangement until Radio Marti is fully operational.

The Commission would like to review the question of a permanent oversight agency for no more than one year after Congress authorizes and funds Radio Marti. Accordingly, the Commission also recommends that its term be extended for a period not to exceed one year from the effective date of Congressional legislation authorizing and funding RBC, Inc. 16/ During this period, the Commission should continue in its advisory role assisting the State Department with its responsibility for oversight over Radio Marti. The Commission as a body, and its expert members individually, could serve as consultant

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15/ If H.R. 5427, now before the Congress, is passed, direct supervision and oversight of Radio Marti will be assigned to the Board for International Broadcasting.

16/ The Commission would make recommendations on the implementation of Radio Marti based on progress as of the date to which the White House extends its term, should this occur.

advisors to Radio Marti during that period. The Commission would further undertake to produce specific recommendations on permanent oversight authority and on program design and content before its mandate expires. 17/

D. Broadcast Band

The Commission recommends that Radio Marti broadcast on the AM (medium frequency) radio band. This is the only band which will enable Radio Marti to fulfill its goal of reaching the Cuban people effectively. The other broadcast bands, such as short wave and FM, would reach only a limited part of the Cuban population. 18/

E. Frequency

The Commission recommend that Radio Marti begin operating on one basic, well established frequency on the AM band. Even though 1040 kHz has already been assigned to the government for this purpose, the Commission notes that the process of selecting a frequency for Radio Marti is to be repeated in conformance with the procedure and criteria specified in H.R. 5427, Section 3, if this provision is approved by the Senate. This would ensure that the most appropriate frequency for Radio Marti is chosen, while taking into account the interests of U.S. broadcasters.

The Commission also recommends that consideration be given to the possibility of using additional frequencies, if this is found to be feasible by the FCC and NTIA, in order to make more difficult possible Cuban jamming of Radio Marti broadcasts. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of complementary technical facilities for contingency use.

F. Cuban Interference

The Commission believes that suspension of plans for Radio Marti would certainly not eliminate nor probably even reduce Cuban radio interference now or in the future.

17/ If extended, the Commission anticipates that it would be asked to advise the White House, the Department of State and the Board for International Broadcasting on the implementation of Radio Marti. The BIB would have permanent formal oversight responsibility under H.R. 5427.

18/ This is not meant to exclude the possibility of considering the use of other bands (including short wave) to supplement the AM band, as provided for in Section 3, Paragraph (d)(3) of H.R. 5427.

The Commission recommends that the Department of State keep the door open to opportunities to address this problem though negotiations, particularly involving international organizations and efforts by other nations, as well as our own. The State Department should continue to work with the NAB to develop a position acceptable to U.S. broadcasters should the opportunity for talking seriously to Cuba about this present itself.

The question of compensation for costs incurred in mitigating the harmful effects of Cuban interference should be postponed until the task force authorized by H.R. 5427, or other appropriate body, makes recommendations. Compensation could then be considered in separate legislation at a later time, because adequate funds for this are not included in legislation now before the Congress.

G. Transmitters

The Commission recommends that Radio Marti use two transmitters in order to reach all areas of Cuba effectively. The first transmitter should be located in the Florida Keys, as close to Cuba as possible. While the budget proposal already submitted to the Congress includes $1.2 million for this purpose, the Department of Defense transmission facilities at the U.S. Navy installation on Saddlebunch Key should be utilized if at all possible in order to reduce costs.

A second transmitter should be located at a Caribbean site in order to broadcast to eastern Cuba.

Radio Marti transmitters located in the United States should conform to the domestic 50KW power limit. To avoid interference with existing U.S. or third country stations, and to define its signal as precisely as possible towards Cuba, Radio Marti should have highly directional antennas.

H. Offices

The Commission recommends that RBC, Inc.'s, headquarters and Radio Marti's major studio be located in Washington, D.C. in close proximity to the oversight agency. Small bureaus should be located in New York and Miami.

I. Information Gathering

The Commission recommends that Radio Marti arrange for subscriptions to the Western wire services reporting from Cuba, the personnel and means to monitor Cuban and Latin American publications and other sources of news, and correspondents in key locations, in addition to the small regional offices in New York and Miami.

J. Programming

Relevance is essential. Conditions in Cuba of the 1980's, not the 1950's, 60's or 70's, must be addressed. Cuban society has undergone socio-economic, political and value changes as a result of government policies and pervasive socialization efforts since Castro came to power.

Credibility will be established over time only if Cubans perceive that Radio Marti is not a spokesman for particular partisan groups in the U.S. This means reporting on as many developments as possible in Cuba. In contrast to the Castro government's media, Radio Marti must be perceived as comprehensive, reliable and objective.

The Commission therefore recommends that news, commentaries and news analysis form the heart of programming for Radio Marti blended in to features, sports, music and cultural programs designed to attract the widest possible listenership in Cuba. As an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, Radio Marti's program content should be carefully monitored to ensure that it conforms with policy guidance received from the Department of State. Care must be taken to assure objectivity and under no circumstances should broadcasts appear pedantic, propagandistic or inflammatory. Truth should be Radio Marti's hallmark. Newscasts and commentaries must be accurate, balanced and, where possible, verifiable by Cubans residing on the island. This means reporting on both negative and positive aspects of events related to Cuba. By maintaining these objectives and observing high journalistic standards, Radio Marti programming should win a large following in Cuba.

K. Budget and Personnel

The Commission recommended in its Interim Report a budget of $10 million in FY 82 and $7.7 million in FY 83, as submitted by the Department of State to the Congress. The Commission believes this recommendation remains justified in order to implement Radio Marti effectively. 19/ Given the high costs of two directional antennas and of the personnel to meet Radio Marti's need for specialized research and programming, these funding levels are reasonable.

19/ Since the decision to seek first year funding for FY 83 (not for FY 82), additional analysis by the Department of State indicates that approximately $12 million would be a more realistic budget figure if all one-time start-up costs ($6.9 million), as well as first-year operating costs, are to be included. The Commission concurs.

To meet the personnel requirements described in Section III. G. the Commission recommends staffing for Radio Marti of 168 employees. Of these, 148 persons would meet programming requirements and 20 others would be required to meet administration needs. When the Caribbean transmitter is ready for use, it is estimated that an additional 14 employees would be needed. These positions, which were requested in the Administration's budget proposal, are further identified in Appendix J.

APPENDICES

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

Old Executive Office Building
Room 450

September 23, 1981

4:30 P.M. EDT

For more than 20 years, the Cuban people have been controlled and manipulated by a totalitarian, Marxist, Leninist dictatorship dedicated to promoting armed violence and undermining the interests of the free world. The standard of living of the Cuban people has deteriorated since 1975, as the Cuban leadership has broadened and intensified these efforts sending tens of thousands of troops to Africa, bringing violent revolutionaries and terrorists from dozens of countries to Cuba for training and stepping up its subversion in Latin America.

Cuba's extensive international troublemaking is made possible by, and is all the more dangerous because of, its alliance with the dependence on the Soviet Union, which provides Cuba with massive economic and military support in exchange for Cuban promotion of Soviet interests. Cuba's communist leaders have kept the Cuban people ignorant of this campaign of international violence by systematic manipulation of information. The regime in Cuba, like all totalitarian regimes, has, in large measure, governed the Cuban people through its control of the media. The Cuban Revolution, in fact, has often been described as a revolution through the media.

One of the boasts of the Cuban government is that the Cuban media never lie. The Cuban media, however, have lied throughout the two decades of the revolution. They lie today and will continue to lie to the Cuban people. The truth about the costs borne by the Cuban people as a result of their government's grandiose international involvement and repression of basic human rights has been shrouded in lies and half-truths. The truth about underdevelopment and mismanagement despite massive Soviet subsidies in direction of the economy is not known in Cuba.

Cubans, like all peoples, yearn for the truth. Even Cuba's leaders rely on the Western press and wire services, the Voice of America and the BBC, for factual, unbiased information about the world they live in. But these sources, because they cover events around the world, cannot satisfy the Cuban people's thirst for reliable information about their own country. This Administration has decided to break the Cuban government's control of information in Cuba. It will do this by supporting the establishment of radio broadcasting to Cuba. In Spanish it will be called "Radio Marti," after Jose Marti, the father of Cuban independence. This radio service will tell the truth to the Cuban people about their government's domestic mismanagement and its promotion of subversion and international terrorism in this hemisphere and elsewhere. It will tell the Cuban people what these activities cost in terms of living standards for them and their children and will correct the false image they have been given of Cuba's international reputation. The Administration believes that breaking the Cuban government's information monopoly will help the Cuban people to judge the Cuban revolution on its true merits.

The President has signed an Executive Order -- that's the end of the statement.

Federal Register
Vol. 46, No. 186
Friday, September 25, 1981

Presidential Documents

Title 3—

The President

Executive Order 12323 of September 22, 1981

Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution of the United States of America, in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), and in order to create a commission to develop recommendations with respect to broadcasting of information and ideas to Cuba, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. *Establishment.* (a) There is established the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba.

(b) The Commission shall be composed of 11 members appointed by the President from among citizens of the United States.

(c) The President shall designate one of the members to be the Chairman.

(d) There shall be a three member Executive Committee of the Commission which shall be composed of the Chairman and two other members elected by the Commission.

Sec. 2. *Functions.*

(a) The Commission shall develop a recommended plan for radio broadcasting intended for transmission to Cuba. The purpose of the plan shall be to promote open communication of information and ideas to Cuba and in particular broadcasting to the Cuban people of accurate information about Cuba.

(b) The Commission shall examine issues related to effectively carrying out such a plan for radio broadcasting to Cuba. These shall include, but not be limited to, possible program content, information gathering, writing and editing needs, staffing requirements, legal structure for a broadcasting organization, proposed legislation, sample budgets, and the location, structure and function of possible broadcasting stations.

(c) The Commission may conduct studies, inquiries, hearings, and meetings as it deems necessary. It may assemble and disseminate information, and issue reports and other publications. It may also coordinate, sponsor, or oversee projects, studies, events and other activities that it deems necessary or desirable for development of a recommended program of broadcasting to Cuba.

(d) The Executive Committee may coordinate the work of the Commission and may act on behalf of the whole Commission.

(e) The Commission shall submit its recommendations and final report to the President and the Secretary of State no later than October 1, 1982.

Sec. 3. *Administration.*

(a) Members of the Commission who are not otherwise Government employees shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission. However, all members shall be entitled to travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5701–5707).

(b) The heads of Executive agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Commission such information and advice with respect to radio broadcasting to Cuba as the Commission may require for the purpose of carrying out its functions.

(c) Expenses of the Commission shall be paid from funds available to the Secretary of State.

Sec. 4. *General.*

(a) Notwithstanding any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), which are applicable to the Commission, except that of reporting annually to the Congress, shall be performed by the Secretary of State in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

(b) The Commission shall terminate on October 1, 1982, or 60 days after submitting its final report, whichever is earlier.

Ronald Reagan

THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 22, 1981.

[FR Doc. 81-28096
Filed 9-24-81; 10:00 am]
Billing code 3195-01-M

CHARTER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

I. PURPOSE

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba has been established by the President to develop recommendations with respect to broadcasting of information and ideas to Cuba. In particular, the Commission shall function as follows:

(a) The Commission will develop a recommended plan for radio broadcasting intended for transmission to Cuba. The purpose of the plan will be to promote open communication of information and ideas to Cuba and in particular broadcasting to the Cuban people accurate information about Cuba;

(b) The Commission will examine issues related to effectively carrying out such a plan for radio broadcasting to Cuba. These will include, but not be limited to, possible program content, information gathering, writing and editing needs, staffing requirements, legal structure for a broadcasting organization,proposed legislation, sample budgets, and the location, structure and function of possible broadcasting stations.

II. AUTHORITY

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba has been established by the President through Executive Order 12323 of September 22, 1981, 46 F.R. 47207 (Sept. 25, 1981).

III. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

A. Membership

Pursuant to section 1(b) of Executive Order 12323, the Commission shall be composed of eleven members appointed by the President from among the citizens of the United States.

B. Designation of Chairman and Executive Committee

Pursuant to section 1(c) of Executive Order 12323, the President shall designate one of the members of the Commission as Chairman. Pursuant to section 1(d) of the Order, there shall be a three member Executive Committee of the Commission

which shall be composed of the Chairman and two other members elected by the Commission. The Chairman shall designate one of the elected members of the Executive Committee as Vice Chairman, who shall serve as Chairman in the Chairman's absence.

C. Establishment of Subgroups

The Chairman may establish informal subgroups as he deems appropriate to carrying out the work of the Commission.

D. Support Functions

In accordance with section 4(a) of the Order, support functions for the operation of the Commission shall be provided by the Department of State.

E. Executive Secretary

As authorized by section 4(a) of the Order, the Under Secretary for Management of the Department of State shall designate an officer or employee of the Department of State to serve as Executive Secretary of the Commission, and specifically to perform the following functions as required under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. Appendix I (hereinafter called "the Act"):

(a) To attend each meeting of the Commission and to adjourn such meetings if adjournment is in the public interest;

(b) To call or to concur in the calling of all meetings of the Commission;

(c) To serve as contact point for the public to provide current information concerning the operations of the Commission.

IV. OPERATIONS

A. Functions of the Chairman

The Chairman shall:

(1) Call meetings with the concurrence of the Executive Secretary;

(2) Prepare or approve the agenda for meetings;

(3) Preside at meetings;

(4) Provide for the keeping of detailed

minutes of meetings of the Commission;

(5) Provide for the maintenance and retention of the records of the Commission, as required by the Act;

(6) Certify the accuracy of the minutes of meetings of the Commission, as required by the Act.

B. Functions of the Executive Committee

The Executive Committee may coordinate the work of the Commission and may act on behalf of the whole Commission.

C. Operations of the Commission

Pursuant to section 2(c) of the Order, the Commission may conduct studies, inquiries, hearings and meetings as it deems necessary. It may assemble and disseminate information, and issue reports and other publications. It may also coordinate sponsor, or oversee projects, studies, events and other activities that it deems necessary or desirable for development of a recommended programs of broadcasting to Cuba.

D. Meetings of the Commission

No quorum for meetings is required.

All meetings of the Commission will be open to the public unless a determination has been made in accordance with section 10(d) of the Act that a meeting or a portion of a meeting should be closed to the public. Timely notice of each meeting, whether open or closed, shall be published in the Federal Register stating the name of the Commission, the time, place, and purpose of the meeting, whether the meeting is open to the public, the reason for closing if a closed meeting, and the name, address, and telephone number of the designated Government employee that members of the public may contact for further information. Except in emergency situations, such notice shall be published at least 15 days in advance of the meeting day. If shorter notice is given, the reason for the emergency must be stated in the notice. It is estimated that the Commission will hold 12 meetings.

E. Records of the Commission

The Commission's records will consist of all papers, documents, and other materials pertinent to its establishment and activities, including its charter, agendas of meetings, determinations for closed meetings, minutes, reports, and all documents related to its proceedings and those of its subgroups, including working papers, drafts, studies or other documents made available to or prepared for or by the Commission or its subgroups. These records shall be available for public inspection and copying to the extent required by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. These records shall be maintained by the Commission for the term of its operations, and shall be deposited with the Department of State upon the termination of the Commission.

F. Minutes of Meetings

Detailed minutes shall be kept of each meeting of the Commission, which shall include a record of the persons present, a complete and accurate description of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all reports received, issued, or approved by the Commission. The accuracy of such minutes shall be certified by the Chairman.

G. Public Participation

At any meeting of the Commission open to the public, but not at closed meetings, interested persons shall be permitted to attend and to make an appearance before or to file written statements with the Commission.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL REPORT

Pursuant to section 2(e) of the Order, the Commission shall submit its recommendations and final report to the President and the Secretary of State no later than October 1, 1982.

VI. COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

Pursuant to section 3(a) of the Order, members of the Commission who are not otherwise Government employees shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Commission, but all members shall be entitled to travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).

VII. COOPERATION BY FEDERAL AGENCIES

Pursuant to section 3(b) of the Order, expenses of the Commission shall be paid from funds available to the Secretary of State. The total operating costs for the Commission are expected to be approximately $160,000 and seven man-years.

IX. FILING OF CHARTER

The Commission shall not meet or take other action until this charter has been approved by the Under Secretary for Management of the Department of State and has been filed with the Administrator of the General Services Administration. A copy of the charter shall be furnished to the Library of Congress, and to the foreign affairs committees of both Houses of the Congress.

APPROVED _____

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

M E M B E R S

F. Clifton White, Commission Chairman
President, F. Clifton White and Associates, Inc.
Washington, D. C.

Senator Richard B. Stone, Member, Commission's Executive Committee
Senior Partner, Proskauer, Rose, Goetz and Mendelsohn
Washington, D. C.

Jorge L. Mas, Member, Commission's Executive Committee
President, Church and Tower of Florida, Inc.
Miami, Florida

William B. Bayer
Political Editor, WINZ
Coral Gables, Florida

Joseph Coors
President, Adolph Coors Company
Golden Colorado

George Jacobs, P.E.
President, George Jacobs and Associates, Inc.
Consulting Radio Engineers
Silver Spring, Maryland

Tirso del Junco, M.D.
Chairman, California Republican Party
Los Angeles, California

Patrick E. O'Donnell
Partner, O'Connor and Hannan
Washington, D. C.

Richard M. Scaife
Publisher, The Tribune Review
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Herbert Schmertz
Vice President for Public Relations
Mobil Oil Corporation
New York City

Hon. Earl E.T.Smith
American Ambassador (ret.)
Palm Beach, Florida

Charles Z. Wick
Director, International Communication Agency
Washington, D. C.

- o -

Special Advisor: Kenneth G. Giddens
former Director, Voice of America

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba held its first meeting in closed session on Friday, February 5, 1982, in Room 6909 of the Department of State at 10:00 a.m. Attending were Chairman F. Clifton White, Members William B. Bayer, Jorge L. Mas, Richard M. Scaife, Senator Richard B. Stone, Dr. Tirso del Junco and George Jacobs; as well as Ambassador George W. Landau, Executive Director; Kenneth R. Giddens, Consultant; James Duncan, Department of Defense; Joshua Bolten, ARA/L; Myles Frechette, ARA/CCA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; and Yale Newman, ICA.

The Commission discussed appropriate sites for locating a transmitter and directional antenna in southern Florida, radio frequencies (medium wave) available for Radio Marti, and steps to be taken to reserve a frequency for Radio Marti.

The Commission also discussed the history of Cuban interference with U.S. radio stations and the likelihood of continued Cuban interference and/or jamming, as well as what the U.S. can do to counteract such interference. The Commission agreed it would be useful to document the pre-Radio Marti level of interference as a reference point.

The Commission agreed to conduct a survey of listener habits and preferences in Cuba, drawing on information from recent entrants, to serve as a basis to develop programming for Radio Marti.

The Commission also agreed to study the questions of organizational structure of Radio Marti as well as legislative considerations so that these subjects could be discussed at the next meeting of the Commission.

A three-person Executive Committee was elected, made up of Chairman F. Clifton White, Senator Richard Stone and Mr. Jorge L. Mas. Senator Stone was chosen Vice Chairman of the Committee.

The meeting of the Commission adjourned at 12:45 p.m. for lunch hosted by Assistant Secretary Enders.

Date: 24 February 1982

Approved by: F. Clifton White

F. Clifton White
Chairman

MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
BROADCASTING TO CUBA

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba held its second meeting on Tuesday, March 2, 1982. The closed session was held in Room 6909 of the Department of State, beginning at 10:00 a.m.; the public session was held in the East Auditorium starting at 2:30 p.m. Attending were Chairman F. Clifton White, Members William B. Bayer, Jorge L. Mas, Richard M. Scaife, Senator Richard B. Stone, Dr. Tirso del Junco, Joseph Coors, George Jacobs, Charles Z. Wick and Herbert Schmertz; as well as Ambassador George W. Landau, Executive Director; Peter P. Lord, Deputy Executive Director; Kenneth R. Giddens, Consultant; James Duncan, Department of Defense; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Myles Frechette, ARA/CCA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; Yale Newman, ICA; and Secretaries Jessica Monk and Rosemary O'Donnell.

Chairman White opened the morning meeting by announcing that the agenda would include the hearings on proposed RBC legislation before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 3 and 4, the Commission's meeting in public session that afternoon, and a classified briefing on Cuba scheduled for 11:00 a.m.

With regard to RBC, Inc, it was agreed that it would be desirable for RBC to establish its headquarters and hire key staff ASAP to begin planning related to programming and recruiting, both of which would require a long lead time. It was hoped that agreement to proceed in this manner might be obtained through consultation with the Congressional leadership before passage of authorization and appropriations bills, if it appeared that passage would not come until later and if Congressional attitudes were favorable now. It was agreed that a goal of passing the legislation by the July recess should be pursued. Meanwhile, consultations with Congressional leaders were being carried out. It should be understood that RBC, Inc. would make no expenditures except for private funds and would not begin broadcasting until legislation was passed.

The desirability of the Commission observing RBC, Inc. in operation during its first year in order to make an eventual sound recommendation concerning parentage was also discussed, including the possibility of extending the Commission's term an additional year to do so. It was agreed that a target of passing the legislation by the July recess should be pursued. Meanwhile, consultations with Congressional leadership were being carried out.

Following the classified briefing, there was some discussion of what options should be pursued if Cuba succeeded in jamming Radio Marti. Possible options included:

(1) purchasing time on private American radio stations to transmit evening programming of perhaps two hours duration, selecting stations from Florida to Louisiana and perhaps Texas in order to provide a variety of geographic sites and frequencies;

(2) using high-powered stations outside the U.S. in the Caribbean to broadcast several hours a day;

(3) using shortwave transmissions, utilizing VOA transmitters at different sites in the U.S.; and

(4) using VOA's Marathon transmitter, which signs off at 10:00 p.m., to broadcast Radio Marti. This would demonstrate to the private sector that the USG is willing to run the same risks as it.

These options would imply budget considerations which should be considered soon.

The point was also made that if Radio Marti were effectively jammed, this would have a devastating psychological impact on the Cuban people. It would also make the USG look bad. Therefore, these options might be worth exploring.

The possibility of providing compensation to private stations which incurred added costs or lost income because of Cuban interference following the establishment of Radio Marti was also discussed.

In conclusion, the Chairman stated that the Commission's first step should be to get Radio Marti on the air as soon as possible, regardless of possible consequences of Cuban interference, and that, secondarily, the Commission should then consider other options, including a second transmitter, to assure that Radio Marti be received in Cuba.

Mr. White obtained the Members' approval for the following Commission recommendations which could be conveyed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, provided that they were also agreed to by those attending the open session that afternoon:

1. A firm endorsement of the concept of Radio Marti;

2. Recognition of the disruptive effects that illegal Cuban radio interference could have on U.S. broadcasters and agreement that various options should be considered to deal with this situation;

3. An endorsement of RBC, Inc., as the appropriate vehicle through which to conduct broadcasting;

4. An endorsement of the approach taken in the pending legislation that the federal supervisory authority over grants to RBC, Inc., be lodged temporarily in the State Department; and that the Commission will continue to study the parentage issue, aided by actual experience with the operation of RBC, Inc.

It was agreed that the next meetings of the Commission should take place on March 30 and April 16, in both closed and open sessions.

The open session began at 2:30 p.m. in the East Auditorium, with 32 members of the public in attendance. These included representatives of the Florida Association of Broadcasters, the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, and the Cuban-American National Foundation. Copies of the statements of those representatives who spoke are on record in the office of the Executive Secretariat. These include Walter Windsor and Harold Frank of the Florida Association of Broadcasters, Herbert Levin of the South FLorida Radio Broadcasters Association, James Popper and Mr. Rav of the National Association of Broadcasters, James P. Riley of the law firm of Fletcher, Heald and Hildreth, and Wilson Dizard of the Cuban-American National Foundation.

Chairman White opened the meeting by summarizing the four tentative recommendations agreed to by the Commission that morning and made an opening statement. In addition to the statements made by the attendees from the public, Commission members William Bayer, Dr. Tirso del Junco, Herbert Schmertz and George Jacobs made comments during the open session, expressing their support for Radio Marti and their concern over Cuban radio interference.

In closing, Mr. White stated that while the Commission recommends the prompt establishment of Radio Marti, the statements presented that afternoon had made clear the magnitude of the problem of actual and potential interference with American radio stations. He said that the Commission would consider how to cope with this problem.

He adjourned the open session at 3:55 p.m.

TESTIMONY OF HERBERT LEVIN REPRESENTING THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA

MARCH 2, 1982

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, MY NAME IS HERBERT LEVIN AND I AM THE GENERAL MANAGER OF RADIO STATIONS WQBA AM AND FM, MIAMI, FLORIDA. I ALSO SERVE AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION. THIS ASSOCIATION IS COMPRISED OF ALL THE RADIO STATIONS LOCATED IN DADE AND BROWARD COUNTIES.

OUR ASSOCIATION BELIEVES THAT BY THE VARY NATURE OF THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE PROBLEM AND THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL, A COORDINATED EFFORT IS NECESSARY. IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS BELIEF, OUR ASSOCIATION HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH NOT ONLY THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, BUT ALSO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS AND THE NATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION TO DEVELOP A GREATER UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE GRAVITY AND SCOPE OF THESE ISSUES.

MOREOVER, IT WAS OUR LOCAL ASSOCIATION THAT FIRST SUGGESTED THAT THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE PROBLEM WAS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN MERELY THE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERFERENCE BETWEEN AM RADIO STATIONS. WE BELIEVE THESE ISSUES OUT-STRIP THE RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND WE SOUGHT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IT NOW APPEARS THAT ALL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT MUST BE CALLED UPON TO LEND THEIR EXPERTISE TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS AND SEEK SOLUTIONS. THEREFORE, WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THIS CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON THESE ISSUES AND TO SEEK YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THESE AREAS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE PROBLEM, OUR ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS THE POSITIONS AS EXPRESSED BY MR. HAROLD FRANK IN HIS TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS. THEREFORE, I WILL NOT BELABOR THIS ISSUE FURTHER.

HOWEVER, UNLIKE THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BRAODCASTERS, THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION HAS CONCERNED THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL IN ITS RAMIFICATIONS. AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION, THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION WENT ON RECORD SUPPORTING RADIO MARTI. (READ RESOLUTION)

SOME BROADCASTERS BELIEVE THAT THE MERE EXISTANCE OF RADIO MARTI WILL COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE PROBLEM. THESE INDIVIDUALS POINT TO THE CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CUBAN REPRESENTATIVES AT THE REGION II CONFERENCE IN RIO. THESE INDIVIDUALS ARGUE THAT RADIO MARTI WILL FURTHER STIMULATE CASTRO TO INCREASE THE INTERFERENCE CAUSED TO U.S. STATIONS BY CUBAN RADIO OPERATIONS.

WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THE REALITY THAT RADIO MARTI AND CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE ARE INTERRELATED TO SOME ASPECTS, WE DO NOT SUPPORT THIS ARGUMENT. AS PART OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED REGION II CONFERENCE, CUBA, ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE PROPOSED 180 RADIO STATIONS, MANY OF WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH U.S. RADIO STATIONS, AT LEAST A YEAR BEFORE THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL WAS FIRST PUBLICLY DISCUSSED. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE STATIONS INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY ARE CLEARLY DESIGNED FOR THE EXPORTATION OF PROPAGANDA THROUGHOUT THE CARIBBEAN AND INTO LATIN AMERICA, AS WELL AS, TO THE UNITED STATES CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THIS INTENT IS APPARENT FROM A REVIEW OF THE INVENTORY. CUBA PROPOSED A 500 kW STATION AT 550 KHz. THIS STATION, WAS AT THAT TIME, BEING OPERATED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AT A POWER APPROXIMATING 150 kW AND ITS PROGRAMMING WAS THE RE-BROADCAST OF RADIO MOSCOW, IN ENGLISH, TO THE UNITED STATES. FURTHER EXAMPLES

OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION CAN BE SEEN BY THE PAST AND CONTINUING USAGE OF SEVERAL SPANISH LANGUAGE STATIONS WHICH BROADCAST REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA TO LATIN AMERICA. OBVIOUSLY, WELL BEFORE RADIO MARTI, CASTRO OPERATED HIS BROADCAST STATIONS IN A MANNER TO SUIT HIS OWN POLITICAL NEEDS WITHOUT ANY CONSIDERATION AS TO INTERFERENCE CAUSED FROM THESE FACITLITIES TO U.S. RADIO STATIONS.

ANOTHER ARGUMENT THAT IS RAISED IN OPPOSITION TO RADIO MARTI, IS THAT COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN MIAMI ARE ALREADY RECEIVED IN CUBA AND THUS, IT IS ARGUED, THAT RADIO MARTI IS UNNECESSARY. PRIOR TO THE RECENT RELIEF GRANTED BY THE F.C.C. TO SEVERAL OF THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO STATIONS, THESE STATIONS OPERATED IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE STANDARDS AS SPECIFIED IN THE NORTH AMERICAN RADIO BROADCASTING AGREEMENT. THE STANDARDS WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE OR ELIMINATE ANY INTERFERENCE FROM THE MIAMI STATIONS TO CUBA. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MIAMI STATIONS MAY BE RECEIVED IN SOME AREAS OF CUBA, THESE STATIONS ARE NOT RECEIVED THROUGHOUT THAT COUNTRY.

FURTHERMORE, EVEN THOUGH SEVERAL OF OUR STATIONS HAVE RECEIVED TEMPORARY AUTHORIZATION TO INCREASE THEIR POWER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THESE STATIONS PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT GREATER COVERAGE IN CUBA. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS ARE A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PROPOSED RADIO MARTI, WHICH AS I UNDERSTAND IT, WILL BE ABLE TO BE RECEIVED THROUGHOUT CUBA.

LET US ALSO EXAMINE THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERFERENCE. WHEREAS THE CUBAN INVENTORY WAS CONSTRUCTED WITH LITTLE OR NO CONSIDERATION AS TO INTERFERENCE THAT WOULD BE CREATED

TO U.S. STATIONS, THE SELECTION OF A FREQUENCY FOR RADIO MARTI SPECIFICALLY TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION INTERFERENCE TO CUBAN RADIO OPERATIONS. I ALSO WOULD LIKE TO NOTE FOR THE RECORD, THAT MU STATION, WQBA, HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF INTENTIONAL JAMMING FROM CUBA FOR THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS.

IN CONCLUSION, AS BROADCASTERS WE RECOGNIZE NOT ONLY THE BROADCAST CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARISE FROM THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL, BUT WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS INHERENT IN THIS PROJECT. AFTER WEIGHING THESE POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES, THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO ASSOCIATION HAS DETERMINED THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE AS A BROADCAST ASSOCIATION TO SUPPORT THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

P.O. Box 430374 • Miami, Florida 33143

south florida radio broadcasters association

RADIO

R E S O L U T I O N

WHEREAS . . . members of the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association are uniquely suited to understand and appreciate the nature of the repressive government of Fidel Castro on the island of Cuba; and whereas the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association recognizes the need for the truth to be heard on the island of Cuba. . . . . be it therefore RESOLVED . . . . that the South Florida Radic Broadcasters Association does now support the concept of Radio Martí, in that Radio Martí will broadcast news and information to Cuba.

/FOR THE ASSOCIATION

Herbert M. Levin, President

/jp

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD FRANK
REPRESENTING THE FLORIDA
ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA

MARCH 2, 1982

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, MY NAME IS HAROLD A. FRANK, I AM THE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF WINZ RADIO, MAIMI, FLORIDA. I ALSO SERVE AS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF RADIO FOR THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS. THE GENTLEMAN SEATED NEXT TO ME IS MATTHEW L. LEIBOWITZ. MR. LEIBOWITZ IS THE SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS WITH RESPECT TO THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE ISSUE.

ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO YOU FOR PROVIDING US WITH THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU A SEVERE PROBLEM THAT FACES AM RADIO STATIONS THROUGHOUT THE NATION. THE PROBLEM TO WHICH I REFER IS RADIO INTERFERENCE FROM CUBA AND THE RELATED ISSUE OF THE PROPOSED RADIO MARTI.

UNLIKE FM BROADCASTING AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING, AM RADIO BROADCAST SIGNALS HAVE THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS TO TRAVEL HUNDREDS OF MILES AND IN SOME CASES, THOUSANDS OF MILES AS THE RESULT OF THE METHOD OF DISSEMINATION. THUS, IT IS NECESSARY TO CLOSELY COORDINATE AM RADIO STATIONS TO AVOID INTERFERENCE.

IN THIS COUNTRY, THIS COORDINATION IS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, FOR THIS HEMISPHERE, AM BROADCASTING WAS GOVERNED PRIMARILY BY THE NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL BROADCASTING AGREEMENT (N.A.R.B.A.) THAT WAS RATIFIED BY THE SENATE ON FEBRUARY 23, 1960.

DESPITE THE FACT THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA WERE SIGNATORIES TO N.A.R.B.A., CUBA VIOLATED THIS AGREEMENT BY BROADCASTING JAMMING SIGNALS FOR APPROXIMATELY THE LAST THIRTEEN YEARS TO INTENTIONALLY INTERFERE WITH WQBA, MIAMI, FLORIDA. THE JAMMING WAS PRODUCED BY TRANSMITTING TWO SIGNALS, ONE ON EACH SIDE OF WQBA'S SIGNAL, THUS CREATING A HETERODYNE TONE.

THIS TONE WOULD INCREASE OR DECREASE IN PROMINENCE DEPENDING ON YOUR LOCATION WITH RESPECT TO THE WQBA TRANSMITTER. HOWEVER, FROM ALMOST ANY LOCATION IN MIAMI, WQBA'S CITY OF LICENSE, THE TONE IS AUDIBLE. (PLAY WQBA TAPE) OBVIOUSLY, THE TONE DETRACTS FROM WQBA'S REGULAR BROADCASTING AND WOULD TEND TO DISSUADE CONTINUED LISTENING.

APPROXIMATELY FIVE YEARS AGO, CUBA INITIATED BROADCAST OPERATIONS WHICH CREATED INTERFERECE TO OTHER U.S. DOMESTIC STATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE LOCATED IN SOUTH FLORIDA. THIS INTERFERENCE WAS INTENSIFIED APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS AGO. UNLIKE THE SITUATION WITH WQBA, A LISTENER TO THESE DOMESTIC STATIONS WOULD BELIEVE THAT HE WAS TUNED INTO TWO STATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY, ONE THE DOMESTIC STATION AND ONE THE CUBAN STATION. (PLAY WINZ TAPE) IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THIS TAPE WAS RECORDED AFTER WINZ RECEIVED SPECIAL RELIEF FROM THE F.C.C. AND INCREASED POWER TO COMPENSATE FOR THE CUBAN INTERFERENCE. PRIOR TO THIS TIME, THE CUBAN BROADCAST WAS THE PREDOMINANT SIGNAL AND THE WINZ BROADCAST WAS MERELY HEARD IN THE BACKGROUND.

A THIRD EXAMPLE OF CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE WAS CUBA'S USE OF A SUPER POWER AM BROADCAST SIGNAL TO DELIVER INTO THE U.S. AN ENGLISH VERSION OF RADIO MOSCOW VIA RADIO HAVANA AT 600 KHz. THIS SIGNAL WAS RECEIVED AT NIGHT AS FAR NORTH AS PENNSYLVANIA AND WASHINGTON, D.C. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THIS STATION WAS OPERATING WITH 150,000 WATTS OF POWER, OR THREE TIMES THE MOST POWERFUL AM RADIO OPERATION IN THE U.S. THIS STATION CHANGED FREQUENCY IN EARLY DECEMBER AND AT THIS TIME APPEARS TO BE OFF THE AIR.

ALL OF THE CUBAN STATIONS INVOLVED IN THIS JAMMING OR INTERFEREN WERE BEING OPERATED IN VIOLATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL BROADCASTING AGREEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION DURING THIS PERIOD AS ENUNCIATED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND CARRIED OUT BY THE F.C.C., WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINED A SIGNATORY TO N.A.R.B.A. AND THUS UNITED STATES STATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE RECEIVING ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE FROM CUBA, WHICH REDUCED THEIR COVERAGE IN THEIR PRIMARY SERVICE AREA.

HOWEVER, IN NOVEMBER 1980, CUBA OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED CANADA THAT THEY WOULD ABROGATE THE TREATY THE FOLLOWING YEAR. IN FACE OF THIS NOTICE OF ABROGATION, AND IN FACE OF A MARKED INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF STATIONS FALLING VICTIM TO THE ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE FROM CUBA, AND AS A RESULT OF THE F.A.B.'S LOBBYING EFFORTS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE F.C.C. MODIFIED ITS POSITION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED A BLANKET AUTHORIZATION UNDER WHICH A DOMESTIC STATION WOULD BE ALLOWED TO INCREASE ITS POWER TO COMPENSATE FOR ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE, BUT ONLY TO RECOOP LOST SERVICE AREA, AND SO LONG AS IT DID NOT INTERFERE WITH STATIONS, LOCATED IN A THIRD NATION SUCH AS CANADA OR MEXICO. UNDER THIS POLICY, THE F.C.C. AGREED TO PROVIDE EXPEDITED RELIEF, ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, TO ANY STATIONS WHO CONFORMED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT CRITERIA AND WHICH ALSO DID NOT CREATE INTERFERENCE TO ANY OTHER DOMESTIC STATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NUMBER OF STATIONS THAT COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW POLICY WERE GREATLY LIMITED. AS A RESULT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT THE FOLLOWING STATIONS RECEIVED PARTIAL RELIEF: WKAT, WINZ, WIOD, WQBA, WNWS, WEAT, AND JUST RECENTLY WVCG. ALL OF THESE STATIONS ARE LOCATED IN SOUTH FLORIDA. STATIONS LOCATED IN OTHER AREAS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO COMPLY WITH THE INTERFERENCE RESTRICTIONS.

IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT EACH OF THESE STATIONS EXPENDED CONSIDERABLE FUNDS IN ENGINEERING AND LEGAL FEES TO RECEIVE ONLY A SPECIAL TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FROM THE F.C.C., MOST OF THE STATIONS HAD TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES FOR NEW EQUIPMENT OR NEW LAND. IT IS ESTIMATED, THAT, THESE STATIONS WERE REQUIRED TO SPEND WELL IN EXCESS OF $2 MILLION, NOT TO IMPROVE THEIR FACILITIES, BUT MERELY TO RECOOP SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THEIR LOST SERVICE AREAS.

SUBSEQUENTLY, REACTING TO CUBA'S NOTICE OF ABROGATION, THE F.C.C. ISSUED A PUBLIC NOTICE INDICATING THAT ALL DOMESTIC STATIONS WERE ENTITLED TO DROP ANY PROTECTION THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REQUIRED UNDER N.A.R.B.A. TO CUBAN OPERATIONS AS OF EARLY NOVEMBER 1981. NEVERTHELESS, ANY GRANT MADE AS A RESULT OF THE ABROGATION, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH CUBA. THUS, BROADCASTERS WERE PRESENTED WITH THE DIFFICULT DECISION OF WHETHER TO INVEST THOUSANDS AND PERHAPS MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO IMPROVE THEIR FACILITITES, IN FACE OF THE UNCERTAINTIES OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE CASTRO REGIME. IN FACT, ONLY A HANDFUL OF APPLICATIONS WERE FILED.

IN ADDITION, TO N.A.R.B.A., THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED IN THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION MEDIUM FREQUENCY BROADCASTING CONFERENCE. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE WAS TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED USE OF AM RADIO THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF THIS CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS HELD IN BUENOS AIRES, IT WAS BELIEVED THAT A SOLUTION TO THE HEMISPHERIC INTERFERENCE PROBLEMS, SUCH AS CUBAN INTERFERENCE, COULD BE FOUND IN A SHIFT FROM 10 KHz SPACING TO 9 KHz SPACING BETWEEN AM CHANNELS. THEREBY CREATING ADDITIONAL NEW CHANNELS. HOWEVER, AFTER IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS, THE F.C.C. DETERMINED THAT THE SHIFT

TO 9 KHz WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE DUE IN PART TO THE POTENTIAL NEW INTERFERENCE THAT WOULD BE CREATED TO ADJACENT CHANNELS AND THE GREAT EXPENSE THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE SUCH A SHIFT. THUS, DURING THE SECOND SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS HELD IN RIO DE JANIERO THIS PAST NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, THE UNITED STATES POSITION REVERTED BACK TO SUPPORT 10 KHz SPACING.

THE CUBAN INTERFERENCE QUESTION WAS A PRIMARY ISSUE THAT HAD TO BE RESOLVED BY THE CONFERENCE. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, CUBA HAD PROPOSED AN INVENTORY OF APPROXIMATELY 180 STATIONS. ONE THIRD OF THESE STATIONS, IF PUT INTO OPERATION, WOULD CREATE INTERFERENCE TO U.S. BROADCAST STATIONS, NOT ONLY IN SOUTH FLORIDA, BUT THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENTIAL UNITED STATES. PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS DIRECTED TO TWO STATIONS WHICH WERE PROPOSED TO OPERATE WITH 500,000 WATTS OF POWER, OR TEN (10) TIMES THE MOST POWERFUL AM STATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE F.C.C. CALCULATED THAT THESE STATIONS WOULD CREATE INTERFERENCE AS FAR AWAY AS HAWAII OR ALASKA.

PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE THERE WERE SOME PROMISING SIGNS AS A RESULT OF TWO BILATERAL NEGOTITATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. NEVERTHELESS, CUBA WALKED OUT OF THE CONFERENCE IN RIO.

BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER, THE F.A.B. WISHES TO NOTE THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS SUCCESSFUL IN RESOLVING MANY OTHER AM CONCERNS. THUS, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION AND ITS CHAIRMAN KALMANN SCHAEFER, SHOULD BE CONGRATULATED FOR THEIR EFFORTS AND SUCCESSES. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THEIR EFFORTS, THE CUBAN PROLBEM REMAINS WITH US, AND, IN FACT IS WORSE TODAY THAN IT WAS PRIOR TO THE RIO NEGOTIATIONS.

IN EARLY DECEMBER, WHILE THE RIO NEGOTIATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE, THE CUBANS INSTITUTED THE BEGINNING OF A SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT OF THEIR

BROADCAST OPERATIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS SHIFT, APPROXIMATELY 29 STATIONS CHANGED FREQUENCY, LOCATION AND OR POWER WITHIN THREE WEEKS. THIS INFORMATION WAS FIRST SUPPLIED TO THE F.C.C. BY F.A.B. MEMBERS AS THE RESULT OF MONITORING BY TWO ENGINEERS WHO ARE WORKING WITH THE F.A.B. COMMITTEE, MR. RONALD F. SCHATZ AND MR. JAMES JOHNSON.

THE SHIFTING OF THE CUBAN OPERATIONS CONTINUES EVEN TO THIS DAY. THE ONLY FIRM CONCLUSION THAT CAN BE DRAWN AT THIS TIME, IS THAT ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES STATIONS ARE NOW VICTIMS OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE. MOREOVER, MANY OF THESE STATIONS ARE NOT LOCATED IN FLORIDA. RADIO STATION KSL IN SALT LAKE CITY, A CLEAR CHANNEL ON 1160, HAS BEEN SEVERELY AFFECTED BY THE BROADCASTING OF RADIO MOSCOW. ENGINEERS HAVE MEASURED THE CUBAN RADIO SIGNAL ON THIS FREQUENCY IN EXCESS OF 3.1 mV/m IN CHICAGO. FOR COMPARASION PURPOSES, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE F.C.C. ONLY REQUIRES A 2 mV/m SIGNAL OVER THE BUSINESS DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF LICENSE BY A LOCAL RADIO STATION. A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THESE CHANGES IS RADIO STATION WHO IN DES MOINES, IOWA OPERATING ON 1040 WHICH HAS ALSO RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE. FURTHER EXAMPLES ARE NUMEROUS, INCLUDING SOME ADDITIONAL STATIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS HAS JUST COMPLETED A STUDY OF THE CUBAN INTERFERENCE AND WILL PRESENT THIS MATERIAL TO YOU .

WITH RESPECT TO THE STATIONS ON 1160 AND 1040, IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT THESE STATIONS WHILE ON THE AIR, WERE OPERATING WITH POWERS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 kW. THIS REPRESENTS THREE TIMES THE MOST POWERFUL STATION IN THE UNITED STATES. AT THIS TIME, BASED UPON

OUR OWN OBSERVATIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA, IT APPEARS THAT THESE STATIONS ARE OFF THE AIR. HOW LONG THESE STATIONS WILL STAY OFF THE AIR IS UNKNOWN AND WHETHER THEY WILL COME BACK WITH ONLY 150 kW OR THE PROPOSED 500 kW OF POWER IS ALSO UNKNOWN. ONLY CASTRO WILL MAKE THESE DECISIONS AND AT THIS TIME, HE IS UNRESTRAINED BY ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

ANOTHER MATTER THAT FURTHER COMPLICATES THESE DISCUSSIONS, IS THE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF RADIO MARTI. AS OF THIS DATE, THE F.A.B. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ITS MEMBERSHIP, HAVE NOT TAKEN A POSITION ON THIS PROPOSAL AS A RESULT OF THE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC CONCERNING THE TECHNICAL METHOD OF OPERATION AND ITS PROPOSED PROGRAMMING. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE OBVIOUS FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS THAT IMPACT ON THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL, WHICH ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE AM BROADCAST CONSIDERATIONS.

HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE THAT SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS CAN BE DISCUSSED CONCERNING RADIO MARTI.

IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, MANY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT RADIO MARTI WILL ONLY AGGRAVATE THE CUBAN INTERFERENCE PROBLEM. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE CUBANS HAVE IMPLICATED RADIO MARTI IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF RADIO INTERFERENCE, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT CASTRO PROPOSED HIS 180 STATION INVENTORY OVER A YEAR PRIOR TO THE FIRST PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE RADIO MARTI OPERATION. THIS INVENTORY INCLUDES RADIO MOSCOW. THUS TO SUGGEST THAT RADIO MARTI WILL <u>CAUSE</u> CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE, IS AT LEAST IN PART, PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE.

WHILE IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE THE VOICE OF AMERICA STATION IN MARATHON, FLORIDA AND RADIO MARTI IN OPERATION THE CUBANS HAVE PROPOSED IN EXCESS OF 60 STATIONS THAT WILL CAUSE

INTERFERENCE TO UNITED STATES STATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS A CLEAR QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS PROPOSED OPERATIONS.

FURTHERMORE, BOTH THE VOICE OF AMERICA STATION AND THE RADIO MARTI STATIONS WERE PROPOSED ON FREQUENCIES WHICH WERE SELECTED SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT CAUSE INTERFERENCE TO CUBAN RADIO OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE CUBAN PROPOSAL CLEARLY CONTEMPLATED MAJOR INTERFERENCE TO U.S. BROADCAST OPERATIONS.

AN ADDITIONAL DISTINCTION CAN BE DRAWN IN THAT, RADIO MARTI AS IT APPEARS TO BE PROPOSED, WILL BROADCAST FACTUAL NEWS AND INFORMATION TO CUBA. THE ENGLISH VERSION OF RADIO MOSCOW, WHICH IS DIRECTED AT THE UNITED STATES, IS CLEARLY A PROPAGANDA STATION DESIGNATED TO EXPORT THE SOVIET UNION'S VIEWS AND PHILOSOPHY. MOREOVER, MANY SPANISH BROADCASTS FROM CUBA ARE DIRECTED AT THE PEOPLE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THEY ADVOCATE CASTRO'S REVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OPEN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE RADIO MARTI PROPOSAL. THESE INCLUDE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, RADIO MARTI WILL PROVIDE ACTUAL REPORTING CONCERNING NEWS AND CURRENT EVENTS OR WILL IT BROADCAST PROPAGANDA DESIGNED FOR CUBA? A SECOND QUESTION IS THAT IN TIMES OF SEVERE BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS, WHETHER TEN MILLION DOLLARS IS ACTUALLY NEEDED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF SUCH A STATION? THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN CLOSE SCRUTINY BY THE CONGRESS.

THE ULTIMATE QUESTION THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED BY ALL BRANCHES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THIS GOVERNMENT, IS WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE

FROM OTHER COUNTRIES?

LITTLE IS KNOWN AS TO CASTRO'S FUTURE OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ALLOW CASTRO TO DICTATE THE UNITED STATES BROADCAST POLICY TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND UNITED STATES BROADCASTERS.

WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE ISSUE, THE CONCERN SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO AM RADIO BROADCASTERS THEMSELVES, OR THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF UNTOLD SUMS OF ADVERTISING REVENUE AND THE DIMINISHED VALUE OF THESE AM RADIO STATIONS. ONE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE AFFECTS ON THE LISTENERS TO THESE AM RADIO STATIONS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, THAT CITIZENS OF THIS COUNTRY ARE BEING DENIED ACCESS TO AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE PRESS AND THE VIEWS THAT ARE EXPRESSED BY THESE STATIONS AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF A HOSTILE COUNTRY'S ILLEGAL BROADCAST OPERATIONS. BUT ALSO, IN AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT RURAL AMERICA, CITIZENS ARE DEPENDANT ON ONE <u>LOCAL</u> AM RADIO STATION IN TIMES OF DISASTER FOR NEWS AND INFORMATION THAT MAY BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY. SOME OF THESE STATIONS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO DISSEMINATE NECESSARY <u>LOCAL</u> EMERGENCY INFORMATION AS A RESULT OF CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE. WE AT THE F.A.B. DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY EXIST THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, BUT WE ARE AWARE OF AT LEAST SOME EXAMPLES WHERE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DO EXIST IN FLORIDA.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUGGESTED THAT THE F.C.C. EXPLORE THIS POTENTIAL AND DETERMINE IF SITUATIONS OF THIS NATURE MAY EXIST TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT. IF SITUATIONS AS DESCRIBED HERE ARE NOT SIMPLY ISOLATED CASES, THE F.A.B. URGES THAT SPECIAL

ATTENTION AND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THESE STATIONS SO THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO BROADCAST VITAL INFORMATION IN TIMES OF DISASTER, AND IN DOING SO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND WELFARE OF THE LOCAL POPULOUS.

THE F.A.B. IS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT A SOLUTION TO THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE CAN BE SIMPLY NEGOTIATED AS AN ISOLATED CONCERN BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE F.A.B., AS ALWAYS, SUPPORTS THE ATTEMPTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN AN EFFORT TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EACH NATION'S AM RADIO STATIONS WOULD OPERATE. A PROPER FRAME WORK FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE CONCEPTS AS EMBODIED IN N.A.R.B.A. EXISTING AM RADIO OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED FOR YEARS IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE STANDARDS IMPOSED BY N.A.R.B.A. SHOULD NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BE REQUIRED TO GO OFF THE AIR OR TO BE MODIFIED IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL WAY.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE F.A.B. RECOGNIZES THE INABILITY, TO DATE, TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT ON THESE ISSUES. PERHAPS THE UNDERLYING REASON FOR THIS FAILURE, IS THE ABSENCE OF INCENTIVES FOR CASTRO TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. ACCORDINGLY, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, ON JANUARY 31, 1982, ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION:

WHEREAS, UNITED STATES RADIO STATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ILLEGAL RADIO INTERFERENCE FROM CUBA FOR OVER THIRTEEN YEARS, AND,

WHEREAS, FLORIDA RADIO STATIONS HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE FROM CUBA, AND,

WHEREAS, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO

DATE, HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE ILLEGAL RADIO INTERFERENCE,

BE IT RESOLVED, THAT THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS URGES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE A PROJECT TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE RADIO FACILITIES THAT WILL CAUSE INTERFERENCE TO CUBAN RADIO OPERATIONS, AND/OR "JAM" CUBAN RADIO OPERATIONS, UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT THE ILLEGAL INTERFERENCE FROM CUBA CEASES.

AS YOU WILL NOTE, THIS RESOLUTION IS SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO NEGOTIATIONS AND IS LIMITED IN DURATION TO THE CESSATION OF CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. IT IS OUR GENUINE HOPE THAT MEASURES OF THIS NATURE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. HOWEVER, METHODS MUST BE FOUND TO STIMULATE THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO RESOLVE THIS CONTINUING PROBLEM.

IT IS ALSO OUR SINCERE BELIEF, THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE ADDRESSED BY ALL BRANCHES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN A COORDINATED EFFORT. AS NOTED EARLIER, NOT ONLY DOES THIS PROBLEM ENCOMPASS BROADCAST ISSUES, BUT THERE ARE CLEARLY FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS AND ISSUES THAT ARE INTERTWINED AND THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED.

THEREFORE, THE F.A.B. URGES THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A TASK FORCE COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF, NOT ONLY THE F.C.C. AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT, BUT ALSO REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, FROM THE CONGRESS AND FROM THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. PERHAPS, THROUGH THIS COORDINATED EFFORT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

IN ADDITION, ALTHOUGH THE F.C.C. AND ITS CHAIRMAN HAVE BEEN SYMPATHETIC AND SUPPORTIVE OF BROADCASTERS WHO HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE, THE F.A.B. URGES THAT NEW IDEAS AND APPROACHES BE EXPLORED. SPECIFICALLY, THE F.A.B. URGES THE

F.C.C., IN COOPERATION WITH THE INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES, TO REVIEW ITS RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE PROTECTION WITH A MIND TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY EXISTS TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL STATIONS TO INCREASE POWER TO COMPENSATE FOR THE CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE. WE HASTEN TO URGE, THAT THIS EFFORT SHOULD NOT ONLY BE LIMITED TO STATIONS LOCATED IN FLORIDA, BUT SHOULD ALSO CONCERN CLEAR CHANNEL STATIONS SUCH AS KSL AND WHO, AND STATIONS IN MIDDLE AMERICA, LIKE THE AKRON, OHIO STATION. FOR IT SHOULD BE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR AS A RESULT OF THE TESTIMONY TODAY, THAT AT THIS TIME THE VICTIMS OF CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE ARE NOT ONLY LOCATED IN SOUTH FLORIDA, BUT IN FACT, ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.

MR CHAIRMAN, AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, UNFORTUNATELY WE ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH EASY SOLUTIONS TO THESE ISSUES. THERE ARE NONE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FLORIDA BROADCASTERS BELIEVE THAT THROUGH EFFORTS LIKE THIS COMMITTEE'S HEARING, WHICH BRING TOGETHER REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY, SOLUTIONS CAN BE FOUND TO THESE GRAVE ISSUES CONFRONTING US TODAY.

THANK YOU.

STATEMENT OF WILSON DIZARD, CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION, BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON RADIO BROADCASTING FOR CUBA
3/2/82

COMMISSIONERS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE COMMISSION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TODAY IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSAL FOR NEW RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA. I AM SPEAKING TODAY ON BEHALF OF THE CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION, AN ORGANIZATION WHICH PROMOTES AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF CUBA AND CUBANS, AND AN OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICIES. THE FOUNDATION SUPPORTS A GENERAL PROGRAM TO ENLIGHTEN AND CLARIFY PUBLIC OPINION ON PROBLEMS OF CUBAN CONCERN, TO FIGHT BIGOTRY, PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PROMOTE CUBAN CULTURAL INTERESTS AND CREATIVE ACHEIVEMENT.

I WOULD LIKE TO IMPRESS ON THE COMMISSION THE NEED FOR THE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION OF THE TYPE OF RADIO BROADCASTING WHICH WILL APPEAL TO THE BROADEST RANGE OF THE CUBAN AUDIENCE. THE AMBITIOUS RADIO BROADCASTING PROGRAM OF THE CUBAN RADIO INSTITUTE TARGETS VIRTUALLY EVERY GROUP OF THE ISLAND'S POPULATION. IT ALSO INCLUDES AN AMBITIOUS INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING EFFORT, WHICH CONSISTS OF 48 HOURS OF BROADCASTING DAILY IN SIX LANGUAGES, AND BEAMS RADIO MOSCOW PROGRAMS TO THIS HEMISPHERE THROUGH A MUTUAL REBROADCASTING PACT WHICH ALSO PROVIDES FOR THE BROADCAST OF RADIO HAVANA PROGRAMS TO EUROPE AND TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

ONLY BY RESPONDING TO THIS UNREMITTING PROPAGANDA AT EVERY LEVEL CAN RADIO MARTI FULFILL ALL ITS PROMISE. THE CORRECT CONTEXT IN WHICH TO VIEW RADIO MARTI IS AS A SUBSTITUTE DOMESTIC CUBAN RADIO STATION, PREPARED FOR AND HEARD IN CUBA ITSELF. THE TOTALITARIAN REPRESSION OF DISSENT AND EVEN DISCUSSION OF THE OPTIONS FOR CUBA HAS THE RESULT THAT CASTRO'S PROPAGANDA GOES UNCHALLENGED. IN FACT, RADIO MOSCOW IS THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL RADIO SERVICE WHICH PREPARES PROGRAMS DIRECTLY TARGETED AT CUBA. THEREFORE, RADIO MARTI PRESENTS ITSELF AS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL OVER THE

CLAMOR OF THIS CACAPHONY OF PROPAGANDA TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE DIRECTLY.

THIS GOAL IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF THE RECENT UPSURGE IN THE CASTRO REGIMES' ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. OUTLANDISH CHARGES OF CLANDESTINE ASSAULTS ON THE CUBAN ECONOMY ALTERNATE WITH THE UNCEASING LITANY OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS MALIFICENT INTENTIONS TOWARD THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CUBA, OF A STAGNANT ECONOMY AND UNREMITTING PREPARATION FOR WAR, STAND IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE PROPAGANDA GENERATED BY THE CUBAN REGIME, WHICH TOUTS THE PROSPERITY AND PEACE OFFERED BY THE COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVE. THE COMPREHENSIVE MISINFORMATION PROGRAM TRUMPETED BY THE CASTRO REGIME'S NEWS, INFORMATION AND CULTURAL OUTLETS EXTENDS INTO THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN A PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL FASHION. ONLY BY CREATING A GENERALIZED IMPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND CONFRONTATION CAN THE SACRIFICES OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE FOR CASTRO'S ADVENTURIST POLICIES BE JUSTIFIED. FOR THIS REASON, A WELL-DOCUMENTED, SOBERLY PRESENTED NEWS AND INFORMATION PROGRAM IS THE BEST COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S THOROGOING AND CAREFULLY DEVISED DOMESTIC AGITATION.

I URGE THE COMMISSION TO CAREFULLY STUDY THE CUBAN POLITY AND SOCIETY SO AS TO DEVISE PROGRAMS WHICH WILL BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SPECTRUM OF THE ISLAND'S POPULACE. ONLY BY COUNTERACTING THE FULL RANGE OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S PROPAGANDA OUTPUT CAN RADIO MARTI MAXIMIZE ITS IMPACT ON THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS.

Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations

March 1, 1982

CUBAN INTERFERENCE TO UNITED STATES AM BROADCASTING

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B. Frequency Study Data *

III. Actual Station Interference

A. Documented Interference Map

B. Cuban Signal Strength Measurements

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B. Cuban Inventory

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Introduction

CUBAN INTERFERENCE TO UNITED STATES AM BROADCASTING

Interference caused by Cuban radio transmission has steadily worsened radio reception in the Southeastern United States. Recent international developments now make Cuban interference a national rather than just regional concern. The present and projected disruption of service is devastating to both the public and radio broadcasters.

At the recent Region 2 (Western Hemisphere) Radio Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Cuba submitted an inventory of 187 AM radio stations to operate throughout their country. The inventory consisted of both existing and proposed stations as well as suggested frequencies and power levels. Two of the proposed stations would operate at 500 kilowatts -- by contrast, the highest powered U.S. stations operate at 50 kilowatt levels. The Rio Conference rejected the Cuban proposal and the Cuban delegation walked out of the Conference. As a result, Cuba is now a non-signatory to the international agreement. It operates its broadcast facilities as an outlaw nation, guided by no international restrictions.

The implications for American radio stations are frightening. The interference they can expect to receive will, in many instances, block out over half the service they provide. The effect on the public is an enormous loss of news, information and entertainment.

This report is designed to graphically illustrate the real and potential problems visited upon U.S. broadcasters and the public by Cuban interference.

Effects of Cuban Proposals

EFFECTS OF CUBAN PROPOSALS ON U.S. BROADCAST STATIONS

AM radio stations in 32 states plus the District of Columbia will experience interference and reduced listening areas should Cuba proceed with its proposed inventory of broadcast facilities. Altogether, over 200 U.S. stations will be affected. Ten clear channel radio stations will lose their entire nighttime coverage area. Thirty-seven clear channel stations would lose large portions of their wide area coverage. Only six clear channel stations would continue to provide interference-free service.

The following maps are graphic examples of what happens to existing U.S. stations' service areas when interference is received from proposed Cuban stations at the proposed power levels.

Frequency data sheets analyzing each U.S. AM channel accompany the maps. They illustrate the effect of each proposed Cuban station on all U.S. frequencies.

Actual Station Interference

ACTUAL STATION INTERFERENCE

Much of the United States is currently experiencing radio interference from Cuba. Several stations in Florida have been granted Special Temporary Authority from the FCC to operate with greater powers and/or alternative directional antennas to recoup as much lost service area as possible. Other stations, including some far north, have reported "substantial" interference from Cuba -- impairing their ability to serve the public with an interference-free signal.

For example, NAB has received correspondence from WICC, Bridgeport, Connecticut, 600 on the AM dial. WICC states that two out of three times it has conducted measurements on Cuban broadcast signals, the signal strengths have been at least twice as strong as otherwise allowed for protection of the WICC service area under the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA). With WICC experiencing actual interference, the following stations which operate on the same frequency are also likely to have their service areas reduced:

WCAO	Baltimore, MD
WMT	Cedar Rapids, IA
WOKV	Jacksonville, FL
WRCC	Memphis, TN
WSJS	Winston-Salem, NC

The signal strengths from Cuba are stronger to the South. However, as the attached Cuban Signal Strength Measurements indicate, the presence of strong signals on WICC's channel is intermittent, fluctuating week to week.

WPLP, Pinellas Park, Florida, operates on the 570 frequency at 500 watts of power with different directional antennas day and night. WPLP measured Cuban signal strength to support an FCC application for recovery of lost service area due to interference. The engineering study showed a Cuban station on 570 operating at a power level of at least 50 kilowatts, whereas the Cuban inventory indicated they would have two stations operating at 30 and 10 kilowatts, respectively. Obviously, Cuba has opted for one stronger station instead. WPLP's documentation of the 50 kilowatt Cuban signal means that the following U.S. stations are also receiving interference on the 570 frequency:

WAAX	Gadsden, AZ
WACL	Waycross, GA
WFAA	Fort Worth, TX
WGMS	Bethesda, MD
WKBN	Youngstown, OH
WMCA	New York, NY
WPLP	Pinellas Park, FL
WSYR	Syracuse, NY
WUMI	Biloxi, MS
WWNC	Asheville, NC

Using signal strength measurements based on the proposed Cuban inventory, estimates can be made of the actual interference received by U.S. AM stations. CMBB is the station proposed to operate on 790 from Guanabacoa, Cuba, at a power level of 25 kilowatts. Whenever CMBB is on the air, the following stations receive nighttime Cuban interference:

KOSY	Texarkana, AR
KULF	Houston, TX
WACB	Allentown, PA
WAKY	Louisville, KY
WEAN	Providence, RI
WLBR	Leesburg-Eustis, FL
WMC	Memphis, TN
WNWS	South Miami, FL
WQXI	Atlanta, GA
WTAR	Norfolk, VA

The FCC has measured Cuban signals on the 820 frequency strong enough to eliminate most, if not all, the nighttime service area of WBAP, Fort Worth, Texas. These measurements also indicate probable interference to:

KGGF	Coffeyville, KS
WAPE	Jacksonville, FL
WTIX	New Orleans, LA

U.S. Class I 50 kilowatt stations operate at night with protection out to a distance of 750 miles. A low-power non-directional Cuban station can substantially reduce this service area. For example, CMDC in Colon, Cuba is listed as operating on the 660 frequency. CMDC would have to be operating at 2.5 kilowatts to produce the FCC-measured signal strength. Even at that low level, CMDC would severely limit the southern coverage of WNBC, New York.

In September, 1980, WINZ, Miami, Florida on 940 filed with the FCC to increase nighttime power from ten to twenty-five kilowatts to recover lost service area from Cuban interference. At the Region 2 Conference in Rio, Cuba proposed several one kilowatt stations on 940, and as of February 9, 1982, it did not yet appear that these were on the air. Nonetheless, WINZ has been experiencing substantial Cuban interference when Cuba has elected to broadcast into the United States.

WQBA, Miami, Florida on 1140 has also filed with the FCC to change its operating precedure so as to recapture portions of its service area lost to Cuban interference. The documented interference is on file with the FCC. In this instance the interference is caused by two Cuban stations, one on 1140 and one on 1142.3, each beaming radio signals without any broadcasts on the frequency. In effect, turning on the transmitter but sending no voice broadcasts. The result is known as a "beat note," an unpleasant, whistling sound received by those tuning in to WQBA. The Cuban jamming of 1140 also causes interference to other stations on the frequency such as WRVA, Richmond, Virginia.

This is a representative sample of the devastating effects of the Cuban problem which adversely affects both broadcasters and the public. NAB will continue to compile documentation of Cuban interference experienced by AM stations nationwide.

A map of WPLP, Pinellas Park, Florida follows, illustrating the current Cuban interference situation on the 570 frequency.

Additionally, Cuban signal strength measurements taken by the FCC are listed along with each U.S. frequency demonstrating the indiscriminate and fluid interference problem.

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Documented Interference Map

best copy available

Documented Interference Map


FEBRUARY 1982
IMPACT OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON ,D.C.
Jules Cohen & Associates, P.C. Consulting Electrical Engineers
WPLP PINELLAS PARK, FL
570 KHZ 1 KW U DA-2
Authorized daytime coverage 5061 square miles
Reduced daytime coverage 1110 square miles
OSCEOLA
HARDEE
MANATEE
OKEECHOBEE
HIGHLANDS
SARASOTA
DESOTO
GLADES
LAKE OKEECHOBEE
CHARLOTTE
LEE
HENDRY
Daytime Coverage lost to Measured CMHI Interference

Cuban Signal Strength Measurements

Cuban Signal Strength Measurements

CUBAN SIGNAL STRENGTH MEASUREMENTS

The Federal Communications Commission performed field measurements to document Cuban radio signal strength on three separate dates, March 31, 1981, January 21, 1982 and February 9, 1982. The results illustrate the constant change in signal strength that causes interference for U.S. stations. All measurements were made at Key Marathon, Florida in uV/m.

Frequency	Signal Strength			Bearing
	3/31/81	1/21/82	2/9/82	
550	4800	730	850	225°
570	4200	4200	-	-
590	890	890	-	-
600	5400	5400	-	-
630	2700	2700	-	-
640	5400	5400	-	-
660	-	-	1420	165°
670	190	190	-	-
680	-	-	320	165°
690	5100	3300	2920	165°
710	3400	3400	-	-
730	-	2100	-	-
760	1400	1400	1900	225°
780	480	480	-	-
790	-	-	5100	235°
820	-	-	2350	225°
840	1000	-	750	165°
860	430	430	1140	240°
880	260	260	240	235°

Frequency	Signal Strength			Bearing
	3/31/81	1/21/82	2/9/82	
890	-	-	95	165°
910	95	550	85	145°
920	700	700	600	190°
930	500	500	490	190°
950	-	-	520	225°
960	-	-	85	180°
980	1100	1100	740	225°
990	-	-	60	225°
1010	-	530	-	-
1020	550	550	450	240°
1040	500	500	65	140°
1050	-	-	70	140°
1080	-	1000	950	220°
1090	-	-	120	240°
1120	-	-	380	225°
1160	-	-	3150	225°
1180	-	-	125	220°
1190	-	-	470	145°
1210	-	-	175	145°
1220	-	1400	1250	190°
1240	400	400	330	190°
1250	-	450	580	145°
1280	-	950	90	165°
1290	-	-	800	165°
1310	-	-	750	145°

Frequency	Signal Strength			Bearing
	3/31/81	1/21/82	2/9/82	
1330	-	-	85	190°
1340	350	-	330	165°
1390	-	400	340	225°
1440	-	-	80	180°
1460	-	1490	-	-
1470	950	950	-	-

History

HISTORY OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE

In 1959, Cuba and the United States signed the North American Regional Broadcast Agreement (NARBA) which gave both nations satisfactory protection against radio interference. Although NARBA was signed by the Batista government in Cuba, until recently, signals broadcast by the Castro regime did not depart drastically from its terms.

In the last two years, AM broadcast stations in the U.S. began suffering unacceptable levels of interference from Cuban stations. Concurrently, preliminary negotiations for a new radio treaty among the nations of the western hemisphere -- at the 1980 Region 2 Conference in Buenos Aires -- were underway. The purpose of the 1980 Region 2 agreement was to establish technical standards for a mutually satisfactory broadcast service for all countries of the hemisphere and to promote the orderly and efficient expansion of AM broadcast service.

Cuba formally denounced NARBA in November, 1980, but did participate in the 1981 Region 2 Conference in Rio de Janeiro. At the Rio Region 2, participating nations were asked to submit inventories or lists of their existing stations and those of planned stations. The inventories submitted by Cuba were devastating to AM broadcasting in the U.S. The Cubans proposed a "block shift" -- an all or nothing proposal -- that would lessen or eliminate interference problems in other countries and shift them to the U.S. The proposal was an obvious ploy to gain the support of other nations at the expense of U.S. broadcasting.

The strategy promoted some nations to support Cuba's "block shift" inventory. But the U.S. delegation made it clear that it would not sign any agreement calling for "the mutilation of our own broadcast service." This ultimately sent Cuba and the U.S. into bilateral negotiations which ended when Cuba withdrew from the final negotiating session at the Rio Region 2 Conference last December.

The Rio Region 2 agreement ultimately signed by the U.S. and other countries will not go into effect until July 1, 1983, and has not been ratified by the Senate. But countries that participated in the Conference adopted resolutions for interim protection of AM broadcasting in this hemisphere until 1983. One such resolution provides that any country that did not sign the agreement, but that participated in the negotiations -- such as Cuba -- would not receive protection for its stations that are interfering with those of signatory nations. This means that Cuba's destructive interference to AM broadcast stations in the U.S. is a glaring violation of international law.

Cuba's denunciation of NARBA, her anti-U.S. inventories at Region 2 and recent illegal levels of interference in the U.S. appear to be part of Castro's "Five Year Plan" to install high power Czechoslovakian-built transmitters and double the number of Cuban AM stations from 90 to over 180. This would give the Castro regime a greatly enhanced presence over the airwaves in Central and South America. But Cuba's plans to broadcast illegally far beyond her borders and her persistent refusal to use directional antennas in doing so, continues to wreak havoc for AM broadcasting in the U.S.

Appendix

ENGINEERING STATEMENT

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Technical Summary Regarding Cuban Interference to United States AM Broadcast Stations

The maps contained in this report, which show existing interference to United States AM broadcast stations and prospective additional interference from Cuban stations, are divided into three groups:

1. Nighttime interference to Class III stations on regional channels.

2. Nighttime interference to Class I stations on clear channels, and

3. Daytime interference to regional stations.

The facilities of United States stations studied were determined from current FCC lists. Cuban stations are those shown in the Cuban inventory just prior to the Region 2 Conference including the changes involving 28 channels proposed by the Cubans shortly before the end of the Conference. A complete listing of the Cuban inventory employed is contained elsewhere in this report.

Nighttime interference to Class III regional stations was determined as outlined in Section 73.182 of the FCC Rules. Appropriate vertical angles and 10-percent skywave factors are those specified in the FCC rules. Employing FCC computer-generated studies, the extent of groundwave coverage was determined based on interference-free coverage under the existing allocation scheme. The proposed interference level was determined based on the facilities for the proposed Cuban station(s) listed for

that frequency. In addition to the maps, a tabulation also provides the areas of interference to the United States stations considered in the study and summarizes the total loss of coverage on the frequency due to Cuban interference. The tabulation is organized by frequency.

Maps showing nighttime interference to regional channels depict groundwave coverage prior to and subsequent to operation of the proposed Cuban station(s). Additional interference by the Cuban station(s) is shown by means of cross-hatching. The area in square miles lost to interference is indicated.

Nighttime interference to Class I stations on clear channels is treated similarly to the regional channels except that Class I stations provide "secondary" or skywave service to very large areas. On the clear channel maps provided, the skywave service of those stations is completely lost due to proposed Cuban interference. Nighttime interference is great enough to also adversely affect groundwave coverage of the clear channel stations. In fact, coverage of the clear channel stations shown is similar to Class III stations on regional channels. The nighttime interference studies show that skywave interference would affect stations in most of the United States. However, during daytime hours, groundwave interference from some Cuban stations is expected in Florida and in states along the Gulf of Mexico. Daytime interference is also possible to southern stations near the Atlantic coast. The third set of maps indicates daytime interference to the groundwave service area of stations

from proposed Cuban stations. One of the maps showing interference to station WPLP is based on field strength measurements on the Cuban station thereby providing certainty as to actual interference.

Interference calculations were made employing current FCC rules and standards, which include nighttime interference calculations based on 10-percent-of-the-time skywave fields. Groundwave contours are projected on the basis of conductivities shown on the Commission's conductivity map.

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1730 M Street, N. W., Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20036

February 24, 1982

CUBAN INVENTORY
OF
EXISTING & PROPOSED STATIONS

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FREQ KHZ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR ANT	P/R D/I ST.	ELECT. HT.	RMS	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER	CURRENT RATIO	ORIENTATION (DEGREES)	SPACING (DEGREES)	PHASING (DEGREES)	ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)							
540	CM4A	CU	20-20- 0 N	77- 8- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P	60.00000	190.75	GR	MANZANILLO
550	CM4A	CU	22-26- 0 N	83-40- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J	84.99999	193.60	PR	PINAR DEL RIO
560	CM1A	CU	21-53- 0 N	78-43- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/J	80.99999	192.96	CA	CIEGO DE AVILA
570	CM4A	CU	19-56- 0 N	77-19- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	82.00000	192.96	GR	PILON
570	CM5A	CU	22-27- 0 N	79-53- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J	83.00000	193.60	VC	SANTA CLARA
580	CM4F	CU	20-21- 0 N	74-30- 0 W	5.00000 U	N	/B	/J	65.00000	190.98	GU	BARACOA
590	CM4A	CU	20- 9- 0 N	75-10- 0 W	5.00000 U	N	/B	/J	65.00000	193.19	GU	GUANTANAMO
590	CM1A	CU	22-48- 0 N	82-14- 0 W	150.00000 U	N	/A	/J	127.00000	205.32	PH	SN ANT VEGAS
600	CM4A	CU	22-55- 0 N	83-10- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P	65.00000	190.75	PR	BAHIA HONDA
600	CM1A	CU	20-35- 0 N	76- 7- 0 W	150.00000 U	N	/A	/J	130.00000	207.69	SC	SAN GERMAN
610	CM1A	CU	20-25- 0 N	75-30- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	65.00000	190.75	HO	MAYARI ARRIBA
610	CM5A	CU	21-47- 0 N	79-59- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	51.00000	186.57	SS	TRINIDAD
620	CM4F	CU	20-40- 0 N	74-56- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	68.00000	192.96	HO	HOA
620	CM1A	CU	22-43- 0 N	80-55- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J	90.99999	195.84	MZ	COLON
630	CM5A	CU	21-23- 0 N	77-59- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J	91.99999	195.84	CS	CAMAGUEY
630	CM0A	CU	21-42- 0 N	82-45- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	68.00000	192.96	LJ	ISLA JUVENTUD
640	CM1A	CU	20-57- 0 N	76-57- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/J	91.99999	195.20	LT	VICTORIA DE LAS TU
650	CM5A	CU	22- 5- 0 N	80-27- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P	71.00000	192.96	CF	CIENFUEGOS
650	CM1A	CU	20- 1- 0 N	75-50- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	71.00000	190.75	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
660	CM0C	CU	22-43- 0 N	80-54- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J	94.99999	195.84	MZ	COLON
670	CM4C	CU	20- 9- 0 N	77-24- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	73.99999	192.96	GR	MEDIA LUNA
670	CM0C	CU	23- 3- 0 N	82-23- 0 W	50.00000 U	N	/A	/J	96.99999	197.69	HA	ARROYO ARENAS
680	CM1C	CU	21-53- 0 N	78-43- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	97.99999	197.45	CA	CIEGO DE AVILA

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FREQ KHZ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR	F/R	D/I	ELECT. ST.	RMS HT.	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER	CURRENT RATIO	ORIENTATION (DEGREES)	SPACING (DEGREES)	PHASING (DEGREES)	ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)								
680	CMMC	CU	20- 6- 0 N	75-13- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/J		96.99999	197.45	GU	GUANTANAMO
680	CMAC	CU	22-54- 0 N	83-10- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P		76.00000	192.96	PR	BAHIA HONDA
680	CMDB	CU	20- 0-48 N	75-49- 0 W	0.50000 N	N 2 /		/N		111.95999	175.00	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
690	CMEC	CU	22-26- 0 N	79-54- 0 W	50.00000 U	N	/A	/J		76.00000	193.19	VC	SANTA CLARA
700	CMJC	CU	20-25- 0 N	75-30- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P		76.00000	192.96	HO	MAYARI ARRIBA
700	CMOC	CU	21-42- 0 N	82-45- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P		76.00000	192.96	IJ	ISLA JUVENTUD
710	CMLC	CU	20-53- 0 N	76-54- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P		78.00000	192.96	LT	VICTORIA DE LAS TU
710	CMDC	CU	23- 3- 0 N	81-35- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P		77.00000	195.20	MZ	MATANZAS
720	CMMC	CU	20-20- 0 N	74-29- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P		78.99999	192.96	GU	BARACOA
720	CMGC	CU	21-46- 0 N	79-59- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J		78.99999	192.96	SS	TRINIDAD
730	CMHC	CU	21-21- 0 N	77-55- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J		107.00000	198.11	CG	CAMAGUEY
740	CMAC	CU	22-19- 0 N	83-39- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J		107.99999	198.11	PR	PINAR DEL RIO
750	CMFC	CU	22- 5- 0 N	80-27- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P		82.00000	195.20	CF	CIENFUEGOS
750	CMJC	CU	20- 1- 0 N	75-50- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P		71.00000	192.96	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
760	CMKC	CU	20-34- 0 N	76-17- 0 W	75.00000 U	N	/A	/Q		111.00000	200.88	HO	CACOCUN
770	CMNC	CU	19-56- 0 N	77-19- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P		111.00000	202.05	GR	PILON
780	CMKC	CU	20-40- 0 N	74-56- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P		86.00000	195.20	HO	MOA
790	CMBB	CU	23- 7- 0 N	82-16- 0 W	50.00000 U	N	/A	/J		115.00000	202.29	HA	GUANABACOA
800	CMAB	CU	22-54- 0 N	83-10- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J		87.99999	195.20	PR	BAHIA HONDA
800	CMEB	CU	22-27- 0 N	79-53- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J		116.99998	202.72	VC	SANTA CLARA
810	CMMB	CU	20- 9- 0 N	75-10- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P		115.00000	202.05	GU	GUANTANAMO
820	CMIB	CU	21-52- 0 N	78-44- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/J		90.00000	195.20	CA	CIEGO DE AVILA
820	CMNB	CU	20-20- 0 N	77- 8- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J		90.00000	195.20	GR	MANZANILLO

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FREQ KHZ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR	F/R	D/I ST.	ELECT. HT.	RMS	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER		CURRENT RATIO	ORIENTATION (DEGREES)	SPACING (DEGREES)	PHASING (DEGREES)	ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)							
820	CMJB	CU	20- 1- 0 N	75-48- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/P	90.00000	195.20	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA	
830	CMFB	CU	22- 9- 0 N	80-26- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	90.99999	195.20	CF	CIENFUEGOS	
840	CMOB	CU	21-42- 0 N	82-45- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	94.00000	195.20	IJ	ISLA JUVENTUD	
840	CMLB	CU	20-57- 0 N	76-57- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/J	120.99999	204.39	LT	VICTORIA DE LAS TU	
850	CMJB	CU	21-22-36 N	77-55- 6 W	1.00000 N	N	2 /	/C	111.99999	175.00	CG	CAMAGUEY	
850	CMJB	CU	20-25- 0 N	75-30- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	94.00000	195.20	HO	MAYARI ARRIBA	
850	CMGB	CU	21-46- 0 N	79-59- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	93.00000	195.20	SS	TRINIDAD	
860	CMMB	CU	20-20- 0 N	74-29- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	94.00000	192.96	GU	BARACOA	
860	CMDB	CU	22-43- 0 N	80-55- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/O	125.99999	205.07	MZ	COLON	
870	CMNB	CU	19-53- 0 N	77-20- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	125.00000	204.40	GR	PILON	
870	CMGB	CU	21-56- 0 N	79-27- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	94.99999	195.20	SS	SANCTI SPIRITUS	
880	CMKB	CU	20-40- 0 N	74-56- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	96.99999	197.45	HO	MOA	
880	CMAB	CU	22-19- 0 N	83-39- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/J	129.00000	207.45	PR	PINAR DEL RIO	
890	CMMB	CU	21-23- 0 N	77-59- 0 W	30.00000 U	N	/A	/O	130.00000	205.07	CG	CAMAGUEY	
900	CMKB	CU	20-44- 0 N	76-19- 0 W	200.00000 U	N	/A	/O	132.00000	208.90	HO	CACOCUN	
910	CMBD	CU	23- 6- 0 N	82-17- 0 W	75.00000 U	N	/A	/O	133.00000	207.94	HA	GUANABACOA	
910	CMMD	CU	20- 7- 0 N	75-13- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	103.99999	197.45	GU	GUANTANAMO	
920	CMDJ	CU	23- 2- 0 N	81-12- 0 W	0.25000 U	N	/C	/J	73.99999	191.20	MZ	CARDENAS	
920	CMED	CU	22-26- 0 N	79-56- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	100.00000	197.45	VC	SANTA CLARA	
920	CMOD	CU	21-52- 0 N	82-47- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	83.00000	195.19	IJ	ISLA JUVENTUD	
920	CMHD	CU	21-20- 0 N	77-52- 0 W	10.00000 U	N	/B	/P	107.00000	199.74	CG	CAMAGUEY	
920	CMND	CU	20-21- 0 N	76-37- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	72.00000	192.96	GR	BAYAMO	
930	CMDB	CU	23- 1- 0 N	81-35- 0 W	1.00000 U	N	/C	/J	75.00000	192.96	MZ	MATANZAS	

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FREQ KHZ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR	F/R	D/I	ELECT. ST.	RMS HT.	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER	CURRENT RATIO	ORIENTATION (DEGREES)		SPACING (DEGREES)	PHASING (DEGREES)	ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)							
930	CMID	CU	21-50- 0 N	78-45- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	101.00000	197.45	CA	CIEGO DE AVILA
930	CMAD	CU	22-23- 0 N	83-41- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	101.00000	197.45	PR	PINAR DEL RIO
930	CMKD	CU	20-51- 0 N	76-16- 0 W	10.00000	U	N	/B	/J	103.00000	197.45	HO	HOLGUIN
930	CMFD	CU	22- 9- 0 N	80-26- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	104.99999	197.45	CF	CIENFUEGOS
940	CMDI	CU	22-43- 0 N	80-54- 0 W	0.25000	U	N	/C	/J	103.00000	197.92	MZ	COLON
940	CMLD	CU	20-56- 0 N	76-56- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	101.99999	197.45	LT	VICTORIA DE LAS TU
940	CMSI	CU	21-54- 0 N	79-26- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	103.99999	197.45	SS	SANCTI SPIRITUS
940	CMJD	CU	20- 1- 0 N	75-50- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	104.99999	197.45	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
950	CMBE	CU	23- 3- 0 N	82-28- 0 W	5.00000	U	N	/B	/J	143.00000	211.83	HA	ARROYO ARENAS
950	CMHE	CU	21-21- 0 N	77-52- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	108.99999	199.74	CG	CAMAGUEY
950	CMEE	CU	22-24- 0 N	79-57- 0 W	0.25000	U	N	/C	/P	75.00000	193.42	VC	SANTA CLARA
950	CMNE	CU	20-23- 0 N	76-37- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	111.99999	199.74	GR	BAYAMO
960	CMKE	CU	20-51- 0 N	76-16- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	107.99999	199.74	HO	HOLGUIN
960	CMFE	CU	22- 8- 0 N	80-27- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	108.99999	199.74	CF	CIENFUEGOS
960	CMME	CU	20- 7- 0 N	75-13- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	111.00000	199.74	GU	GUANTANAMO
960	CMIE	CU	21-50- 0 N	78-45- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	111.99999	199.74	CA	CIEGO DE AVILA
960	CMDE	CU	23- 1- 0 N	81-35- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	83.00000	192.96	MZ	MATANZAS
960	CMAE	CU	22-25- 0 N	83-42- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	111.99999	199.74	PR	PINAR DEL RIO
970	CMAI	CU	22-30- 0 N	83-31- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	137.99998	213.03	PR	CONSOLACION
970	CMOE	CU	21-52- 0 N	82-47- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	107.99999	199.74	IJ	GERONA
970	CMSE	CU	21-56- 0 N	79-27- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	107.99999	199.74	SS	SANCTI SPIRITUS
970	CMJE	CU	20- 1- 0 N	75-49- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/J	72.99999	192.96	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
970	CMLE	CU	20-56- 0 N	76-56- 0 W	1.00000	U	N	/C	/P	111.00000	199.74	LT	VICTORIA DE LAS TU

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FREQ KHZ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR	A/R	D/I ST.	ELECT. HT.	RMS	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER	CURRENT RATIO		ORIENTATION (DEGREES)		SPACING (DEGREES)		PHASING (DEGREES)		ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)				
980	CMBU	CU	23- 4- 0 N	82-23- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	90.00000	195.20	HA	CENTRO HABANA
990	CMAN	CU	22-44- 0 N	83-32- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/P	86.00000	195.20	PR	LA PALMA
990	CMAA	CU	22-12- 0 N	84- 8- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/P	118.99999	204.40	PR	GUANE
1000	CMAO	CU	22-42- 0 N	83- 2- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/P	115.00000	202.05	PR	SAN CRISTOBAL
1000	CMAW	CU	22-40- 0 N	83-56- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/J	144.00000	214.03	PR	MATAHAMBRE
1010	CMBN	CU	22-29- 0 N	81- 7- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/P	113.00000	199.74	MZ	C AUSTRALIA
1020	CMMP	CU	20- 7- 0 N	75-13- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	115.00000	202.05	GU	GUANTANAMO
1020	CMMQ	CU	20-21- 0 N	74-30- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	118.99999	204.40	GU	BARACOA
1040	CMBX	CU	23- 1- 0 N	82-26- 0 W	500.00000 U		N	/A	/P	220.00000	272.89	HA	WAJAY
1060	CMLO	CU	20-45- 0 N	77-34- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/J	115.99999	202.05	LT	AMANCIO
1060	CMLQ	CU	21-12- 0 N	76-37- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/J	113.99999	202.05	LT	PUERTO PADRE
1070	CMAP	CU	22-55- 0 N	83-10- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/J	115.00000	199.74	PR	BAHIA HONDA
1070	CMAL	CU	22-23- 0 N	83-41- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/P	115.99999	202.05	PR	PINAR DEL RIO
1080	CMCU	CU	22-51-11 N	82- 1-46 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	127.00000	204.40	PH	GUINES
1090	CMLL	CU	20-55- 0 N	76-54- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	115.00000	202.05	LT	VICTORIA DE LAS TU
1100	CMBW	CU	23- 4- 0 N	82-23- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	123.99999	204.40	HA	CENTRO HABANA
1100	CMNN	CU	20- 9- 0 N	77-26- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/J	125.00000	206.76	GR	MEDIA LUNA
1110	CMKL	CU	20-51- 0 N	76-16- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	122.00000	204.40	HO	HOLGUIN
1120	CMKQ	CU	20-39- 0 N	75-40- 0 W	1.00000 U		N	/C	/J	122.99999	204.40	HO	MAYARI
1120	CMCW	CU	22-48- 0 N	82-15- 0 W	5.00000 U		N	/B	/J	122.00000	202.30	PH	ARTEMISA
1130	CMKU	CU	20-35- 0 N	75-14- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	123.99999	204.40	HO	SAGUA DE TANAMO
1140	CMNW	CU	19-53- 0 N	77-20- 0 W	10.00000 U		N	/B	/J	168.00000	226.70	GR	PILON
1160	CMBV	CU	23- 1- 0 N	82-26- 0 W	500.00000 U		N	/A	/P	120.00000	204.64	HA	WAJAY

FILE: FCC GENERATED ON 111681 AT 22.879 ***** PAGE 6 ***** LAST UPDATED ON

FREQ KHZ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR	F/R	D/I ST.	ELECT. HT.	RMS	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER		CURRENT RATIO	ORIENTATION (DEGREES)		SPACING (DEGREES)	PHASING (DEGREES)		ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)					
1180	CMJW	CU	20-25- 0 N	75-30- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	130.00000	206.76	HO	MAYARI ARRIBA
1180	CMGL	CU	21-54- 0 N	79-26- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	129.00000	206.76	SS	SANCTI SPIRITUS
1190	CMGO	CU	22-18- 0 N	79-13- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	130.99998	206.76	SS	YAGUAJAY
1190	CMJL	CU	20- 1- 0 N	75-48- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/P	130.99998	206.76	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
1200	CMGM	CU	21-47- 0 N	79-59- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	101.00000	197.45	SS	TRINIDAD
1200	CMJQ	CU	20-10- 0 N	75-58- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	130.00000	206.76	SC	PALMA SORIANO
1210	CMBN	CU	23- 7- 0 N	82-18- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/P	133.00000	209.15	HA	GUANABACOA
1210	CMJX	CU	19-58- 0 N	76-26- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	133.00000	209.15	SC	CHIVIRICO
1220	CMDM	CU	22-48- 0 N	81- 1- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	133.99998	209.15	MZ	C ESPANA
1230	CMHW	CU	20- 4- 0 N	74-38- 0 W	0.25000 U	N		/C	/J	133.00000	217.20	GU	IMIAS
1230	CMDM	CU	23- 1- 0 N	81-35- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	99.00000	197.45	MZ	MATANZAS
1230	CMHN	CU	21-41- 0 N	77-26- 0 W	0.25000 U	N		/C	/J	140.99998	212.08	CG	GUAIMARO
1250	CMDU	CU	22-17- 0 N	81-12- 0 W	0.25000 U	N		/C	/J	90.00000	193.42	MZ	PLAYA LARGA
1260	CMBM	CU	23- 7- 0 N	82-20- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	118.99999	202.05	HA	REGLA
1270	CMNR	CU	20-23- 0 N	76-37- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/P	139.00000	209.15	GR	BAYAMO
1270	CMDO	CU	22-36- 0 N	81-13- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	139.00000	209.15	MZ	TORRIENTE
1270	CMGR	CU	21-56- 0 N	79-27- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/P	139.00000	209.15	SS	SANCTI SPIRITUS
1280	CMEL	CU	22-26- 0 N	79-56- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	143.00000	211.57	VC	SANTA CLARA
1290	CMBL	CU	23- 4- 0 N	82-23- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/P	186.99998	242.92	HA	CIUDAD HABANA
1290	CMEO	CU	22-53- 0 N	80-23- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	142.00000	211.58	VC	RANCHO VELOZ
1300	CMNQ	CU	20-17- 0 N	76-46- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	125.99999	206.76	GR	E BUEYCITO
1310	CMGL	CU	21-42- 0 N	82-45- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/P	144.00000	214.03	IJ	ISLA JUVENTUD
1310	CMEP	CU	22-48- 0 N	80- 6- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	144.00000	214.03	VC	SAGUA LA GRANDE

FILE: FCC GENERATED ON 111681 AT 22.373 XXXX PAGE 7 XXXX LAST UPDATED ON

FREQ	CALL SIGN	CT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	POWER	HRS	DIR	F/R	D/T ST.	ELECT. HT.	RMS	ST	CITY
TOWER NUMBER	CURRENT RATIO	ORIENTATION (DEGREES)	SPACING (DEGREES)	PHASING (DEGREES)	ELECT. HT. (DEGREES)								
1320	CMBA	CU	20- 0-48 N	75-49- 0 W	1.00000 N	N		3 /	/H	111.95999	175.00	SC	SANTIAGO DE CUBA
1320	CMEN	CU	22-31- 0 N	79-28- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	145.00000	214.03	VC	CAIBARIEN
1330	CMCB	CU	23- 6-30 N	82-22-24 W	1.00000 N	N		3 /	/C	111.95999	175.00	HA	HAVANA
1330	CMKM	CU	20-59- 0 N	75-43- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	145.99998	214.03	HO	BANES
1340	CMFL	CU	22-14- 0 N	80-24- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	147.00000	214.03	CF	PALMIRA
1340	MEW	CU	19-53-11 N	75- 9-24 W	0.25000 U	N		4 /	/H	122.00000	203.00	GU	GUANTANAMO BAY
1350	CMLM	CU	21-12- 0 N	76-37- 0 W	0.25000 U	N		/C	/J	147.99998	217.02	LT	PUERTO PADRE
1350	CMFM	CU	22-23- 0 N	80-55- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	147.99998	204.39	MZ	A B PASAJEROS
1360	CMHW	CU	21-23- 0 N	78-24- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	149.00000	216.50	CG	C RAMIREZ
1370	CMHX	CU	21-33- 0 N	77-16- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	150.00000	216.50	CG	NUEVITAS
1380	CMHY	CU	21-47- 0 N	77-57- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	151.00000	216.50	CG	CENT BRASIL
1390	CMHL	CU	21-20- 0 N	77-52- 0 W	5.00000 U	N		/B	/P	153.00000	216.76	CG	CAMAGUEY
1390	CMCN	CU	23- 2-.0 N	82- 0- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	89.00000	195.20	PH	JARUCO
1400	CMHV	CU	21-41- 0 N	77-26- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	154.00000	216.50	CG	GUAIMARO
1410	CMHP	CU	20-44- 0 N	78- 0- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	154.99998	219.01	CG	SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR
1410	CMHR	CU	20- 7- 0 N	75-13- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/P	154.00000	219.01	GU	GUANTANAMO
1410	CMHQ	CU	22-23- 0 N	83-41- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	154.99998	219.01	PR	PINAR DEL RIO
1420	CMHH	CU	20-20- 0 N	74-29- 0 W	1.00000 U	N		/C	/J	154.99998	219.01	GU	BARACOA
1420	CMDQ	CU	22-43- 0 N	80-54- 0 W	0.25000 U	N		/C	/J	156.00000	217.02	MZ	COLON
1430	CMIN	CU	22- 6- 0 N.	78-37- 0 W	10.00000 U	N		/B	/J	157.00000	219.01	CA	MORON
1440	CMIL	CU	21-52- 0 N	78-44- 0 W	5.00000 U	N		/B	/J	157.99998	219.27	CA	CIEGO DE AVILA
1440	CMCL	CU	22-48- 0 N	82- 1- 0 W	0.25000 U	N		/C	/J	157.99998	219.53	PH	GUINES
1450	CMBX	CU	22-16-20 N	83-50- 0 W	0.25000 N	N		4 /	/N	111.95999	150.00	GU	BARACOA

FILE: FCC GENERATED ON 111681 AT 22.678 ##### PAGE 8 ##### LAST UPDATED ON
FREQ CALL CT LATITUDE LONGITUDE POWER HRS DIR F/R D/I ELECT. RMS ST CITY
KHZ SIGN ST. HT.

TOWER CURRENT ORIENTATION SPACING PHASING ELECT. HT.

NUMBER RATIO (DEGREES) (DEGREES) (DEGREES) (DEGREES)

1450 CMLN CU 20-45- 0 N 77-34- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 159.00000 221.55 LT C AMANCIO R

1450 CMJN CU 20- 1- 0 N 75-49- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 106.00000 197.45 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA

1460 CMMZ CU 21-40- 0 N 76-45- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 159.00000 221.55 CB SOLA

1470 CMDP CU 23- 2- 0 N 81-12- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 118.00000 204.39 MZ CARDENAS

1480 CMMR CU 21-30- 0 N 78-13- 0 W 0.25000 U N /C /J 162.99998 224.65 CG FLORIDA

1490 CMGM CU 20-39- 0 N 75-40- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 164.00000 226.71 HO MAYARI

1490 CMCN CU 22-57- 0 N 82- 9- 0 W 0.25000 U N /C /J 86.00000 193.42 PN SAN JOSE

1500 CMGR CU 20-52- 0 N 76-16- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 164.00000 224.11 HO HOLGUIN

1500 CMEN CU 22-24- 0 N 79-57- 0 W 0.25000 U N /C /P 110.00000 200.22 VC SANTA CLARA

1510 CMGN CU 21-21- 0 N 77-52- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /P 166.00000 224.11 CB CAMAGUEY

1510 CMCO CU 22-53- 0 N 82-30- 0 W 0.25000 U N /C /J 107.99999 202.53 PN SAN ANTONIO DE LOS

1520 CMJU CU 20-10- 0 N 75-58- 0 W 1.00000 U K /C /J 166.00000 224.11 SC PALMA SORIANO

1530 CMIN CU 22- 6- 0 N 79-27- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 168.00000 226.71 CA MORON

1540 CMJZ CU 20-11- 0 N 75-51- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /J 168.00000 226.71 SC SAN LUIS

1550 CMMO CU 21-33- 0 N 77-16- 0 W 0.25000 U N /C /J 169.99998 227.25 CG NUEVITAS

1550 CMOR CU 21-52- 0 N 82-47- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /P 168.99998 229.33 PN NUEVA GERONA

1560 CMIR CU 21-58- 0 N 78-45- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /P 169.99998 229.33 CA CIEGO DE AVILA

1560 CMDR CU 23- 3- 0 N 81-35- 0 W 1.00000 U N /C /P 169.99998 226.71 MZ MATANZAS

1560 CMJM CU 20- 1- 0 N 75-48- 0 W 0.50000 U N /C /P 171.00000 229.61 SC SANTIAGO DE CUBA

1580 CMMG CU 20-44- 0 N 78- 0- 0 W 0.25000 U N /C /J 173.00000 227.25 CG SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR

1590 CMMM CU 20-20- 0 N 77- 8- 0 W 0.50000 U N /C /J 174.00000 234.95 GR MANZANILLO

PRINT MENU
(A)LL RECORDS PRINTED
(U)SER SELECTED RECORDS PRINTED
(T)ERMINATE PRINT OPTION
SELECTION ? T

PROGRAM OPTIONS

(U)PDATE DATA BASE

Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the computer facilities and cooperation of the Federal Communications Commission. We would also like to extend our appreciation to the offices of Jules Cohen and Associates for their technical and engineering expertise.

National Association of Broadcasters
March 1, 1982

SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA
March 30, 1982

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba held its third meeting in closed session on Tuesday, March 30, 1982, in Room 6909 of the Department of State, at 10:00 a.m. Attending were Chairman F. Clifton White, Members William B. Bayer, Jorge L. Mas, Richard M. Scaife, Senator Richard B. Stone, Dr. Tirso del Junco, George Jacobs and Herbert Schmertz; as well as Ambassador George W. Landau, Executive Director; Peter P. Lord, Deputy Executive Director; Kenneth R. Giddens, Consultant, James Duncan, Department of Defense; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Myles Frechette, ARA/CCA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; Yale Newman, ICA; and Secretaries Jessica Monk and Eydie Gaskins. Arriving later to the meeting were Mr. Kalman Schaefer, Assistant to the Chairman for International Communications at the FCC; and Mr. William Jahn, EB/TD, Department of State.

Chairman White introduced the morning's agenda, which would include discussion of legislative progress to date, consideration of transmitter sites and broadcast frequencies, and preparation of an interim report on Commission progress.

Ambassador Landau summarized the progress of the proposed legislation to date, citing the favorable vote in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 24. He described the bill as amended by Congressman Fascell, namely to place radio broadcasting to Cuba under the Board of International Broadcasting and to authorize BIB to compensate American broadcasters for costs incurred as a result of Cuban radio interference. He also described the amendment proposed by Mr. Leach, authorizing BIB to utilize VOA's Marathon transmitter and AM frequency for broadcasting to Cuba on an optional basis, which was approved by the Committee. He added that the Senate appropriations subcommittee hearings are scheduled for April 20 and that the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold authorization hearings on April 22.

Discussion of oversight responsibility for broadcasting to Cuba then ensued. The difference between the bill originally proposed by the Administration and that approved by the Committee, which provided for immediate BIB oversight, was noted. Depending on the version of the bill resulting from Senate consideration, the responsibility of resolving the question of oversight would fall to the joint Senate-House conference committee, at which time the Commission could make a final recommendation.

Given the favorable action by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Commission discussed the possibility of activating Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., which has already been incorporated as an independent, non-profit organization in the District of Columbia. The possibility was raised of appointing key operating officers to begin planning in a preliminary way for recruiting and programming in order to be ready to proceed rapidly once Congressional authorization and appropriations were received. This preliminary planning could be undertaken with private funds available to the Commission. Chairman White agreed to consult with House and Senate leaders on activating RBC, Inc., in this manner.

Options were then discussed with regard to transmitter sites and frequencies which could be used for Radio Marti.

The Chairman also asked the Members of the Commission to submit suggestions in writing for inclusion in an interim report on Commission progress to date to be considered at the next Commission meeting scheduled for April 16. A subsequent meeting of the Commission was scheduled for May 3.

The Commission met in open session in the afternoon at 2:00 p.m. in Room 1406 of the Department of State. Attending were Chairman F. Clifton White, Members, William B. Bayer, Jorge L. Mas, Senator Richard B. Stone, Dr. Tirso del Junco, George Jacobs; as well as Ambassador George W. Landau, Executive Director; Peter P. Lord, Deputy Executive Director; Kenneth R. Giddens, Consultant; James Duncan, Department of Defense; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Myles Frechette, ARA/CCA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; Yale Newman, ICA; and Secretaries Jessica Monk and Eydie Gaskins.

Chairman White announced that a statement which Senator Grassley of Iowa had hoped to deliver in person would be provided subsequently and made part of the record. (A copy of his statement is attached.)

Mr. Robert Engelhardt,Vice President of Palmer Communications, Inc., which owns and operates WHO in Des Moines, then read a prepared statement expressing concern at possible future Cuban radio interference and provided a copy of a report on WHO to the Commission members.

Mr. Glenn Wilkenson of the Bonneville International Corporation, representing radio station KSL in Salt Lake City, also read a statement expressing similar concern with regard to Cuban radio interference.

Mr. Jules Cohn, a private consultant and radio engineer, then gave a brief explanation of the difference between jamming and interference.

The meeting adjourned at approximately 3:00 p.m.

Attachment - Senator Grassley's Statement dated March 30, 1982.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY

BEFORE

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

MARCH 30, 1982

I appreciate this opportunity to express my deep concerns about the potential effect of operating the proposed Radio Marti as presently planned. Specifically, I am referring to the disastrous consequences for the WHO Broadcasting Company that will result if Cuba carries out its threat to jam Radio Marti with a 500,000 watt AM station. WHO, which shares Radio Marti's proposed frequency of 1040 kHz, would be harmed immensely in the event that Cuba retaliates. This Cuban action not only would spell ruin in terms of WHO operations, but also would destroy a marketing and production informational tool that thousands of farm families have come to rely upon over the past several decades.

In addition to my service in Congress and the Iowa General Assembly, I have farmed most of my life. I recognize and appreciate the importance of being able to depend upon WHO at 5 or 6 a.m. to provide important farm news, weather forecasts, farm market quotations, etc. Farmers must start very early in the morning to begin their daily livestock chores and to get to the fields. Information provided by WHO in those early hours shapes the management decisions of the farmer not only

for that immediate day, but also for the weeks ahead for the year. Farmers must have this valuable, timely information if they are to operate effectively and successfully.

It is not only the Iowa farmer who depends upon WHO's pre-dawn broadcast services. WHO's broadcast covers 1,714,377 square miles during the evening and pre-dawn hours. With this range, WHO can reach farmers from over 30 states and Canada. If Cuba retaliates as threatened, this coverage would be reduced to fewer than 6000 square miles, reducing the station's broadcast radius from 800 miles to about 45 miles. Needless to say, this action would deprive most of Iowa's farmers from the essential information offered by WHO, let alone the hundreds of thousands of farm families throughout the rest of the region.

While I fully support the purposes and goals of Radio Marti, in light of the severe damage that the present plans will create for WHO and farmers throughout the Nation, I strongly urge the selection of one of the many viable alternative operating plans that exist for Radio Marti. These alternatives can provide the same positive results at a lower cost, while avoiding the tremendous damage to WHO service.

The most feasible alternative would be to utilize the existing Voice of America facility at Marathon, Florida. Since this station is used only a few hours a day, there would be plenty of broadcasting time available to serve the purposes of Radio Marti. Another positive aspect of this alternative is the fact that Radio Marti could be operational immediately, at little

or no additional cost to the government. As a member of the Senate Budget Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, I am acutely sensitive to the unnecessary, avoidable expenses of government. It seems to me a waste to spend over $10 million to build and operate Radio Marti when other less costly facilitie are available. Furthermore, there exists even weaker logic for these enormous expenditures, for a radio station that could be rendered immediately ineffective by Cuban retaliatory jamming. For those who suggest that we cannot afford to jeopardize Radio Marathon's operation, I suggest that we likewise cannot justify the destruction of one of the finest farm radio operations in the country.

If the threat from Cuban retaliation is determined to be too real to jeopardize Radio Marathon, and since there is no justification for ruining the operations of WHO, other alternatives may require additional consideration. It is possible that we might be able to use a Mexican clear-channel frequency if permission can be obtained; we might be able to utilize a flexible FM signal that would be far more difficult to jam; the use of 1200 Kilohertz presents another alternative that would also be more difficult to jam; and it would also be possible to broadcast from air or sea.

In summary, Radio Marti must be operated in a manner that minimizes the costs to our citizens and to our government. Utilizing 1040 kHz will destroy a very valuable service provided by WHO for the hundreds of thousands of farmers and

other radio listeners around the country in the event that Cuba carries out its threat. If the State Department and other government officials determine that there is no real threat, then Radio Marathon should be utilized because of the cost savings as well as many other benefits that this alternative presents. If the Cuban retaliation threat is real and imminent, then we must not waste taxpayers money by building Radio Marti, as well as allow the destruction of a fine farm radio service. Instead, a workable alternative must be developed.

Thank you for this opportunity to present my views. appreciate your consideration.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. ENGELHARDT
VICE PRESIDENT, PALMER COMMUNICATIONS INCORPORATED
BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
BROADCASTING TO CUBA
MARCH 30, 1982

My name is Robert G. Engelhardt. I am Vice President of Palmer Communications Incorporated. Palmer is the licensee of Radio Station WHO located in Des Moines, Iowa. With me are Charles McKerns and Kenneth Salomon of the law firm of Dow, Lohnes and Albertson. I welcome this opportunity to testify on the relationship between Radio Marti and WHO.

WHO is a Class 1-A clear channel AM radio station broadcasting on 1040 KHz with 50 kw of power. Radio Marti is slated to operate from Saddlebunch, Florida on 1040 KHz with 50 kw. WHO's nighttime service area encompasses 1,714,337 square miles. Approximately 40 million people in 32 states are able to receive WHO at night. One of our most vital services is our 5:30-6:30 a.m. farm and agribusiness news, weather and market reports for <u>all</u> major Midwestern market terminals. During much of the year, these are nighttime hours. Hundreds of thousands of farmers across the Midwest make their marketing decisions based on these reports. That is, they frequently

decide whether to buy or sell livestock or agricultural commodities on a given day based upon the price quotes they are able to receive via WHO in the early morning hours. No other station in the region carries such extensive farm and agribusiness information.

We are deeply concerned that Cuba's announced plans to jam Radio Marti with up to 500 kw of power will destroy WHO's nighttime service, including its vital farm market reports. Such jamming will shrink WHO's coverage from a radius of 800 miles to a radius of 45 miles, from 1,700,000 square miles to 5,900 square miles -- a 99.65 percent decrease. We have distributed a brochure about WHO, its nearly 58 year history of service and the devastating impact that Cuban retaliation against Radio Marti will have on the station and its audience.

WHO takes no position on the need of our government to broadcast the "truth" about the Cuban government to the people of Cuba. We do question, however, whether Radio Marti, operating on WHO's frequency of 1040 KHz, is the most efficient and economical way to deliver the message. We are also concerned about the impact Cuba's proposal to operate more than 180 AM stations will have on U.S. broadcasters and their audiences.

Over the past month, we have had numerous discussions about Radio Marti, the Cuban retaliation by way of jamming and its impact on Midwestern farmers and WHO with members of this Commission, and representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the State Department and the Defense Department. In this regard, let me say at the outset that we are astonished that no one involved with Radio Marti has yet contacted WHO about the use of 1040 KHz. We only learned of the decision to use 1040 KHz through press reports and our own efforts in coming to Washington to talk to as many people involved in this project as possible. Many said that we were to be consulted, but no one made the effort. We have also met with the entire Iowa Congressional delegation as well as with members of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance concerning the effect of current and projected Cuban radio interference on U.S. broadcasters.

In the course of our discussions, it became clear that the use of other technologies and broadcast services were at best insufficiently studied before it was decided to build an AM station on 1040 KHz. The ease

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of jamming a single AM station and the effect of that jamming on U.S. broadcasters was not considered at all by the FCC and other agencies in this process. Until we raised it at the Defense Department no thought was given to using AM frequencies below 540 and above 1600 KHZ to avoid Cuban jamming of Radio Marti from destroying U.S. commercial stations.

Cuba has announced that it will jam Radio Marti. From its point of view, Radio Marti's broadcasts can only be considered provocative. It is naive to think that the station will not be jammed. Cuba said it would do so when it walked out of the Region 2 Conference on AM Broadcasting in mid-December of last year. Indeed, one member of this Commission has said that "you have to be an awful optimist to think that" Cuba will not jam Radio Marti. In a December 1981 report entitled International Shortwave Broadcasting and Direct Broadcast Satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti (H.R. Report Number 398, 97th Congress, 1st Session), the House Committee on Government Operations noted that international radio broadcasts have been jammed since their inception. For example, the Soviet Union began jamming of Radio Liberty within ten minutes of its

going on the air. There is no reason to think Cuba will do less.

There is a kind of "Catch-22" illogic to this situation. If Radio Marti were not judged to be effectively serving its purpose of broadcasting the "truth" to Cuba it would be an expensive folly. Yet to the extent it does serve that purpose, it encourages and perhaps compels the Cuban government to resort to jamming techniques, and it is clearly within their capability in this instance to render it an expensive folly.

After reports in Broadcasting magazine at least as early as November 2, 1981 that 1040 KHz would be used for Radio Marti, Cuba amended its AM inventory during the week of December 7, 1981 moving its two 500 kw stations from 550 and 1010 KHz to 1040 and 1160 KHz. This timing sequence has been acknowledged by FCC Chairman Fowler. Cuba's action, therefore, came after press reports in August of U.S. plans to build Radio Marti, after the President signed Executive Order 12323 on September 22, 1981 creating this Commission and after then National Security Advisor Richard Allen formally announced Radio Marti on September 23, 1981.

If the goal of Radio Marti is to actually deliver the truth to the Cuban people rather than to serve as a domestic political symbol or to provoke a radio war, we suggest that the project as currently planned will fail and that the government's $10 million investment will be totally wasted -- not to mention that WHO and its millions of listeners will be irreparably damaged.

There are a number of options to the current plan. The Government Operations Committee said that one proven method of maximizing the chance of international broadcasts overcoming jamming and reaching their intended audience is to broadcast on multiple frequencies. The Committee said that

> [m]ultiple frequency broadcasting gives the jammer more to deal with and increases the possibility that listeners will be able to tune in an audible signal. Since the international broadcasts are monitored by the receiving nation, one channel must be left unjammed and it is possible for the listener to find that one channel.

With this background, it is clear that the better way to get a message to Cuba is by simultaneously utilizing a combination of AM, FM, TV and shortwave signals. This can easily be done without investing $2\frac{1}{2}$-4 million dollars in a new station. The Voice of America's

Radio Marathon in Florida, is an existing, underutilized 50 kw facility on 1180 KHz, which is received in Cuba, and can be used in conjunction with shortwave broadcasts as well as leasing time on commercial AM, FM and TV stations in Gulf Coast states. The Government Operations Committee noted that shortwave has been, and continues to be, the primary means of transmitting news and information across international borders and, that with regard to Cuba, U.S. commercial television and radio broadcasts are received on that island. While there may be fewer FM and shortwave receivers than AM receivers in Cuba, FM and shortwave are more difficult to jam. Therefore, given that difficulty, more Cubans would be able to hear unjammed shortwave and FM broadcasts than jammed AM broadcasts.

Parenthetically, I should note that these are reliable reports, recounted in the Chicago Tribune, the Miami Herald and elsewhere, that Spanish language commercials carried on Miami Spanish-language commercial radio stations, reflecting the relative abundance of American life, are among the most devastating rebuttals of the Cuban government's message to its own people. These also carry an internal credibility that may be difficult to

match with a government owned, operated and programmed facility.

If it is decided to employ only a single government-owned AM station, no compelling reason exists in the current budget situation for building a new facility at a cost of many million dollars rather than taking over or leasing time on Radio Marathon, which is now operating only 5½ hours per day. Radio Marathon broadcasts for 1½ hours in the morning and between 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. We understand that studies of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty indicate that late night hours are "prime time" for international broadcasts. The physical broadcast plant is in place and ready to go, literally on a moment's notice. Any possible legal impediment to the use of the VOA station would be solved by passage of H.R. 5427 as amended on March 24. Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa proposed, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee adopted, a provision permitting Radio Marti to use Radio Marathon's frequency. We also note that Charles Z. Wick, Director of the U.S. International Communication Agency, testified on March 24 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations that ICA plans to build several AM stations in the Caribbean to

reach Central America and the Caribbean basin. That being the case, it is only natural to ask why Radio Marti cannot operate on one of these new facilities thereby protecting U.S. stations on the Radio Marti frequency from jamming?

One final comment about the use of Radio Marathon. It is fundamental that the government must weigh the benefits to be gained in broadcasting to Cuba against the risk that Cuba will jam the broadcasts resulting in a loss of $10 million. Cuba has made its intentions clear and the capability exists to carry out these intentions. Private enterprise has been asked to do much by this Administration, but it seems to us that if there is a risk that a station's service will be destroyed by Cuban jamming, it should be the government's station, Radio Marathon, that should initially be placed in jeopardy on the front lines rather than private broadcasters' stations. It is grossly unfair to place the burden on WHO when the government has a facility that is ready and available for Radio Marti.

The State Department has testified that one principle codified in the International Telecommunications Union rules is that the AM band is for <u>domestic</u> use

and that shortwave frequencies are the proper medium for international broadcasts. See the testimony of Richard Shrum, Office of International Communications Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, before the Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, October 23, 1981.

Therefore, we must ask will Radio Marti be legal under international law? Operation of Radio Marti on 1040 KHz may well interfere with stations on that frequency in other Western Hemisphere countries. Honduras, Guatamala, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Columbia and the Dominican Republic, for example, have or propose to have stations on that frequency. The U.S. listed 1040 KHz at Saddlebunch, Florida in our Region 2 inventory. But it is on List B, which is a tentative allocation subject to bilateral negotiations with our neighbors.

As you know, U.S. broadcasters in the Southeast, particularly in Florida, already receive interference from Cuba. It is a serious problem. And Cuba's Region 2 AM inventory will, according to the National Association of Broadcasters, result in interference to more than 200 U.S. stations in 32 states and the District

of Columbia. Until the announcement of Radio Marti, last summer's bilateral Cuban-U.S. negotiations to resolve mutual interference problems were surprisingly encouraging. All hopes of a negotiated settlement evaporated with the announcement of Radio Marti. But, who will be perceived as the "aggressor" in this radio war? Some, perhaps including many of our Latin American neighbors, would say that the U.S. government's establishment of Radio Marathon in 1962, which was outside of the North American Regional Broadcast Agreement, set the stage.

In summary, WHO is deeply concerned that Cuban jamming of Radio Marti, operating on 1040 KHz, will effectively end its nighttime service and, in particular, its farm and agribusiness reports so vital to the marketing decisions and the economic well being of hundreds of thousands of farmers throughout the entire Midwest. We think it is grossly unfair for the government to put WHO and its listeners in jeopardy when Radio Marathon can provide the desired service -- in short, it is the government's place to bear the risk in the first instance, not WHO and its listeners. We are also concerned that the combination of Cuba's inventory and the operation of Radio Marti will make the existing problem of Cuban inter-

ference far more serious than it is now. And Radio Marti, as experience of last summer shows, will make negotiations impossible. If the project to broadcast to Cuba must go forward, far more desirable, workable and efficient means exist to deliver the message so as to maximize the chance of the Cuban people to hear it.

Thank you for the time you have given us today. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

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RADIO STATION WHO

"The Voice of the Middlewest"
Des Moines, Iowa

On Saturday, April 10, 1982, Radio Station WHO, Des Moines, will observe 58 years of service to millions of radio families in Mid-America. On the occasion of its receipt of the broadcast industry's coveted "Mike Award" February 7, 1966, the Governor of Iowa, The Honorable Harold E. Hughes, described its history in the following manner:

> "Steadily, reliably, and constantly, WHO has grown ... ever pursuing a course of service."

From its first broadcast nearly 58 years ago, WHO has proudly met its obligations to the public with a programming philosophy of service through quality, integrity and responsibility.

Reflecting the pioneer spirt of the Palmer family, which acquired the young station from The Bankers Life Company of Des Moines in 1930 -- and despite a Depression-born skepticism about the future of radio broadcasting -- WHO recognized early the need of a well-rounded radio service to its listeners.

In 1933, WHO was granted 50,000 watts to serve a vast segment of the Midwest, and in 1941 became a 1-A Clear Channel station to provide interference free service to distant areas.

Accepting the challenge of serving a wide area of audience, WHO took its first step in becoming a distinguished leader in broadcast journalism when it established a large, professionally staffed and fully equipped news department under the leadership of H. R. Gross and Jack Shelley.

Continued.....

One of the first truly non-network radio news operations in the nation, the WHO News Bureau (as it was then known) quickly achieved a reputation for responsible reporting and balanced coverage that still is demonstrated daily.

There is no greater measurement of the respect held for the WHO radio news department than that expressed by its peers -- the National Association of Radio-TV News Directors who four times since the mid-Fifties named it the "Best Radio News Operation in the United States."

News stories normally left to the networks to cover became standard assignments for WHO's News Bureau staffers. During World War II, two full-time members of the News Bureau were accredited as war correspondents to both the European and Pacific theaters. WHO's listeners heard interviews with Iowans fighting in battle areas and first-hand accounts by its reporters of the "Battle of the Bulge," the signing of the German Army's surrender and the Japanese surrender aboard the U.S.S. Missouri. Later, the war in Vietnam was covered by WHO Radio News Director Bob Wilbanks.

The WHO News Bureau also served as the catalyst for many public service projects: During World War II, it sold $6,153,400 worth of Treasury Bonds to 25,000 investors in 46 states. Following the war, 17,000 listeners answered News Bureau appeals and dispatched 260,000 parcels (1,430 tons) of clothing to destitute families in Europe. The Greek government later named city streets for "WHO", "Des Moines" and "Iowa."

Later years found the radio news department turning its attention to other public needs, such as during recent spring floods in South Dakota when the department acted as a clearing house for information about Iowans trapped in the area and provided Red Cross chapters throughout the midlands with assistance for emergency appeals and messages.

Continued.....

Today, WHO Newsradio has a staff of 17, including two WHO Newsradio Washington reporters, plus 25 midwest correspondents. This is one of the largest 24-hour radio news staffs in mid-America and is responsible for a heavy schedule of newscasts that total 45 hours weekly. The staff is supported by extensive technical equipment and news-gathering services.

In keeping with its long tradition of nighttime news service to a wide geographical area, WHO Newsradio's 10:00-10:30 p.m. newscast draws on an 11-state regional news printer service, as well as its own staff and regional correspondents. A typical 10 p.m. newscast can include top news stories from Nebraska, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, the Dakotas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and other mid-America states, plus multi-state weather forecasts as a service to farmers throughout rural regions of the country.

And, each year during the area's severe winter weeks, WHO Newsradio broadcasts as many as 400 to 500 school and business closings -- many from surrounding states -- during each day's early morning and evening newscasts. For many of the rural and small community schools, WHO Newsradio is the only "official" source of such information.

WHO's program history has been closely linked to the economic history of its primary and secondary service areas. Farming and agriculture-related business by far has been the most important industry in Iowa, and it has had a dominating significance in the surrounding states of the Midwest, South and West.

WHO broadcast its first farm program in 1934 and in August, 1936, established the radio industry's first broadcast department specializing in agricultural journalism.

In establishing the nation's first radio farm department, WHO adopted a schedule of farm information, news, weather, markets and other services of productive interest to farm families and businesses and industry allied to agriculture.

The WHO Farm Service Department, in its continuing endeavor to be of complete service to the agriculture industry, originated "National Soil Conservation Field Days," an annual event now rotated throughout the midwest. Described by Dr. Hugh Bennett, former Chief of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, as "one of the most important things that has taken place on American farm lands...", one of WHO's Field Day programs was attended by more than 250,000 people.

WHO has also sponsored or co-sponsored a number of other special agricultural events, including the Iowa School Fire Prevention campaign, WHO Farm Safety contests, farm family days, tractor rodeos, and master swine producers awards functions.

Continued.....

This tradition of service to the farmer continues unmatched in today's radio programming, with more than 150 separate farm programs broadcast weekly under the direction of WHO's four-member Farm Service Department.

Special attention is given by WHO's Farm Service Department to marketing and weather information, some of which is not available from most other radio stations in mid-America. For example, livestock and commodity reports broadcast early each morning and again during the 10 p.m. news cover not only Iowa market points, county elevator reports, The Chicago Board of Trade and The Commodity Mercantile Exchange, but also terminals at the following locations:

Omaha	St. Louis	Indianapolis
Sioux City	West Fargo	Louisville
Peoria	Kansas City	Sioux Falls
Joliet	Wichita	
St. Paul	St. Joseph	

Daily wide area state weather forecasts, vital to farmers and agricultural-related businesses, are presented at 5:45 a.m. and within the 10 p.m. news for the following states: Wyoming, Colorado, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Minnesota, Illinois and Wisconsin.

Weather information is of vital concern to nearly everyone, and in an effort to determine exact needs of its listeners, WHO recently requested comments from listeners to the 5:45 a.m. weather. More than 200 letters and cards were received, with about one-third from states other than Iowa.

Some of the comments included:

"I listen to WHO's early morning weather every morning as I go to work..."

Frank Ketson, R. 8, Kingsport, Tenn.

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"...Keep the weather news on..."

R. A. Tyler, R. 2, Morristown, Tenn.

-0-

"...Keep the weather report coming..."

Al Heard, Saltsburg, PA

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"...We really enjoy the weather news..."

Earl E. Schroeder, Columbus, Georgia

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Continued.....

"...Hearing your early weather news, we can usually predict our own a day or two ahead of time..."

Ruth Braucht, Chestertown, Maryland

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"...We hear you every morning on the farm program..."

Robert M. Hubbard, Montgomery, Alabama

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"Your weather reports are valued highly since they indicate what weather we can expect here the following day..."

Paul A. Doyle, Pittston, PA

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"...The weather forecasts are valuable to me."

Edward Daily, RR #3, Milan, MO

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"Keep those weather forecasts coming. Yours is the only clear, concise program I can find for the information I need..."

N. Henkins, RR, Newark, MO

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"We listen more to that (5:45 a.m.) forecast (program) than any other in the morning, because our weather comes from most of those states..."

E. W. Hanson, 2614 Shelby Rd., La Crosse, WI

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"WHO is the only station giving the weather for Missouri and all surrounding states and that is really helpful when traveling..."

Carrol Surtzer, Bucklin, MO

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"...I like to hear the weather report for the crops, plus I get an idea on what we might expect in the way of weather coming this way..."

Maurice Pahr, Bridgeport Twp., Saginaw, MI

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Continued.....

"...It is the best weather information we can get for our area."

R. E. Bilderback, Trucking & Cornshelling,
Bowen, IL

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The response to WHO's long dedication to serving the agricultural industry is best evidenced by farmers' listening measurements. The 1980 Doane Farm Media Measurement Study for Iowa showed that 50 percent of Iowa's farmers indicated they depended upon WHO farm programs and farm broadcasters for markets, farm news, weather and other information -- almost equal to all of the other commercial Iowa broadcasters and stations combined!

Additionally, the Arbitron Iowa Farm Radio Study of March/April 1981 gave WHO 75.2 percent share of the farm listenership in the ADI area vs. the number two station's 22.9 percent.

The significant contributions by the WHO Farm Service Department and members of its staff in the interests of farmers and agricultural-related audiences have been recognized through the years with hundreds of national, regional, and state awards and citations -- including the famed duPont Award for "Outstanding Public Service." WHO three times has been the recipient of the prestigious "Oscar in Agriculture" for specific farm programs.

A recent and partial list of awards and recognition includes:

NAMA/Iowa Dept. of Agriculture "Friend of Agriculture" award "for providing needed information to farmers..."

Iowa Veterinary Medical Association award "for broadcasting needed information to livestock producers..."

Iowa State University "Friends of Extension" award "for promoting farm safety..."

American Soybean Association "Broadcast Media Award" for "outstanding and long-term coverage of soybean related news to midwest farmers..."

Iowa Cattlemens Association "for coverage of cattlemens activities throughout Iowa..."

Iowa Beef Improvement Association "for outstanding service..."

Soil Conservation Society of America, Iowa chapter, "Friends of Conservation" award for "consistent coverage of soil conservation meetings and events..."

Iowa Wildlife Federation "Conservation Communicator of the Year" award...

Continued.....

Iowa Association of Future Farmers of America "Distinguished Service" award for communicating "rural America's story..."

Peace Corps citation for "recognition in the Peace Corps/Agriculture recruiting effort..."

Insurance Association "Loss Prevention Award" for coordinating state's fire prevention programs in rural schools.

Mid-America Dairymen award "for long and devoted service to dairymen and farmers..."

National Safety Council award "for exceptional service to farm safety..."

Agriculture Council of America citation "for support in achieving the goal of a better informed public..."

Geigy-National Association of Farm Broadcasters award "for excellence in farm broadcasting..."

4-H citation "for outstanding service and effective coverage of local, state and national 4-H events..."

And, a letter of special commendation from the U. S. Department of Agriculture's Stabilization and Conservation Service for WHO Farmradio's "timely interviews concerning the 1978 disaster and set-aside program in aiding us to disseminate program details rapidly to the farmers...your radio broadcasts were one of the most important factors for an excellent sign-up in the set-aside program in Iowa..."

Today, WHO continues to afford this important farm broadcast service to the hundreds of thousands of farm and rural families in Iowa and surrounding states, with its observance of the following daily farm broadcast schedule, Monday through Saturday:

FARM SERVICE BROADCAST SCHEDULE

Monday through Saturday

5:30-5:40 AM - General News

5:40-5:45 AM - Farm News

5:45-5:50 AM - 11-State Weather Forecasts (Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Wyoming)

5:50-5:55 AM - Farm News

5:55-6:00 AM - Previous Day's Closing Farm Market Quotations

6:00-6:05 AM - Farm News 11-State Weather Forecasts

6:05-6:15 AM - Anticipated Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals

6:15-6:20 AM - Calendar of Day's Principal Agricultural Events

6:20-6:30 AM - Summary, Farm News, 11-State Weather Forecasts, Previous Day's Closing Farm Market Quotations, Anticipated Receipts at Principal Livestock Terminals, Farm Calendar

6:40-6:45 AM - Anticipated Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals

9:30-9:35 AM - Opening Farm Markets

10:30-10:35 AM- Opening Farm Markets

11:30-11:40 AM- Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals

11:55A-12 Noon - Farm News

12 N-12:15 PM - Farm News, Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts, 11-State Weather Forecasts

12:15-12:30 PM- Farm News and Commentary

12:45-1:00 PM - Farm Commentary

1:00-1:05 PM - Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts

1:30-1:35 PM - Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts

2:30-2:35 PM - Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts

3:30-3:35 PM - Clsoing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts

4:45-5:00 PM - Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts

5:55-6:00 PM - Closing Farm Markets, Livestock Terminal Receipts

Continued ...

6:25-6:30 PM - Farm Markets Final, including Closing Farm Market Quotations, Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals, and 11-State Weather Forecasts

10:00-10:15 PM- Within Body of General Newscast, 5-Minute Insert Covering Day's Closing Farm Market Quotations, Receipts at Interior Iowa, Omaha, Sioux City, Peoria, Joliet, St. Paul, St. Louis, and Chicago Livestock Terminals, and 11-State Weather Forecasts

WHO has always had a deep awareness of the public interest and involvement in its programming and in 1965 introduced to the community the first of a now greatly-expanded audience-participation telephone talk show concept. These eight separate programs, each with its own hosts, are now scheduled seven days a week for a total of 12½ hours daily and 75½ hours weekly.

Utilizing nine local and toll-free WATS telephone lines, interfaced with a specially designed computer control system to insure free and easy participation in the programs locally and throughout the nation, the talk shows afford air time for all shades of opinion and discussion. They are truly "public access" programs.

Total number of calls attempted and answered for each of WHO's talk shows are recorded on an automatic "call-counter" device constructed by Northwestern Bell and tied into WHO Talkradio's in-studio computer system, which also records origin of calls, whether caller is male or female, and subject matter to be discussed.

Continued ...

WHO's analyst during its play-by-play coverage of Iowa football; "Call Hayden Fry," the Iowa football coach; and "Call Lute Olson," the Iowa basketball coach. Each of these shows is once per week.

The widespread interest in University of Iowa athletics through WHO broadcasts can be seen in the number of states represented by callers to the seasonal special talk shows: "Call Evy" -- 12 states; "Call Hayden Fry" -- 15 states; "Call Lute Olson" -- 13 states.

From its earliest broadcast years WHO has recognized the sharp interest its audience has in sports programming. The station's first college football play-by-play origination occurred in 1926 (Drake vs. Notre Dame) and it has maintained a strong posture in coverage of collegiate, high school and professional sports.

The 1982 University of Iowa football schedule marked WHO's 50th consecutive season of play-by-play coverage of the Hawkeyes, beginning with Ronald Reagan's first broadcast as WHO Sports Director.

WHO's coverage of Iowa football was best described in November, 1981, by a Minneapolis newspaper sports columnist in his characterization of Hawkeye football fans:

> "They (Iowa fans) may wander the desert forever looking for the promised land of Pasadena, but you'll never hear them whimper. And as they go they will listen to information about the Hawkeyes from WHO Radio in Des Moines...WHO covers Iowa football like the networks cover political conventions. Thoroughly."

Iowa's fans, incidentally, did make it across the desert to Pasadena when the Hawkeyes won co-championship of the Big Ten Conference and played in the 1982 New Year's Day Rose Bowl game. Named as the "official" originating station for the play-by-play by the University of Iowa was WHO. Said C.W. Elliott, Director of Athletics, in announcing his selection of WHO as the university's "official" station:

> "The WHO signal reaches more Iowa fans than any other station."

The station has been able to serve Iowa fans across the nation with its daytime play-by-play coverage of football and basketball by the use of a unique programming concept -- nighttime rebroadcasts of those games.

Not all of WHO's programming centers around news blocks, farm news, talk shows or sports events. But all of it does carry the beat of information -- even its "Country Music/USA", 1:00-5:30 a.m. nightly, which provides newscasts every half hour from the WHO 24-hour news staff, as well as a service particularly valuable to truckers and travelers: Continuous updates on weather forecasts from the direct wires of the National Weather Service and road conditions throughout the nation, including major travel advisories, storm warnings, and highway patrol road reports in any state whenever conditions warrant.

Continued.....

In addition to the regular sources of information about roads and weather conditions throughout the country, WHO's all-night music is supported by a network of AAA Motor Club contacts along the major interstate routes who report to the station with last minute road and weather information.

Some WHO programming is designed to provide responsive service to a very specialized group of listeners. Each Sunday evening WHO broadcasts a locally-produced half-hour program -- "The Voice of Southest Asians" -- entirely in Vietnamese and Thaidam-Lao languages and featuring music, news and public service information for the more than 4,000 natives of Southeast Asia now living in Iowa. WHO was the first radio station in the nation to broadcast a regularly scheduled program for Southeast Asians.

Occasionally, WHO's service to its public brings surprising -- and dramatic -- responses. On Wednesday, December 30, an unemployed Urbandale, Iowa, resident wrote the Des Moines Register he would commit suicide by midnight, December 31, so that his family would be eligible for welfare benefits. The letter, printed in that day's Register, received widespread attention and initiated a search by authorities for the writer.

The following day the man turned himself in to authorities and, according to the Register's story, he told authorities a listener's telephone call to WHO's "Clear Channel Conversation" Wednesday night, in which she pleaded to the writer to reconsider his threat, "persuaded him to change his mind -- and to seek help."

The following Sunday -- January 3 --an Ankeny, Iowa, man called WHO's "Sunday Talk Radio" program and told hosts Dena Michaels and Jim Frye he planned to shoot his wife and then himself because, he said, life's problems were overwhelming him. For more than two hours, Ms. Michaels and Mr. Frye kept the caller on the air while authorities traced the call and reached the man.

The next day's Des Moines Tribune reported: "Local officials praised two WHO-Radio talk show hosts today for their 'diligence and sensitivity'... they did a super job of keeping him talking..."

However, as dramatic as those two program incidents were, it has been WHO's long history of constant dedication to programming excellence, to public service, to integrity and to pioneering in new broadcasting techniques that earned it The American Women in Radio-Television's 1979 award for:

"Outstanding Achievement in Radio Station Performance."

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Continued.....

But not all of WHO's wide area service is devoted to current on-air broadcasting. Little known by the public is special equipment installed at WHO's transmitter to facilitate continuation of radio transmission in the event of nuclear emergency. The equipment -- "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)" -- was installed in cooperation with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and the U.S. Navy.

WHO, along with a few other radio stations in the country, was selected by the Federal Government for the equipment on the basis of WHO's maximum amount of service to the maximum number of people over a long period of time.

The EMP, for which WHO bears all operation and maintenance costs, provides protection for the WHO transmitter, antenna system, emergency generator, selected program lines, underground broadcasting facilities and Emergency Broadcast System equipment. WHO's broadcast facilities thus can be used by authorities during the most severe national emergency.

Severe duplication or distortion of WHO's 1040 frequency would seriously diminish, if not destroy, the effectiveness of this federal civil preparedness and defense plan.

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SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA
May 3, 1982

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba held its fourth meeting in closed session on Monday, May 3, 1982, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 6909 of the Department of State. In attendance were Chairman F. Clifton White, Members William B. Bayer, Jorge L. Mas, Richard M. Scaife, Senator Richard B. Stone, Dr. Tirso del Junco, George Jacobs, Herbert Schmertz, Joseph Coors, and Charles Z. Wick; as well as Ambassador George W. Landau, Executive Director; Peter Lord, Deputy Executive Director; Yale Newman, Program Director; Kenneth R. Giddens, Consultant; James Duncan, Department of Defense; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Myles Frechette, ARA/CCA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; William Jahn, EB/TD; Wilson LaFollette, FCC; and Secretaries Jessica Monk and Eydie Gaskins.

In opening the meeting, Chairman White asked Ambassador Landau to report on the legislative status of Radio Marti. The Ambassador reported that the Senate appropriation hearing was rescheduled from April 20 to May 4, when Assistant Secretary Enders would testify. The Senate authorization hearing scheduled for April 22 had been postponed and the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications had scheduled a hearing for May 10. Ambassador Landau added that this was his final Commission meeting and that Mr. Frechette would serve as acting Executive Director.

Mr. White, in regretting the Senate hearing's postponement, said it was important nevertheless to activate RBC, Inc. for reasons outlined at the previous meeting. He outlined steps needing to be taken to do this.

Mr. White then discussed the TV program on radio broadcasting to Cuba which NBC was preparing and mentioned NBC's invitation to him to participate.

The members then discussed what might be included in the preliminary report which had been requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Agreement was reached on an outline, which the staff would follow in preparing an initial draft. The members also suggested preparing a separate report concerning the background and status of Cuban radio interference with U.S. broadcasting, showing that the interference problem was really a separate issue from Radio Marti and underlining the illegal nature of Cuba's actions.

The members then discussed what the requirements should be in selecting senior officials for RBC, Inc., once the corporation was activated.

The selection of a date for the next meeting of the Commission was deferred until after the next hearings. Members would be notified by telephone of the date and place. There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 12:05 p.m.

The third public meeting of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba took place on Monday, May 3, at 2:00p.m. in Room 1410 of the Department of State. In attendance were Chairman F. Clifton White, members Senator Richard Stone, Jorge Mas, Dr. Tirso del Junco, George Jacobs, Herbert Schmertz, William Bayer and Joseph Coors, as well as Executive Director Ambassador George W. Landau; Deputy Executive Director, Peter Lord; Myles Frechette and Tim Brown, ARA/CCA; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Kenneth R. Giddens, Consultant; and Yale Newman.

Chairman White opened the public meeting by calling on anyone present who wished to make a presentation or statement. As there were no presentatins to be made, Chairman White summarized the general status of the Commission's deliberations to date.

Chairman White then took the opportunity to thank Ambassador George Landau, who was departing on leave, for his service as Executive Director and, on behalf of the entire Commission, wished him the very best in his future assignment thereafter.

The public meeting was adjourned at 2:22 p.m.

SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA
September 30, 1982

The Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba held its fifth meeting in closed session on Thursday, September 30, 1982 at 10:00 a.m. in Room 6909 of the Department of State. In attendance were Chairman F. Clifton White, Members William B. Bayer, George Jacobs, Jorge L. Mas, Richard M. Scaife, Senator Richard B. Stone, Charles Z. Wick, Amb.(Ret.) Earl E.T. Smith and Patrick E. O'Donnell; as well as Myles R.R. Frechette, Acting Executive Director; Peter Lord, Deputy Executive Director; Yale Newman, Program Director; Kenneth R. Giddens, Special Advisor; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; William Jahn, EB/TD; and Eydie Gaskins, Executive Secretariat.

Chairman White introduced the two new Commission members, Ambassador (Ret.) Earl E.T. Smith and Mr. Patrick E. O'Donnell.

The Chairman then traced the course which the Radio Marti bill had taken through the Congress, including consideration by the various committees in the House, the House passage of the bill on August 10 by a vote of 250-134, hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its action reporting out the bill 11-5 on September 9. He noted that the Commission had consulted with Chairman Percy on scheduling Committee hearings and had produced both an Interim Report and a Final Report at the request of the Committee in order to facilitate the hearings and mark-up. Mr. White thanked the Commission members for their help during this process.

With regard to the bill's current status, the Chairman explained that the Radio Marti bill had been reported out by both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Budget Committee and was awaiting action by the full Senate. He said he had asked Senator Baker to try to schedule floor action before the October recess. He pointed out that if the bill was not passed before the end of the current session of Congress, Radio Marti would suffer a serious setback in that a new bill would have to be introduced in the next Congress and the whole legislative process repeated.

The Chairman then asked Commission members to review the Final Report again before its transmittal to the President and to the Secretary of State. He suggested that any changes to the Report be made in the form of footnotes in order to avoid changing the text, since the Final Report had already been submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Commission members agreed that the report be amended to make it clear that other bands besides the AM band and other frequencies besides 1040 kHz could be considered for use by Radio Marti. It was also agreed to make clear that the $12.9 million budget figure referred to on page 2 included all one-time start-up costs for Radio Marti. Several additions were suggested to the proposed letter transmitting the Final Report to the President and to the Secretary. The Final Report and the transmittal letter were then formally approved by the Commission members.

Another motion was approved expressing the Commission's thanks to the Commission staff for its work and efforts in support of the Commission. A motion was also approved thanking Mr. Kenneth R. Giddens for the advice and information he provided as an unpaid advisor to the Commission, noting his dedication and understanding in filling this role. It was agreed that this tribute should be conveyed to Mr. Giddens in written form. Chairman White, Mr. Mas and Assistant Secretary Enders were also singled out for their contributions of time and effort on behalf of radio broadcasting to Cuba.

Another motion was approved at the request of Mr. Mas, recommending that the target date for beginning Radio Marti broadcasts should be January 28, 1983 in commemoration of the birthday of Jose Marti.

Mr. White explained that the future role of the Commission would remain pending until the Congress had completed action on the authorizing legislation. At that time, the President would decide how best to proceed with Radio Marti and whether the Commission could play a useful role.

The morning meeting adjourned at 11:50 a.m.

The fourth public meeting of the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba took place on Thursday, September 30, 1982, at 1:34 p.m. in Room 6909 of the Department of State. In attendance were Chairman P. Clifton White, members Senator Richard B. Stone, Jorge L. Mas, George Jacobs, William Bayer, Ambassador (Ret.) Earl E.T. Smith and Patrick E. O'Donnell, as well as Acting Executive Director Myles R.R. Frechette; Deputy Executive Director Peter Lord; Joshua Bolten, L/ARA; Timothy Brown, ARA/CCA; Kenneth R. Giddens, Special Advisor; Yale Newman, Program Director; and Eydie Gaskins, Executive Secretariat.

Chairman White outlined briefly the status of the Radio Marti legislation and explained that a determination on the Commission's future would await the outcome of Congressional action on the legislation as well as a White House decision on the most effective way to implement Radio Marti, if authorized.

A motion was approved to submit the Final Report to the President and to the Secretary of State.

The Chairman also expressed the Commission's gratitude to the Executive Secretariat staff and to Mr. Kenneth R. Giddens for services rendered in support of the Commission.

Senator Stone moved a special thanks to the Chairman for his guidance and leadership of the Commission.

The public meeting was adjourned at 2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

F. CLIFTON WHITE

IN THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MARCH 4, 1982

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA WAS ESTABLISHED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12323 OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1981. ITS TEN MEMBERS WERE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED ON JANUARY 18, 1982. THE COMMISSION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING A RECOMMENDED PLAN FOR RADIO BROADCASTING INTENDED FOR TRANSMISSION TO CUBA. ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, IT WILL EXAMINE SUCH ISSUES AS POSSIBLE PROGRAM CONTENT, INFORMATION GATHERING, WRITING AND EDITING NEEDS, STAFFING REQUIREMENTS, LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR A BROADCASTING ORGANIZATION, PROPOSED LEGISLATION, SAMPLE BUDGETS, AND THE LOCATION, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF POSSIBLE BROADCASTING STATIONS.

THE COMMISSION HAS HELD TWO MEETINGS TO DATE -- ON FEBRUARY 5 AND ON MARCH 2 -- TO CONSIDER THESE ISSUES. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION AND THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS FOR THEIR TESTIMONY AND SUPPORT, AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS FOR ITS POSITIVE ATTITUDE, AT THE PUBLIC MEETING HELD ON MARCH 2, 1982. AS A RESULT OF THE MEETINGS, THE COMMISSION HAS AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. A FIRM ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF RADIO MARTI, IN KEEPING WITH THE UNWAIVERING COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION,

A FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM RECOGNIZED BY EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.

2. RECOGNITION OF THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS THAT ILLEGAL CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE HAS HAD ON U.S. BROADCASTS FOR 13 YEARS DESPITE U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM, AND AGREEMENT THAT OPTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION.

3. AN ENDORSEMENT OF RBC, INC., AS THE APPROPRIATE INITIAL VEHICLE THROUGH WHICH TO CONDUCT BROADCASTING.

4. AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND IN THIS PENDING LEGISLATION THAT THE FEDERAL SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER GRANTS TO RBC, INC., BE LODGED TEMPORARILY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT; AND THAT THE COMMISSION WILL CONTINUE TO STUDY THE PARENTAGE ISSUE, AIDED BY ACTUAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE INITIAL OPERATION OF RBC, INC.

TO GIVE THE COMMISSION TIME TO MAKE AN INFORMED FINAL JUDGMENT ON PARENTAGE, THE COMMISSION MAY ALSO RECOMMEND THAT ITS OWN TERM BE EXTENDED.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

F. CLIFTON WHITE

AT THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS MAY 10, 1982

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA WAS ESTABLISHED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12323 OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1981. ITS TEN MEMBERS WERE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED ON JANUARY 18, 1982. A LIST OF THE MEMBERS IS ATTACHED. THE COMMISSION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING A RECOMMENDED PLAN FOR RADIO BROADCASTING INTENDED FOR TRANSMISSION TO CUBA. ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, IT SHOULD EXAMINE SUCH ISSUES AS POSSIBLE PROGRAM CONTENT, INFORMATION GATHERING, WRITING AND EDITING NEEDS, STAFFING REQUIREMENTS, LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR A BROADCASTING ORGANIZATION, PROPOSED LEGISLATION, BUDGETS, AND THE LOCATION, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF POSSIBLE BROADCASTING FACILITIES.

THE COMMISSION HAS HELD SEVERAL MEETINGS SINCE FEBRUARY 5 TO CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS. BASED ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THESE MEETINGS, I CAN MAKE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION:

THE COMMISSION STRONGLY ENDORSES THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO INITIATE RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS AVAILABLE TO MAKE THE CUBAN PEOPLE AWARE OF THE COSTS TO THEM OF CASTRO'S MISMANAGEMENT AT HOME AND ADVENTURISM ABROAD, SO THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO TRY TO HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT MORE ACCOUNTABLE. "RADIO MARTI" SHOULD

BE ESTABLISHED TO BROADCAST TO CUBA INFORMATION AND PROGRAMS SIMILAR TO THOSE BEAMED BY RADIO FREE EUROPE (RFE) AND RADIO LIBERTY (RL) BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. BY PROVIDING COMPREHENSIVE AND RELIABLE NEWS, ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, RADIO MARTI CAN GIVE BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS A PERSPECTIVE, BALANCE AND FULLNESS NOW DENIED THE CUBAN PEOPLE BY ITS GOVERNMENT. IN FURNISHING SUCH INFORMATION TOGETHER WITH ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS, RADIO MARTI CAN SERVE AS A SURROGATE "HOME SERVICE" AND BREAK THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S VIRTUAL MONOPOLY ON NEWS AND INFORMATION. THIS PROGRAM OF BROADCASTING TO CUBA IS BEING PROPOSED IN KEEPING WITH OUR UNWAIVERING COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, A FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM RECOGNIZED BY EVERY RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.

NEITHER VOA NOR PRIVATE STATIONS ARE DESIGNED TO PERFORM THIS ROLE. WHILE SPANISH LANGUAGE BROADCASTS BY VOA AND COMMERCIAL STATIONS IN FLORIDA CAN BE HEARD IN CUBA, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED DIFFERS FROM THAT PLANNED FOR RADIO MARTI. THE CHARTER GRANTED TO THE VOA BY THE CONGRESS IN 1976 DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE A SURROGATE HOME SERVICE, LIKE RADIO MARTI. RATHER, THE VOA IS MANDATED TO SERVE AS A WINDOW ON AMERICA, PRESENTING U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PROJECTING AMERICAN SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS.

PRIVATE U.S. COMMERCIAL STATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE GEARED PRIMARILY TO THE LISTENING TASTES OF THEIR LOCAL AUDIENCE WHICH FORMS THE RATE BASE FOR THEIR ADVERTISING REVENUES. THE PROGRAM CONTENT OF THESE STATIONS DOES NOT

ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF LISTENERS IN CUBA AND MAY BE TOO PARTISAN TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. IN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MARCH 3, THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATIONSTATED CLEARLY THAT BECAUSE OF LIMITED RECEPTION IN CUBA "COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS ARE A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PROPOSED RADIO MARTI."

THE RIGHT "TO SEEK, RECEIVE AND IMPART INFORMATION AND IDEAS THROUGH ANY MEDIA AND REGARDLESS OF FRONTIERS," IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 19 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS BASIC TO THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT RADIO MARTI SHOULD BE JUDGED.

IN REACHING THE CUBAN PEOPLE, NEITHER FM NOR TV BROADCASTS WOULD HAVE ADEQUATE RECEPTION, EVEN IN THE AREA OF HAVANA AND ITS SURROUNDINGS, FROM AVAILABLE TRANSMISSION SITES IN THE U.S. NEITHER COULD POSSIBLY REACH THE MAJORITY OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE, WHO LIVE IN EASTERN CUBA. FURTHERMORE, SHORTWAVE RECEIVERS ARE RELATIVELY SCARCE IN CUBA. AM TRANSMISSION, WITH QUALITY RECEPTION THROUGHOUT CUBA, HOWEVER, IS QUITE FEASIBLE, ESPECIALLY WITH TWO TRANSMITTERS. AM RECEIVERS ARE COMMON AND WIDELY DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

TRANSMITTERS LOCATED IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES SHOULD CONFORM TO THE DOMESTIC 50KW POWER LIMIT. TO AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING U.S. OR THIRD COUNTRY STATIONS, AND TO DEFINE ITS SIGNAL AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS CUBA ONLY, RADIO MARTI SHOULD INSTALL HIGHLY DIRECTIONAL ANTENNAE.

WITH REGARD TO FREQUENCIES, TECHNICAL STUDIES CONDUCTED BY THE FCC SHOW THAT THE MOST APPROPRIATE STANDARD AM FREQUENCY AVAILABLE FOR RADIO MARTI IS 1040KHZ. IT WOULD PROVIDE GOOD COVERAGE OF CUBA AND WOULD AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. STATIONS. RADIO MARTI ITSELF WOULD NOT INTERFERE SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE PRIMARY U.S.STATION ALREADY ASSIGNED THE USE OF THIS CHANNEL IN THE UNITED STATES, W-H-O OF DES MOINES. THE FCC AND NTIA HAVE APPROVED THIS FREQUENCY FOR RADIO MARTI, AND NTIA HAS ASSIGNED IT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ITU.

WHILE CONSIDERING 1040KHZ TO BE RADIO MARTI'S BASIC OPERATING FREQUENCY, THE COMMISSION FAVORS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING ADDITIONAL FREQUENCIES IN ORDER TO MAKE CUBAN JAMMING OF RADIO MARTI BROADCASTS MORE DIFFICULT.

CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. BROADCASTING IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST AGREEMENTS AND NORMS OFTEN DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROJECT IS A SEPARATE PROBLEM THAT HAS EXISTED FOR 13 YEARS, WELL BEFORE RADIO MARTI WAS PROPOSED. THIS HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION BY THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS AND BY THE BROADCASTING ASSOCIATIONS IN FLORIDA.

W-H-O FEARS CUBAN RETALIATION AGAINST RADIO MARTI. IF CUBA JAMS RECEPTION OF RADIO MARTI IN CUBA, W-H-O WOULD PROBABLY BE AFFECTED VERY LITTLE, IF AT ALL. IF CUBA IGNORES THE ITU REGIONAL PLAN AND BROADCASTS ON 1040 AS IT INDICATED IT WOULD LAST YEAR, THIS WILL CAUSE SERIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH MUCH OF W-H-O'S RECEPTION AREA. THERE IS A THREAT TO W-H-O WITH OR

WITHOUT RADIO MARTI. TYING THIS THREAT TO RADIO MARTI'S INACCURATE AND MISLEADING. IF CUBA IGNORES THE ITU REGIONAL PLAN AND BROADCASTS ON 1040, THIS WILL CAUSE SERIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH MUCH OF WHO'S RECEPTION AREA. THE ILLEGAL RADIO INTERFERENCE BY CUBA OVER THE LAST 13 YEARS REPRESENTS A SERIOUS THREAT TO REGIONAL BROADCASTING TOTALLY UNRELATED TO RADIO MARTI.

IF CUBA DOES JAM AND/OR INTERFERE DELIBERATELY WITH RADIO MARTI ON 1040 KHZ, NOT ONLY W-H-O BUT ALSO RADIO MARTI WOULD BE AFFECTED. UTILIZING 1180 KHZ FOR RADIO MARTI INSTEAD OF 1040 WOULD ONLY SHIFT THE RISK TO BOTH VOA AND WHAM OF ROCHESTER. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO FREQUENCY AVAILABLE FOR RADIO MARTI ON THE AM BAND IN THE U.S. WHICH IS NOT ALSO USED BY ONE OR MORE OTHER STATIONS.

PROBLEMS RELATED TO RADIO INTERFERENCE WOULD NORMALLY BE ADDRESSED BILATERALLY OR THROUGH THE RELEVANT MULTILATERAL CHANNELS. BUT CUBA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE REGIONAL AM BROADCASTING CONFERENCE LAST YEAR AFTER ITS FREQUENCY PROPOSALS WERE REJECTED REVEALS ITS LACK OF RESPECT FOR ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH MATTERS RELATED TO THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCIES. CUBA HAS CLEARLY RATIFIED ITS OUTLAW STATUS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS WITH ITS BLATANT DISREGARD FOR ACCEPTED NORMS. THIS DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR AN EARLY DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE INTERFERENCE PROBLEM. NEVERTHELESS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD KEEP THE DOOR OPEN TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

SHOULD CUBA VIOLATE ALL INTERNATIONAL NORMS BY LAUNCHING A RADIO WAR OF DELIBERATE AND EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN BROADCASTING, THE U.S. SHOULD CONSIDER AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

CHAIRMAN
Mr. F. Clifton White
President of Public Relations firm
F. Clifton White and Associates,Inc.

MEMBERS:

William B. Bayer
Political Editor, WINZ

Joseph Coors,
President, Adolph Coors Company

Jorge L. Mas
President, Church and Tower of Florida, Inc.

Richard M. Scaife
Publisher, The Tribune Review, Pittsburgh

Herbert Schmertz
Vice President for Public Relations
Mobil Oil Corporation

Senator Richard B. Stone
Proskauer, Rose, Gertz and Mendelsohn

Dr. Tirso del Junco
Chairman, California Republican Party

Charles Z. Wick
Director, International Communication Agency

George Jacobs
Consulting Radio Engineer

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

F. CLIFTON WHITE

AT THE AUTHORIZATION HEARING BEFORE THE

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

July 1, 1982

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA WAS ESTABLISHED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12323 OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1981. TEN MEMBERS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY APPOINTED TO THE COMMISSION IN JANUARY, AND AN ELEVENTH MEMBER WAS NAMED IN JUNE. A LIST OF THEIR NAMES IS ATTACHED. THE COMMISSION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING A RECOMMENDED PLAN FOR RADIO BROADCASTING INTENDED FOR TRANSMISSION TO CUBA. ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER, IT SHOULD EXAMINE SUCH ISSUES AS POSSIBLE PROGRAM CONTENT, INFORMATION GATHERING, WRITING AND EDITING NEEDS, STAFFING REQUIREMENTS, LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR A BROADCASTING ORGANIZATION, PROPOSED LEGISLATION, BUDGETS, AND THE LOCATION, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF POSSIBLE BROADCASTING FACILITIES.

THE COMMISSION'S INTERIM REPORT PREPARED FOR THIS HEARING PROVIDES THE COMMISSION'S PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO MOST OF THESE QUESTIONS BASED ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF ITS MEETINGS DURING THE WINTER AND SPRING. LET ME CALL ATTENTION TO THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE FINDINGS, AS FOLLOWS:

THE COMMISSION STRONGLY ENDORSES THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO INITIATE RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS AVAILABLE TO MAKE THE CUBAN PEOPLE AWARE OF THE COSTS TO THEM OF CASTRO'S MISMANAGEMENT AT HOME AND ADVENTURISM ABROAD, SO THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO TRY TO HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT MORE ACCOUNTABLE. "RADIO MARTI" SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO BROADCAST TO CUBA INFORMATION AND PROGRAMS SIMILAR TO THOSE BEAMED BY RADIO FREE EUROPE (RFE) AND RADIO LIBERTY (RL) BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. PROGRAM POLICY GUIDELINES HAVE BEEN ADAPTED FROM THE RFE/RL EXPERIENCE TO SERVE RADIO MARTI. BY PROVIDING COMPREHENSIVE AND RELIABLE NEWS, ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, RADIO MARTI CAN GIVE BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS A PERSPECTIVE, BALANCE AND FULLNESS NOW DENIED THE CUBAN PEOPLE BY ITS GOVERNMENT. IN FURNISHING SUCH INFORMATION TOGETHER WITH ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS, RADIO MARTI CAN SERVE AS A SURROGATE "HOME SERVICE" AND BREAK THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S VIRTUAL MONOPOLY ON NEWS AND INFORMATION. THIS PROGRAM OF BROADCASTING TO CUBA IS BEING PROPOSED IN KEEPING WITH OUR UNWAIVERING COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, THAT IS THE RIGHT "TO SEEK, RECEIVE AND IMPART INFORMATION AND IDEAS THROUGH ANY MEDIA AND REGARDLESS OF FRONTIERS," IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 19 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

NEITHER VOA NOR PRIVATE STATIONS ARE DESIGNED TO PERFORM THIS ROLE. WHILE SPANISH LANGUAGE BROADCASTS BY VOA AND COMMERCIAL STATIONS IN FLORIDA CAN BE HEARD IN CUBA, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED DIFFERS FROM THAT PLANNED FOR RADIO MARTI. THE CHARTER GRANTED TO THE VOA BY THE CONGRESS IN 1976 DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE A SURROGATE HOME SERVICE, LIKE RADIO MARTI. RATHER, THE VOA IS MANDATED TO SERVE AS A WINDOW ON AMERICA, PRESENTING U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PROJECTING AMERICAN SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS.

PRIVATE U.S. COMMERCIAL STATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE GEARED PRIMARILY TO THE LISTENING TASTES OF THEIR LOCAL AUDIENCE WHICH FORMS THE RATE BASE FOR THEIR ADVERTISING REVENUES. THE PROGRAM CONTENT OF THESE STATIONS DOES NOT ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF LISTENERS IN CUBA AND MAY BE TOO PARTISAN TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. IN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MARCH 3, THE SOUTH FLORIDA RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION STATED CLEARLY THAT BECAUSE OF LIMITED RECEPTION IN CUBA "COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS ARE A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PROPOSED RADIO MARTI."

IN REACHING THE CUBAN PEOPLE, NEITHER FM NOR TV BROADCASTS WOULD HAVE ADEQUATE RECEPTION, EVEN IN THE AREA OF HAVANA AND ITS SURROUNDINGS, FROM AVAILABLE TRANSMISSION SITES IN THE U.S. NEITHER COULD POSSIBLY REACH THE MAJORITY OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE, WHO LIVE IN EASTERN CUBA. NOR WOULD SHORTWAVE BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO REACH THE CUBAN POPULACE SINCE SW RECEIVERS ARE SCARCE IN CUBA. AM TRANSMISSION, WITH QUALITY RECEPTION THROUGHOUT CUBA, HOWEVER, IS QUITE FEASIBLE. AM IS THE MEDIUM THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT USES TO REACH ITS OWN PEOPLE. AM RECEIVERS ARE COMMON AND WIDELY DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT CUBA. AM BROADCASTING IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY FOR RADIO MARTI TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION.

WITH REGARD TO FREQUENCIES, TECHNICAL STUDIES CONDUCTED BY THE FCC SHOW THAT THE MOST APPROPRIATE STANDARD AM FREQUENCY AVAILABLE FOR RADIO MARTI IS 1040KHZ. IT WOULD PROVIDE GOOD COVERAGE OF CUBA AND WOULD AVOID INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. STATIONS. RADIO MARTI ITSELF WOULD NOT INTERFERE SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE PRIMARY U.S.STATION ALREADY ASSIGNED THE USE OF THIS CHANNEL IN THE UNITED STATES, W-H-O OF DES MOINES. THE FCC AND NTIA HAVE APPROVED THIS FREQUENCY FOR RADIO MARTI, AND NTIA HAS ASSIGNED IT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE ITU.

CUBAN RADIO INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. BROADCASTING IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST AGREEMENTS AND NORMS OFTEN DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROJECT IS A SEPARATE PROBLEM THAT HAS EXISTED FOR 15 YEARS, WELL BEFORE RADIO MARTI WAS PROPOSED. THIS HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION BY THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS AND BY THE BROADCASTING ASSOCIATIONS IN FLORIDA.

TYING CUBAN INTERFERENCE TO RADIO MARTI IS INACCURATE AND MISLEADING. THE ILLEGAL RADIO INTERFERENCE BY CUBA OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS REPRESENTS A SERIOUS THREAT TO REGIONAL BROADCASTING TOTALLY UNRELATED TO RADIO MARTI. THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN MEDIUM WAVE BROADCASTING SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE AGENDA OF THIS ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY OF MOVING FORWARD WITH RADIO MARTI, AN IMPORTANT INITIATIVE IN COMMUNICATING WITH THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS AS CHAIRMAN AND AS A COMMISSION THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEEDING EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH FAVORABLE ACTION ON THIS BILL SO THAT RADIO MARTI MAY BE ON THE AIR BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

Chairman

Mr. F. Clifton White
President of Public Relations firm
F. Clifton White and Associates, Inc.

Members

William B. Bayer
Political Editor, WINZ

Joseph Coors
President, Adolph Coors Company

Tirso del Junco, M.D.
Chairman, California Republican Party

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Jorge L. Mas
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Richard M. Scaife
Publisher, The Tribune Review, Pittsburgh

Herbert Schmertz
Vice President for Public Relations
Mobil Oil Corporation

Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith
former Ambassador to Cuba, retired

Senator Richard B. Stone
Proskauer, Rose, Gertz and Mendelsohn

Charles Z. Wick
Director, International Communication Agency

TESTIMONY GIVEN BY
FORMER U.S. SENATOR RICHARD B. STONE
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON S. 1853 ON JULY 1, 1982

The Cuban people have the right to know and, currently as in previous years, that right has been stifled by a virtual monopoly of internal propaganda. As the Miami Herald stated in a lead editorial on October 6, 1981:

> "There is no freedom of expression in Cuba. The flow of information is tightly controlled by the Communist dictatorship. As long as that remains true, the U.S. government has a right - even a duty - to fill the void by broadcasting to Mr. Castro's captives."

The great value of accurate information and balanced opinion by an American broadcasting facility has been proven in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by the excellent work of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The Christian Science Monitor on July 2, 1981 put it this way:

> "It is astonishing that after 22 years of Castro, the U.S. still has not set up for Cuba the kind of hard-hitting, objective, round-the-clock broadcasting operation that Radio Free Europe has provided for Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe since 1950. It is still not too late to do so. Broadcasts to Cuba could be supplemented by English and Spanish services for the entire Caribbean and Central American region. The U.S. looks inept when it does nothing to counter the Soviet broadcasts which are now relaying out of Havana to Latin America as well as to the U.S. and Canada."

The press of our hemisphere organized and speaking through the Inter American Press Association in its general assembly at Rio de Janeiro last October resolved as follows:

"WHEREAS (1) since the rise to power of the Communist government of Fidel Castro, all media have been confiscated and consolidated into a few official organizations, giving the government absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination...."

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLVES (2) to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially members of the Inter American Press Association, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective.

The Castro regime does not stop at attempts to indoctrinate its own people, but for years has broadcasted extensively and intensively to the Western Hemisphere and specifically to the United States. The New York Times carried an item last December 28th as follows:

"Radio Havana Moves; Now Clear in the East

Late-night radio listeners along the Atlantic Coast can tune in Radio Havana at 1160 on the AM dial.

For the first time, English-language programming from the station is on a frequency audible throughout the East. Cuba has been broadcasting in English to the United States for two years, but has been using frequencies 550 and 600, which are crowded with local and regional United States stations, making reception difficult."

This project has bipartisan support. At the Democratic National Party in Conference in Philadelphia last week, the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party resolved support of the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba/Radio Marti for broadcasting to the people of Cuba. And their reasons for adopting these resolutions were that:

> "the people of Cuba deserve to have an accurate, timely, and unbiased source of news and information about significant events in relation to the activities of their neighboring peoples and governments, in the Americas and the world; and, radio broadcasting, in a peaceful manner consistent with international law, has proven effective in furthering communications between peoples divided by political boundaries as demonstrated by the experience of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty."

On June 18, 1982, the Presidential National Security Advisor, William Clark, wrote Congressman Broyhill:

> "I am writing to urge you to support the President's proposal to establish a new radio station for broadcasting to Cuba. Informing the Cuban people is a keystone of the Administration's efforts to address the growing Soviet/ Cuban presence in the Caribbean. It represents one of the few peaceful options available to the United States in this very sensitive and vital area."

Furthermore, regarding the frequently stated concern that the Cuban government would go beyond jamming the Radio Marti signal in Cuba and would agressively interfere with other radio station signals in the United States, Judge Clark wrote:

> "Radio Marti is consistent with international law, in contrast to the Cuban government's practice of generating interference with U.S. stations. This illegal Cuban broadcasting, which has continued for more than ten years, is indeed a serious problem, but it is not one that will be resolved by actions we take with regard to Radio Marti. Basing U.S. policy on presumed threats from a foreign power is, in any event, an unacceptable precedent."

They can be expected to continue and expand these broadcasts and interference efforts with our own domestic broadcasts whether or not Radio Marti itself broadcasts. But broadcasts by Radio Marti will disclose to the Cuban people the costs of violent Castro adventures in this hemisphere, Africa and the Middle East. This will raise the political cost domestically within Cuba of engaging in these disruptive world exercises. The broadcasts will be balanced, accurate and fair, and I urge the committee to approve this legislation, and thereby address the right to know of our neighbors, the people of Cuba.

As Jose Marti wrote: "El que vive en un credo autocratico es lo mismo que una ostra en su concha, que solo ve la prision que la encierra y cree, en la oscuridad, que aquello es el mundo; la libertad pone alas a la ostra. Y lo que oido en lo interior de la concha, parecia portentosa contienda, resulta a la luz del aire ser el natural movimiento de la savia en el pulso energico del mundo." Which means in summary that he who lives under autocratic domination is like an oyster imprisoned in darkness in its shell, but he who can hear from within that shell receives the wings of liberty and knows the energetic pulse of the world.

Let the people of Cuba hear.

OPENING STATEMENT

BY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

THOMAS O. ENDERS

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

MARCH 3, 1982

1.

PERHAPS I SHOULD BEGIN WITH CUBAN SOCIETY ITSELF.

THERE IS NOTHING QUITE LIKE IT. IMPROVEMENTS IN SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS ARE FAR LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. THE ECONOMY, ORGANIZED IN THE FAMILIAR SOVIET COMMAND MODEL, HAS REGISTERED A GENERAL FAILURE. DESPITE GROWING SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN SALES OF OIL AT LOW PRICES AND PURCHASES OF SUGAR AT HIGH PRICES -- THE WHOLE SOVIET AID EFFORT IS NOW EQUIVALENT TO ONE QUARTER OF GNP -- PER CAPITA INCOME HAS BEEN STAGNANT AND STEADILY FALLING RELATIVE TO MUCH OF LATIN AMERICA.

YET CUBA PROJECTS POWER IN THE WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION SUBSIDIZES CUBA WITH OVER $3 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AID PER YEAR. IN ADDITION, CUBA'S ARMED FORCES -- AUGMENTED BY 66,000 TONS OF SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES IN 1981 ALONE -- ARE STRONGER THAN ANY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES. IT MAINTAINS 40 THOUSAND SOLDIERS IN AFRICA, DOMINATING TWO COUNTRIES, AND DOING FOR THE SOVIET UNION WHAT THE GURKHA MERCENARIES DID FOR NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND. IN CENTRAL AMERICA CUBA IS ATTEMPTING TO UNITE THE LEFT IN SEARCH OF THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT, AND MAINTAINS NO LESS THAN 1800 TO 2000 MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL IN NICARAGUA.

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IN OTHER WORDS, A WOULD-BE FOREIGN POLICY GIANT ALLIED TO AN ECONOMIC PYGMY, WHOSE PEOPLES HAVE HAD TO SACRIFICE ALL HOPE FOR A RISING STANDARD OF LIVING TO FOREIGN ADV. AGES.

MOST COUNTRIES CANNOT OVERCOMMIT TO STATE INTERESTS IN THIS MANNER, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE FORCE THEM TO ADDRESS THEIR CONCERNS. BUT CUBANS LACK THE MEANS TO HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE.

2.

THE PROPOSAL WE DISCUSS TODAY -- RADIO MARTI -- IS INTENDED TO SUPPLY WHAT THE CUBAN PUBLIC IS MISSING: RELIABLE NEWS ABOUT CUBAN LIFE, FEATURES, SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THOSE OFFERED BY A GOVERNMENT THAT RULES NOT FOR THE PEOPLE BUT FOR ITSELF.

NO, THIS IS NOT A PROJECT TO TELL THE CUBAN PEOPLE ABOUT THE UNITED STATES. VOA -- WHOSE CHARTER IS INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND AMERICAN FEATURES AND CULTURE -- ALREADY DOES THAT. IT CAN BE HEARD IN SPANISH. SO ALSO CAN FLORIDA RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTING IN SPANISH TO CUBAN-AMERICANS. THESE STATIONS CAN TELL CUBANS MUCH ABOUT US. BUT THEY ARE NOT A GOOD SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN CUBA ITSELF.

NOR IS IT A PROJECT TO INCITE CUBANS TO REVOLT AGAINST THEIR OWN SOCIETY. THERE IS PROVOCATION ENOUGH IN THE REDIS-

best copy available

TRIBUTED POVERTY, IN THE DEPRESSING AUSTERITY, IN THE UN- AND UNDER-EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATED CUBANS, IN THE RIGID REGIMENTATION AND IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES THAT ONLY FURTHER SACRIFICE LIES AHEAD. BUT IT WOULD BE IMMORAL, IRRESPONSIBLE TO SET A PEOPLE AGAINST A GOVERNMENT THAT MONOPOLIZES THE MEANS OF COERCION.

THIS RADIO IS A PROPOSAL TO GIVE CUBANS THE MEANS THEY NOW LACK TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF A SOCIETY HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON THEM, TO HAVE A SOURCE OF NEWS AND ENTERTAINMENT THAT IS NOT MANIPULATED BY THE STATE, TO FIND OUT WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN THEIR COUNTRY, WHY SO MANY HAVE TO GO OFF TO FOREIGN MILITARY DUTY NOT ALWAYS TO RETURN, AND WHAT THE STATE DOES WITH THE WEALTH OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

THE RADIO -- LIKE RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY BEFORE IT -- IS INTENDED GRADUALLY TO EARN ITS AUDIENCE THROUGH ITS SPECIAL SENSITIVITY TO NEEDS THE STATE IGNORES. IT WILL SPEAK TO YOUNG PEOPLE OF THE SPORTS AND MUSIC THEY LOVE. IT WILL SPEAK TO ADULTS OF THE GREAT CUBAN AND HISPANIC-AMERICAN HERITAGE THEY ADMIRE, WHICH SO OFTEN THE STATE DENATURES. AND IT WILL GIVE NEWS ON WHOSE PROBITY LISTENERS CAN RELY.

WE KNOW THAT IN EASTERN EUROPE IT TOOK YEARS TO EARN AN AUDIENCE. LITTLE BY LITTLE THAT AUDIENCE EXPANDED. RADIO FREE EUROPE NOW HAS PERHAPS 70 PER CENT OF THE POLISH RADIO AUDIENCE. IS THERE ANY DOUBT THAT THE CHANGES OF THE LAST

DECADE COULD HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THAT TRUSTWORTHY, HUMANE OUTSIDE CONTACT?

OUR PROPOSAL IS THUS TO BEGIN A SUSTAINED EFFORT, OVER MANY YEARS, TO HELP THE CUBANS KNOW MORE ABOUT THEIR COUNTRY, AND THUS TO HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE IN WAYS IT IS NOT NOW.

3.

PEOPLE SAY: WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CUBANS; OR IT ISN'T LIKE US TO ENGAGE IN PROPAGANDA; OR CUBAN COUNTERMEASURES WILL HURT US TOO MUCH.

WE HAVE TRIED TO TALK WITH CUBA IN THE PAST AND IT WOULD BE WRONG TO RULE OUT TRYING AGAIN. BUT THE RECORD IS DAUNTING.

IN 1977 WE STARTED TALKING SERIOUSLY TO THE CUBANS, SAYING WE WANTED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE LEGACY OF THE PAST -- THE EMBARGO, POLITICAL TENSION -- COULD BE OVERCOME. WE SUGGESTED A GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MORE THAN 20,000 CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. AFTER ALL, THE CIVIL WAR WAS OVER. WHILE WE TALKED, CUBA WENT INTO ETHIOPIA.

CONVERSATIONS CONTINUED. IN MID-1978, CUBA LAUNCHED UPON A NEW AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, UNITING THE LEFT PARTIES OF FIRST NICARAGUA, THEN EL SALVADOR, THEN

GUATEMALA, COMMITTING THEM TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.

TALKS WENT ON. IN 1980, CASTRO TURNED THE DESIRE OF MANY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN TO FLEE CUBA INTO A HOSTILE ACT AGAINST THE U.S. -- THE MARIEL BOATLIFT.

IT IS NOT WRONG TO TALK TO ADVERSARIES. OFTEN IT IS ONLY PRUDENT.

BUT WHAT COUNTS IS NOT THE MEDIUM, BUT THE MESSAGE. TALKS CANNOT BE A COMPLETE CUBAN POLICY, ANY MORE THAN DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES ARE A COMPLETE SOVIET OR POLISH POLICY. DIPLOMACY ENABLES US TO TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT. WE MUST ALSO TALK TO THE PEOPLE.

4.

OTHERS ASK: SHOULD WE BE ASSOCIATED WITH "PROPAGANDA?"

NO, WE SHOULD NOT. WE WILL NOT SUCCEED IN ATTRACTING AN AUDIENCE IN CUBA IF WE OFFER THEM PROPAGANDA. IF THERE ARE FALSE REPORTS, THE LISTENERS WILL REACT. IF FALSE REPORTS CONTINUE, THEY WILL TURN OFF. ONLY BY RESPECTING ITS AUDIENCE CAN A PROJECT LIKE THIS SUCCEED.

SO IT MUST BE THE CREATURE OF NO POLITICAL TENDENCY, OF NO ACTION GROUP, OF NO VESTED INTEREST. WE HAVE ACQUIRED EXPERIENCE -- IN RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY -- OF HOW TO DO THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE BEGINNINGS WERE DIFFICULT.

5.

CUBA HAS THREATENED TO RETALIATE AGAINST RADIO MARTI BY INTERFERENCE AGAINST U.S. BROADCASTERS.

BUT IT WAS ALREADY CAUSING SERIOUS INTERFERENCE IN THE 1960'S AND HAS BEEN INTERFERING MORE AND MORE IN RECENT YEARS. IN 1979 -- WHEN THE U.S. WAS TRYING HARD TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA -- HAVANA ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR SEVERAL NEW RADIO TRANSMITTERS INCLUDING TWO 500 KW STATIONS. THESE TRANSMITTERS, INCLUDING THE TWO LARGE UNITS BELIEVED READY FOR USE NOW OR VERY SOON, COULD CAUSE EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE IN THE U.S. SHOULD SUCH INTERFERENCE BECOME DELIBERATE AND PROMISCUOUS, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE ACTION, POSSIBLY INCLUDING "FAST-TRACK" REGULATORY PROCEDURES SO THAT AFFECTED STATIONS CAN INCREASE POWER OR CHANGE FREQUENCIES WHEN TARGETED. THE CONGRESS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR STATIONS AFFECTED BY ADDITIONAL, AGGRESSIVE INTERFERENCE SHOULD ALL ELSE FAIL.

6.

I RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONTEMPLATE INCREASED EXPENDITURES IN A YEAR OF BUDGETARY CUTBACKS. BUT THE $10 MILLION IN START-UP COSTS FOR RADIO MARTI ARE EXPECTED TO COME FROM REPROGRAMMING OF ALREADY BUDGETED FUNDS AND DO NOT REPRESENT AN INCREASE IN FY-82 APPROPRIATIONS. SUBSEQUENT YEARS SHOULD COST SOMEWHAT LESS. EXPERTS BELIEVE THIS IS A LEAN BUDGET. WE BELIEVE IT IS A RELATIVELY LOW-COST, LOW-RISK WAY TO REACH THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

7.

TO ASSIST THE ADMINISTRATION IN FORMULATING ITS PLAN FOR BROADCASTING TO CUBA, A PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION WAS ESTABLISHED LAST SEPTEMBER. THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION WERE APPOINTED IN MID-JANUARY. THEY INCLUDE F. CLIFTON WHITE, ITS CHAIRMAN, WHO IS WITH US TODAY, AS WELL AS FORMER SENATOR FROM FLORIDA, RICHARD STONE, AND JORGE L. MAS, AMONG OTHERS.

AS A RESULT OF ITS FIRST TWO MEETINGS THE COMMISSION HAS STRONGLY ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA AS WELL AS MUCH OF THE PREPARATORY WORK ALREADY UNDERTAKEN BY VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

SPECIFICALLY, THE COMMISSION HAS RECOMMENDED THAT BROADCASTING TO CUBA BE UNDERTAKEN BY AN INDEPENDENT, NON-PROFIT

ENTITY, RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA, INC., WHICH WILL OPERATE RADIO MARTI IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER THAT RFE/RL, INC. NOW OPERATES RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY. RBC, INC., HAS ALREADY BEEN INCORPORATED AS A PRELIMINARY STEP. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION INTRODUCED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE AUTHORIZES SUPPORT FOR RBC, INC., UNDER THE OVERSIGHT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE PENDING THE DESIGNATION OF AN APPROPRIATE OVERSIGHT AGENCY, PRESUMABLY THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING.

THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT RADIO MARTI BE OPERATED BY RBC, INC., AS A MEDIUM WAVE (AM), 50 KW STATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS.

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION AT YESTERDAY'S PUBLIC SESSION HEARD STATEMENTS FROM VARIOUS BROADCASTING ASSOCIATIONS. I UNDERSTAND THEY WILL TESTIFY SEPARATELY BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE.

8.

MR. CHAIRMAN, RADIO MARTI IS DESIGNED TO RESPOND TO A BASIC HUMAN NEED -- THE NEED TO HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON EVENTS AND POLICIES THAT AFFECT THE LIVES OF INDIVIDUALS. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IS WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE, A FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM RECOGNIZED BY EVERY RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD. THIS RIGHT, THIS FREEDOM, HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY DENIED TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE SINCE CASTRO

CAME TO POWER IN 1959. RADIO MARTI WILL HELP FILL THIS LONG-STANDING INFORMATION GAP.

THOSE OF US WHO HAVE LIVED IN A COMMUNIST STATE WILL KNOW JUST HOW MUCH RADIO MARTI CAN AFFECT THE LIVES OF CUBANS. FOR THOSE OF US WHO HAVE NOT, IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER HOPE AND THE MEANS TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON THE ACTIONS OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. FOR A PEOPLE BOTTLED UP IN A SYSTEM OF OPPRESSION THEY DID NOT SEEK AND CANNOT REMOVE, THAT CAN BE PRECIOUS.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS
AT THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
May 10, 1982

MR. F. CLIFTON WHITE, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA WILL TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF RADIO MARTI. I WOULD LIKE TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT CONCERNING CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN BROADCASTING.

THE SERIOUS PROBLEM OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE RADIO BROADCASTING OF ITS NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE RADIO MARTI QUESTION. SERIOUS CUBAN INTERFERENCE HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR OVER A DECADE, LONG BEFORE RADIO MARTI WAS EVEN AN IDEA. MORE RECENTLY, TWO YEARS AND ONE ADMINISTRATION BEFORE RADIO MARTI WAS ANNOUNCED, CUBA MADE KNOWN PLANS FOR STATIONS THAT WOULD CAUSE MUCH ADDED INTERFERENCE. TODAY CUBA IS CONTINUING ITS INTERFERENCE, AND RADIO MARTI IS NOT EVEN ON THE AIR. IN FACT CUBA'S BROADCASTING PLANS THAT WILL RESULT IN INCREASED INTERFERENCE FOR AMERICAN BROADCASTERS WILL PROBABLY BE IMPLEMENTED WITH OR WITHOUT RADIO MARTI AS A SCAPEGOAT. AND IF CUBA DID NOT HAVE RADIO MARTI IT WOULD FIND ANOTHER PRETEXT.

RADIO MARTI IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE CUBAN PEOPLE WITH AN ALTERNATE, RELIABLE SOURCE OF NEWS AND COMMENTARY ABOUT EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN THEIR HOMELAND. IT IS INTENDED TO SUPPLY WHAT THE CUBAN PUBLIC IS MISSING -- RELIABLE NEWS ABOUT CUBAN LIFE, FEATURES, SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT, ALTERNATIVES TO THE DISTORTED, CENSORED NEWS AND PROGRAMMING THAT IS BEING OFFERED BY A GOVERNMENT THAT RULES NOT FOR THE PEOPLE BUT FOR ITSELF.

RADIO MARTI IS A PROPOSAL TO GIVE CUBANS THE MEANS THEY NOW LACK TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF A SOCIETY HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON THEM, TO FURNISH THEM WITH A SOURCE OF NEWS AND ENTERTAINMENT THAT IS NOT MANIPULATED BY THE STATE, TO LET THEM FIND OUT WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN THEIR COUNTRY, TO INFORM THEM WHY SO MANY HAVE GONE OFF TO FOREIGN MILITARY DUTY NOT ALWAYS TO RETURN, AND TO LEARN WHAT THE STATE REALLY DOES WITH THE WEALTH OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

BUT FAR BEFORE RADIO MARTI, IN THE MID 1960'S THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO REDESIGN ITS DOMESTIC AM BROADCASTING SYSTEM AND TO INITIATE BROADCASTING DIRECTED TOWARD THE U.S. AND OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. MOST OF THE NEW STATIONS WERE IN DIRECT

VIOLATION OF ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL BROADCASTING AGREEMENT AND RESULTED IN HARMFUL INTERFERENCE TO LONG ESTABLISHED STATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, MEXICO AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN.

FROM THE MID 1960'S THROUGH 1979 THE LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE CAUSED TO AM STATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES BY CUBAN STATIONS STEADILY INCREASED. THIS INTERFERENCE PRIMARILY AFFECTED AM STATIONS IN FLORIDA AND ALONG THE GULF COAST. SINCE 1967, WQBA, A SPANISH LANGUAGE STATION IN MIAMI, HAS BEEN AND STILL IS BEING INTENTIONALLY JAMMED BY CUBA, USING TONES OFFSET FROM THE CARRIER FREQUENCY OF WQBA. THIS JAMMING HAS ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECTED WRVA, A CO-CHANNEL STATION IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA.

IN LATE 1979, IN PREPARATION FOR THE REGIONAL BROADCASTING CONFERENCE, CUBA SUBMITTED AN INVENTORY OF RADIO STATION REQUIREMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION WHICH, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED TO AM BROADCASTING STATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND MOST OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN THE REGION. INCLUDED IN THIS INVENTORY WERE TWO 500

KW STATIONS - TEN TIMES THE AMOUNT OF POWER AUTHORIZED IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE IN NORTH AMERICA - PLUS A NUMBER OF OTHER MODERATE AND HIGH POWER STATIONS ALSO CAPABLE OF CAUSING CONSIDERABLE INTERFERENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE CUBANS HAVE NEVER EXPLAINED WHY THEY WANTED SUCH ENORMOUS POWER, BUT THE REASON IS OBVIOUS-SINCE 1979 THEY HAVE PLANNED TO INCREASE THEIR ABILITY TO PROPAGANDIZE THEIR NEIGHBORS.

BEGINNING IN 1980, MORE AND MORE COMPLAINTS OF HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WERE RECEIVED FROM AM STATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AS CUBA BEGAN IMPLEMENTING THIS INVENTORY. STATIONS AS FAR NORTH AS NEW ENGLAND AND AS FAR WEST AS INDIANA WERE RECORDING SERIOUS INTERFERENCE FROM CUBAN STATIONS. PART OF THIS INTERFERENCE RESULTED FROM CUBAN REBROADCASTING OF RADIO MOSCOW IN ENGLISH USING TRANSMITTER POWERS OF UP TO 150 KW.

PRIOR TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE REGIONAL AM BROADCASTING CONFERENCE IN RIO DE JANEIRO LAST FALL, THE UNITED STATES HELD THREE ROUNDS OF TECHNICAL LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE MEANS TO REDUCE OUR MUTUAL INTERFERENCE PROBLEMS. WHILE IT APPEARED THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS COULD BE RESOLVED, THROUGHOUT THE

DISCUSSIONS IT WAS VERY CLEAR THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAD STATIONS IN THEIR INVENTORY THAT WERE NOT NEGOTIABLE. FOR THE UNITED STATES THIS WAS OUR EXISTING VOA STATION IN MARATHON, FLORIDA AND FOR CUBA IT WAS THEIR TWO PLANNED 500 KW STATIONS. AT THE LAST OF THESE THREE MEETINGS, IN WASHINGTON, D.C. IN AUGUST OF 1981, CUBA REMAINED FIRM IN ITS INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT THESE 500 KW STATIONS AND FURTHER INFORMED US THAT THEY WOULD BE SHIFTING THE FREQUENCIES OF THESE STATIONS TO 1040 AND 1160 KHZ. THIS PRECEDED ANNOUNCEMENT OF RADIO MARTI ON SEPTEMBER 23 AND FORMAL IDENTIFICATION ON OCTOBER 29 OF 1040 KHZ AS THE BEST FREQUENCY FOR RADIO MARTI.

WHILE WE WERE AWARE OF CUBAN INTEREST IN 1040, ACCEPTING CUBA'S PLAN WOULD HAVE MEANT ACCEPTING DESTRUCTION OF WHO DES MOINES BY A 500 KW SUPER-STATION. OUR OWN PLANS WERE CAREFULLY CRAFTED TO CAUSE NO SUCH DAMAGE. WE THEREFORE TOOK OUR CASE TO THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL FORUM, THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE, WHERE WE WERE VINDICATED.

DURING THAT CONFERENCE IN RIO WE HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CUBANS AND REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON A PROCEDURE IN WHICH THE ENGINEERS ON OUR RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS

WOULD GET TOGETHER TO BEGIN WORKING OUT THE RESOLUTION OF SPECIFIC INTERFERENCE PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, THE CUBANS REFUSED TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH BILATERAL MEETINGS, PARALLELLING THE CONFERENCE APPROACH, A PROCEDURE WHICH ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS WERE USING TO RESOLVE INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN STATIONS. INSTEAD, CUBA SUBMITTED TO THE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE ON A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS", 48 FREQUENCY CHANGES WHICH, WHILE RESOLVING SOME OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN CUBAN STATIONS AND THOSE OF SOME OF ITS NEIGHBORS, SHIFTED THE REMAINING INCOMPATIBILITIES ONTO FREQUENCIES OCCUPIED BY U.S. STATIONS, RESULTING IN AN INCREASED LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE TO U.S. STATIONS. TWO IMPORTANT U.S. STATIONS AFFECTED WOULD BE KSL IN SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH ON 1160 KHZ AND WHO IN DES MOINES, IOWA ON 1040 KHZ. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING THE RIO CONFERENCE TO REJECT THIS PROPOSAL BUT THE CUBAN DELEGATION REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONFERENCE'S DECISIONS AND WITHDREW.

LATER, CUBA NOTIFIED THE ITU IT WOULD IGNORE THE ASSIGNMENT PLAN ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE AND THE DECISIONS MADE THERE WHICH REJECTED THEIR 48 FREQUENCY CHANGES. CUBA SAID IT WOULD IMPLEMENT ITS 48 CHANGES REGARDLESS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

CUBA HAS IN FACT IMPLEMENTED IMPORTANT PARTS OF ITS PLAN. CUBA'S SECOND SUPER STATION ON 1160 KHZ HAS BEEN ON THE AIR USING AT LEAST 100 KW OF ITS PLANNED 500 KW POWER AND HAS SEVERELY REDUCED KSL SALT LAKE'S SECONDARY NIGHTIME SERVICE AREA FROM 750 TO 50-60 MILES. WHO, ON 1040, HAS THUS FAR BEEN SPARED, PERHAPS IN HOPE THAT THIS CUBAN THREAT WOULD INCITE AN ACTIVE CAMPAIGN BY INTERESTED PARTIES TO KILL RADIO MARTI.

WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT CUBAN DAMAGE TO ALL U.S. STATIONS AND INDEED WHEN CUBA THREATENS ANY U.S. INTEREST. BUT WE CANNOT ALLOW CUBAN THREATS OF OUTLAW BEHAVIOR TO DICTATE OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION CAN COMMENT ON THE EFFECT THE CUBAN INVENTORY OF STATIONS AS MODIFIED BY THEIR 48 FREQUENCY CHANGES WOULD HAVE ON U. S. DOMESTIC BROADCASTING.

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS HAS DONE ITS OWN ANALYSIS OF THESE 48 FREQUENCY CHANGES AND HAS FOUND THAT AM RADIO STATIONS IN 32 STATES PLUS THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WILL EXPERIENCE INTERFERENCE AND REDUCED LISTENING AREAS SHOULD CUBA IMPLEMENT IN

FULL ITS PROPOSED INVENTORY. ALTOGETHER, OVER 200 U.S. STATIONS WILL BE AFFECTED. THE NAB STUDY SHOWS THAT TEN CLEAR CHANNEL RADIO STATIONS WILL LOSE THEIR NIGHTTIME COVERAGE, THIRTY-SEVEN CLEAR CHANNEL STATIONS WOULD LOSE LARGE PORTIONS OF THEIR WIDE AREA COVERAGE, AND ONLY SIX CLEAR CHANNEL STATIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE INTERFERENCE-FREE SERVICE.

SOME PEOPLE SAY - THE THREAT FROM CUBA IS TOO GREAT, RADIO MARTI WILL INVITE MASSIVE CUBAN JAMMING, INTERFERENCE, RETALIATION. THEY SAY, CHANGE FREQUENCIES AND HURT SOMEONE ELSE, NOT ME, OR THEY SUGGEST USING ANOTHER SYSTEM - FM, SHORT WAVE, TV, OUT-OF-BAND AM, ANYTHING. SOME EVEN SEEM TO IMPLY WE SHOULD ABANDON OUR PLANS OUT OF FEAR.

WELL, CUBAN INTERFERENCE <u>IS</u> A PROBLEM, A SERIOUS PROBLEM, BECAUSE INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING IS BASED ON COOPERATION. BUT CUBAN INTERFERENCE IS NOT A NEW PROBLEM BECAUSE CUBA LONG AGO CHOSE TO ACT AS AN OUTLAW. CUBA'S LAWLESSNESS PRE-DATES RADIO MARTI AND WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THE FUTURE -WITH OR WITHOUT THIS NEW STATION.

THE TRUTH IS THAT WE DO NOT KNOW FOR CERTAIN WHAT CUBA WILL DO TO INTERFERE FURTHER WITH U.S. RADIO. CUBAN PLANS TO PUT A HIGH-POWERED STATION ON 1040 KHZ WOULD SERIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH WHO DES MOINES, AND EVEN MORE WITH ANY RADIO MARTI BROADCASTS ON THAT FREQUENCY. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD ALSO CAUSE MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR BROADCASTERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND COULD CAUSE THE CUBAN STATION ITSELF TO LOSE EFFECTIVENESS BECAUSE OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE WITH WHO AND RADIO MARTI.

THE CUBAN DELEGATION TO THE REGION II MEDIUM FREQUENCY BROADCASTING CONFERENCE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INCLUSION OF 1040 KHZ FOR RADIO MARTI IN LIST B AS A US STATION GRANTED IT INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND LEGITIMACY. THE OPERATION OF RADIO MARTI AND WHO CAN BE TECHNICALLY COMPATIBLE. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE CASTRO REGIME MIGHT ATTEMPT TO JAM RADIO MARTI WITH LOW-POWERED STATIONS SITUATED IN THE MAIN CITIES AND TOWNS OF CUBA. THIS WOULD BADLY INTERFERE WITH RECEPTION OF RADIO MARTI, BUT MIGHT HAVE A MINIMAL EFFECT ON WHO. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT CUBA MAY DO NOTHING. THE VOA HAS BEEN

DIRECTING BROADCASTS TO CUBA FOR MORE THAN 21 YEARS AND CASTRO HAS RARELY SERIOUSLY TRIED TO JAM THESE BROADCASTS.

WHILE SOME AMERICAN OBSERVERS MAY HAVE DOUBTS AS TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIO MARTI, CUBAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NONE. THEY FULLY RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF RADIO MARTI AND TAKE IT VERY SERIOUSLY INDEED.

CUBA CAN MOUNT A JAMMING EFFORT. MANY REPORTS INDICATE PREPARATION OF STATIONS, INCLUDING A SO-CALLED RADIO LINCOLN, WHICH COULD EITHER JAM OR COUNTER-BROADCAST.

BUT THE MOST RECENT AND MOST AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT WAS BY FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF TO THE UNION OF YOUNG COMMUNISTS IN CUBA ON APRIL 4. SPEAKING OF RADIO MARTI, CASTRO SAID HE HOPES IT WON'T GO ON THE AIR BUT "...IF IN THE END THERE IS TO BE A DIALECTIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEM AND US, THEY WITH THEIR SUBVERSIVE STATION AND WE WITH OUR (ARGUMENTS IN) RESPONSE ... WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE A SUITABLE RESPONSE...." THIS SUGGESTS THAT CASTRO HIMSELF IS THREATENING A STEPPED UP CAMPAIGN OF BROADCASTING TO THE U.S.

THUS, WHILE WE CANNOT SAY FOR CERTAIN JUST WHAT CUBA WILL IN FACT DO, THE STAGE SEEMS SET FOR COUNTER-BROADCASTING RATHER THAN JAMMING. AND GENTLEMEN, WE HAVE NO FEAR OF ANYTHING CASTRO MIGHT SAY. THAT IS THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACY THRIVES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTROVERSY; COMMUNISM PANICS AT THE SOUND OF TRUTH.

QUITE APART FROM THE QUESTION OF RADIO MARTI, WE NEED TO STUDY THE MUCH BROADER PROBLEM POSED BY OUTLAW CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. RADIO. WE SUPPORT A PROPOSAL THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO ASSIGN A TASK FORCE TO STUDY THIS PROBLEM AND RECOMMEND WHAT WE MIGHT DO IN RESPONSE. DELIBERATE, CUBAN-CAUSED DAMAGE TO U.S. BROADCASTING IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN UNFRIENDLY ACT TO WHICH WE SHOULD RESPOND. THE TECHNICAL MEANS EXIST TO DO THAT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THOSE OF US WHO HAVE LIVED IN A COMMUNIST STATE WILL KNOW JUST HOW MUCH RADIO MARTI CAN AFFECT THE LIVES OF CUBANS. FOR THOSE OF US WHO HAVE NOT, IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER THE CUBAN PEOPLE HOPE AND THE MEANS TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON THE ACTIONS OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. FOR A PEOPLE BOTTLED UP IN A SYSTEM OF OPPRESSION WHICH THEY DID NOT SEEK AND CANNOT REMOVE, THAT CAN BE PRECIOUS.

RADIO MARTI and the 1040 kHz frequency - A Chronology

1979 Cuba announces construction of two 500 KW transmitters

1981 Aug 24-28
U.S.-Cuban bilateral talks in Washington on frequency problems. Cuba makes known its intention to utilize its 500 KW transmitters on 1040 kHz (WHO) and 1160 (KSL), both clear channel frequencies in the U.S.

Aug. 27
New York Times article on Administration plan to launch radio broadcasting to Cuba.

Sept. 18
Interagency Group asks FCC to identify an appropriate frequency for Radio Marti.

Sept. 23
Announcement by NSC concerning program of radio broadcasting to Cuba.

Oct. 29
FCC formally identifies 1040 kHz as recommended frequency for Radio Marti.

Nov. 2
1040 kHz first mentioned publicly as frequency for Radio Marti in "Broadcasting" Magazine.

Nov. 8
Western Hemisphere AM Broadcasting Conference in Rio; U.S. delegation files broadcast plan including 1040 kHz as frequency for USG use. (First official U.S. notification of intent to use 1040 kHz). Conference rejects Cuban application for use of 1040 and accepts U.S. plan to use this frequency.

Dec. 14
Cuba announced decision no longer to participate in Rio Conference.

Dec. 28
Cuba notifies ITU it would ignore frequency assignment plan adopted by Rio Conference and indicated it would implement the 48 frequency changes it had proposed at Rio.

1982 Jan. 12
NTIA formally assigns 1040 kHz for use by U.S. Government.

STATEMENT OF

THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Before

THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

July 1, 1982

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

1.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

LET ME START WITH CUBAN SOCIETY ITSELF. THERE IS NOTHING QUITE LIKE IT. A WOULD-BE FOREIGN POLICY GIANT IS ALLIED TO AN ECONOMIC PYGMY, WHOSE PEOPLES HAVE HAD TO SACRIFICE ALL HOPE FOR A RISING STANDARD OF LIVING TO FOREIGN ADVENTURES.

THE CUBAN ECONOMY, ORGANIZED IN THE FAMILIAR SOVIET COMMAND MODEL, HAS REGISTERED A GENERAL FAILURE. DESPITE GROWING SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN SALES OF OIL AT LOW PRICES AND PURCHASES OF SUGAR AT HIGH PRICES -- THE WHOLE SOVIET AID EFFORT IS NOW EQUIVALENT TO ONE QUARTER OF CUBA'S GNP -- PER CAPITA INCOME IN CUBA HAS BEEN STAGNANT AND STEADILY FALLING RELATIVE TO MUCH OF LATIN AMERICA.

YET CUBA PROJECTS POWER IN THE WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION SUBSIDIZES CUBA WITH OVER $3 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AID PER YEAR. IN ADDITION, CUBA'S ARMED FORCES -- AUGMENTED BY 66,000 TONS OF SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES IN 1981 ALONE -- ARE STRONGER THAN ANY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES. IT MAINTAINS 40 THOUSAND SOLDIERS IN AFRICA, DOMINATING TWO COUNTRIES, AND SERVING THE SOVIET UNION AS A PROXY. IN CENTRAL AMERICA CUBA IS ATTEMPTING TO UNITE THE LEFT IN SEARCH OF THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT, AND MAINTAINS 2000 MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL IN NICARAGUA.

MOST COUNTRIES CANNOT OVERCOMMIT TO STATE INTERESTS IN THIS MANNER, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE FORCE THEM TO ADDRESS THEIR CONCERNS. BUT CUBANS LACK THE MEANS TO HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE.

THE PROPOSAL WE DISCUSS TODAY -- RADIO BROADCASTING TO CUBA -- IS INTENDED TO SUPPLY WHAT THE CUBAN PUBLIC IS MISSING: RELIABLE NEWS ABOUT CUBAN LIFE, FEATURES, SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE DISTORTED, CENSORED NEWS THAT IS BEING OFFERED BY A GOVERNMENT THAT RULES NOT FOR THE PEOPLE BUT FOR ITSELF.

NO, THIS IS NOT A PROJECT TO TELL THE CUBAN PEOPLE ABOUT THE UNITED STATES. VOA -- WHOSE CHARTER IS INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND AMERICAN FEATURES AND CULTURE -- ALREADY DOES THAT. IT CAN BE HEARD IN SPANISH. SO ALSO CAN FLORIDA RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTING IN SPANISH TO CUBAN-AMERICANS. THESE STATIONS CAN TELL CUBANS MUCH ABOUT US. BUT THEY ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN AND ABOUT CUBA ITSELF.

NOR IS IT A PROJECT TO INCITE CUBANS TO REVOLT AGAINST THEIR OWN SOCIETY. THERE IS PROVOCATION ENOUGH IN THE REDISTRIBUTED POVERTY, IN THE DEPRESSING AUSTERITY, IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDER-EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATED CUBANS, IN THE RIGID REGIMENTION AND IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES THAT ONLY FURTHER SACRIFICE LIES AHEAD. BUT IT WOULD BE IMMORAL, IRRESPONSIBLE TO SET A PEOPLE AGAINST A GOVERNMENT THAT MONOPOLIZES THE MEANS OF COERCION.

THIS RADIO IS A PROPOSAL TO GIVE CUBANS THE MEANS THEY NOW LACK TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF A SOCIETY HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON THEM, TO FURNISH THEM WITH A SOURCE OF NEWS AND ENTERTAINMENT THAT IS NOT MANIPULATED BY THE STATE, TO LET THEM FIND OUT WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN THEIR COUNTRY, TO INFORM THEM WHY SO MANY HAVE GONE OFF TO FOREIGN MILITARY DUTY NOT ALWAYS TO RETURN, AND TO LEARN WHAT THE STATE REALLY DOES WITH THE WEALTH OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

THE RADIO -- LIKE RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY BEFORE IT -- IS INTENDED GRADUALLY TO EARN ITS AUDIENCE THROUGH ITS SPECIAL SENSITIVITY TO NEEDS THE STATE IGNORES. IT WILL SPEAK TO YOUNG PEOPLE OF THE SPORTS AND MUSIC THEY LOVE. IT WILL SPEAK TO ADULTS OF THE GREAT CUBAN AND HISPANIC-AMERICAN HERITAGE THEY ADMIRE, WHICH SO OFTEN THE STATE DENIGRATES. AND IT WILL GIVE NEWS ON THE TRUTH OF WHICH THE LISTENERS CAN RELY.

WE KNOW THAT IN EASTERN EUROPE IT TOOK YEARS FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE TO EARN AN AUDIENCE. LITTLE BY LITTLE THAT AUDIENCE EXPANDED. RADIO FREE EUROPE NOW HAS PERHAPS 70 PERCENT OF THE POLISH RADIO AUDIENCE. IS THERE ANY DOUBT THAT THE CHANGES OF THE LAST DECADE COULD HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THAT HONEST, TRUSTWORTHY, HUMANE OUTSIDE CONTACT?

OUR PROPOSAL IS THUS TO BEGIN A SUSTAINED EFFORT, OVER MANY YEARS, TO HELP THE CUBANS KNOW MORE ABOUT THEIR COUNTRY, AND THUS TO HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE IN WAYS IT IS NOT NOW.

3.

PEOPLE SAY: WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CUBANS; OR IT ISN'T LIKE US TO ENGAGE IN PROPAGANDA; OR CUBAN COUNTERMEASURES WILL HURT US TOO MUCH.

WE HAVE TRIED TO TALK WITH CUBA IN THE PAST AND IT WOULD BE WRONG TO RULE OUT TRYING AGAIN. BUT THE RECORD IS DAUNTING.

IN 1977 WE STARTED TALKING SERIOUSLY TO THE CUBANS, SAYING WE WANTED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE LEGACY OF THE PAST -- THE EMBARGO AND THE POLITICAL TENSION -- COULD BE OVERCOME. WE SUGGESTED A GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MORE THAN 20,000 CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. AFTER ALL, THE CIVIL WAR WAS OVER. WHILE WE TALKED, CUBA WENT INTO ETHIOPIA.

CONVERSATIONS CONTINUED. IN MID-1978, CUBA LAUNCHED UPON A NEW AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, UNITING THE LEFT PARTIES OF FIRST NICARAGUA, THEN EL SALVADOR, THEN GUATEMALA, COMMITTING THEM TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.

TALKS WENT ON. IN 1980, CASTRO TURNED THE DESIRE OF MANY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN TO FLEE CUBA INTO A HOSTILE ACT AGAINST THE U.S. -- THE MARIEL BOATLIFT.

IT IS NOT WRONG TO TALK TO ADVERSARIES. OFTEN IT IS ONLY PRUDENT. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT WITH CUBAN LEADERS TO SEE WHETHER THERE ARE AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST.

BUT WHAT COUNTS IS NOT THE MEDIUM, BUT THE MESSAGE. TALKS CANNOT BE A COMPLETE CUBAN POLICY, ANY MORE THAN DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES ARE A COMPLETE SOVIET OR POLISH POLICY. DIPLOMACY ENABLES US TO TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT. WE MUST ALSO TALK TO THE PEOPLE.

4.

OTHERS ASK: SHOULD WE BE ASSOCIATED WITH "PROPAGANDA?"

NO, WE SHOULD NOT. WE WILL NOT SUCCEED IN ATTRACTING AN AUDIENCE IN CUBA IF WE OFFER THEM PROPAGANDA. IF THERE ARE FALSE REPORTS, THE LISTENERS WILL SOON REALIZE THE REPORTS ARE FALSE.. IF FALSE REPORTS CONTINUE, THEY WILL TURN OFF. ONLY BY RESPECTING ITS AUDIENCE CAN A PROJECT LIKE THIS SUCCEED.

SO IT MUST BE THE CREATURE OF NO POLITICAL TENDENCY, OF NO ACTION GROUP, OF NO VESTED INTEREST. WE HAVE ACQUIRED EXPERIENCE -- IN RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY -- OF HOW TO DO THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE BEGINNINGS WERE DIFFICULT.

5.

SOME PEOPLE SAY - THE THREAT FROM CUBA IS TOO GREAT, RADIO MARTI WILL INVITE MASSIVE CUBAN JAMMING, INTERFERENCE, RETALIATION. THEY SAY, CHANGE FREQUENCIES AND HURT SOMEONE ELSE, NOT ME, OR THEY SAY USE ANOTHER SYSTEM - FM, SW, TV, OUT-OF-BAND AM. SOME EVEN SEEM TO IMPLY WE SHOULD ABANDON OUR PLANS OUT OF FEAR.

WELL, CUBAN INTERFERENCE IS A PROBLEM, A SERIOUS PROBLEM, BECAUSE INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING IS BASED ON COOPERATION, BUT CUBA HAS CHOSEN TO ACT AS AN OUTLAW. BUT CUBA'S LAWLESSNESS VASTLY PRE-DATES RADIO MARTI AND WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THE FUTURE - WITH OR WITHOUT THIS NEW STATION. THE CUBANS REFUSE TO USE DIRECTIONAL ANTENNAE, AS WE DO, TO PROTECT OTHERS BROADCASTING ON THE SAME FREQUENCY. AND THEY DO NOT RESPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL BODY THAT ALLOCATES FREQUENCIES.

THE TRUTH IS THAT WE DO NO KNOW FOR CERTAIN WHAT CUBA WILL DO ABOUT RADIO MARTI. IN AUGUST 1981 -- A MONTH BEFORE THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR RADIO MARTI -- CUBA MADE KNOWN ITS INTENTION TO PUT A HIGH-POWERED STATION ON 1040 KHZ WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH WHO, DES MOINES, AND EVEN MORE WITH ANY RADIO MARTI BROADCASTS ON THAT FREQUENCY. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD ALSO CAUSE MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR BROADCASTERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND WOULD CAUSE THE CUBAN STATION ITSELF TO LOSE EFFECTIVENESS BECAUSE OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE WITH WHO AND RADIO MARTI.

WE WOULD LIKE TO USE 1040 KHZ AS THE FREQUENCY FOR RADIO RADIO MARTI. THIS FREQUENCY APPEARS IN THE REGION II FREQUENCY PLAN FOR USE AT SADDLEBUNCH KEY, FLORIDA. ACCORDING TO THE FCC AND THE NTIA, THAT LISTING IN THE PLAN PERMITS US TO USE THE

FREQUENCY FOR RADIO MARTI. THAT MEANS ITS USE IS LEGAL AND HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN THIS COUNTRY. THE CUBAN DELEGATION TO THE REGION II MEDIUM FREQUENCY BROADCASTING CONFERENCE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INCLUSION OF 1040 KHZ FOR RADIO MARTI IN LIST B GRANTED IT INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND LEGITIMACY. W-H-O, DES MOINES, ALSO APPEARS IN THE PLAN FOR 1040 KHZ. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE RADIO MARTI INSTALLATION WILL BE DESIGNED SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH W-H-O'S SIGNAL AS PROVIDED BY THE FCC RULES AND REGULATIONS. THE OPERATION OF RADIO MARTI AND W-H-O CAN BE TECHNICALLY COMPATIBLE. THE ANTENNA ARRAY BEING BUILT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AT THE U.S. NAVY INSTALLATION ON SADDLEBUNCH KEY TO MEET MILITARY NEEDS HAS BEEN DESIGNED WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS IN MIND, SHOULD A DECISION BE TAKEN LATER TO USE THIS FACILITY FOR RADIO MARTI. MEANWHILE, DESPITE RECENT STORIES TO THE CONTRARY, NO GOVERNMENT FUNDS ARE BEING, OR WILL BE, SPENT ON RADIO MARTI ITSELF UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS.

THE CASTRO REGIME MAY ATTEMPT TO JAM RADIO MARTI WITH LOW-POWERED STATIONS SITUATED IN THE MAIN CITIES AND TOWNS OF CUBA. THIS WOULD BADLY INTERFERE WITH RECEPTION OF RADIO MARTI, BUT MIGHT HAVE A MINIMAL EFFECT ON WHO. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT CUBA MAY DO NOTHING. THE VOA HAS BEEN DIRECTING BROADCASTS TO CUBA FOR MORE THAN 21 YEARS AND CASTRO HAS RARELY SERIOUSLY TRIED TO JAM THESE BROADCASTS.

WHILE SOME AMERICAN OBSERVERS MAY HAVE DOUBTS AS TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIO MARTI, CUBAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NONE. THEY FULLY RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF RADIO MARTI AND TAKE IT VERY SERIOUSLY INDEED.

CUBA CAN MOUNT A JAMMING EFFORT. MANY REPORTS INDICATE PREPARATION OF STATIONS, INCLUDING A SO-CALLED RADIO LINCOLN, WHICH COULD EITHER JAM OR COUNTER-BROADCAST.

BUT THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT WAS BY FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF TO THE YOUNG COMMUNISTS UNION IN CUBA ON APRIL 4. SPEAKING OF RADIO MARTI, CASTRO SAID HE HOPES IT WON'T GO ON THE AIR BUT "...IF IN THE END THERE IS TO BE A DIALECTIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEM AND US, THEY WITH THEIR SUBVERSIVE STATION AND WE WITH OUR (ARGUMENTS IN) RESPONSE ... WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE A SUITABLE RESPONSE..." THIS SUGGESTS THAT CASTRO HIMSELF IS THREATENING A STEPPED UP CAMPAIGN OF BROADCASTING TO THE US. MORE RECENT INDICATIONS SUPPORT THIS

THUS, WHILE WE CANNOT SAY FOR CERTAIN JUST WHAT CUBA WILL IN FACT DO, THE STAGE IS SET FOR COUNTER-BROADCASTING RATHER THAN JAMMING. I THINK AMERICANS HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR FROM A COMPETITION OF IDEAS.

SHOULD FEAR OF CUBAN COUNTERMEASURES CAUSE US TO ABANDON PLANS FOR RADIO MARTI, WE WOULD HAND FIDEL CASTRO A MAJOR PROPAGANDA VICTORY. RATHER THAN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE WITH U.S. BROADCASTERS, OUR STANCE WOULD FEED CUBAN INTRANSIGENCE ON RADIO INTERFERENCE.

6.

MR. CHAIRMAN, RADIO MARTI IS DESIGNED TO RESPOND TO A BASIC HUMAN NEED -- THE NEED TO HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON EVENTS AND POLICIES THAT AFFECT THE LIVES OF INDIVIDUALS. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IS WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE, A FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM RECOGNIZED BY EVERY RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL AND GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD. THIS RIGHT, THIS FREEDOM, HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY DENIED TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE SINCE CASTRO CAME TO POWER IN 1959. RADIO MARTI WILL HELP RESTORE IT. THIS IS ONE REASON WHY THE RADIO MARTI BILL WAS GIVEN BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, WHICH APPROVED THE BILL BY A 20 TO 5 VOTE.

THOSE OF US WHO HAVE LIVED IN A COMMUNIST STATE WILL KNOW JUST HOW MUCH RADIO MARTI CAN AFFECT THE LIVES OF CUBANS. FOR THOSE OF US WHO HAVE NOT, IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER THE CUBAN PEOPLE HOPE AND THE MEANS TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON THE ACTIONS OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. FOR A PEOPLE BOTTLED UP IN A SYSTEM OF OPPRESSION WHICH THEY DID NOT SEEK AND CANNOT REMOVE, THAT CAN BE PRECIOUS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THE COMMITTEE MIGHT HAVE REGARDING THIS REQUEST.

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON BROADCASTING TO CUBA

INTERIM REPORT

May 24, 1982

INTERIM REPORT

In accordance with Executive Order 12323 of September, 1981, and as a result of its deliberations since its first meeting on February 5, the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba herewith issues an interim report containing its preliminary conclusions and recommendations with regard to radio broadcasting to Cuba:

1. Concept: The Commission strongly endorses the Administration's proposal to initiate radio broadcasting to Cuba as the most effective means available to make the Cuban people aware of the costs to them of Castro's mismanagement at home and adventurism abroad, and would provide them with the information needed to try to hold the Castro government more accountable. This proposal has also been strongly supported by the South Florida Radio Broadcasters Association and by the Inter-American Press Association. The United States should establish "Radio Marti" to broadcast to Cuba information and programs similar to those broadcast by Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) behind the Iron Curtain.

2. Name: "Radio Marti" is an appropriate name. Some have suggested that its namesake, the Cuban liberator, Jose Marti, was critical of the United States and therefore is somehow unworthy. Jose Marti was passionately dedicated to the truth, to democracy and freedom, and to the independence of Cuba from foreign dominance from whatever quarter. This credo should be

mirrored by the station of his namesake; Radio Marti should emulate his values. Marti is a symbol of a free Cuba to Cubans of all political views. He is perhaps the only such symbol acceptable to all Cubans.

3. Broadcasting entity: Adopting the view that a separate corporate entity patterned after RFE/RL, Inc. would enhance the credibility and efficiency of the broadcasting organization, the Commission endorses the establishment of Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. (RBC). RBC was incorporated as a private DC non-profit corporation in September 1981, and was recognized as a tax exempt organization by the Internal Revenue Service in Janury 1982. Pending the enactment of federal legislation, RBC has remained essentially a non-operational corporate shell. However, the Commission has recommended that RBC be activated to perform certain planning functions using only private funds. After consulting the House and Senate foreign affairs leadership, the Commission recommended in early May that RBC begin to hire several key personnel to begin planning for programming and future recruitment.

4. Goals: The intent in establishing Radio Marti is explained in Section 1 of the proposed legislation, namely that:

(a) it is the policy of the United States to support the right of the people of Cuba "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers," in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) consonant with this policy, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Incorporated, in its planned broadcasting to Cuba, should be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas to the people of Cuba, and in particular accurate information about Cuba; and

(c) such broadcasting by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States and in accordance with high professional standards, would be in the national interest.

The specific goals of Radio Marti should be to:

-- provide an alternate, reliable source of information concerning Cuba's domestic and international policies and actions now lacking to the Cuban people;

-- provide the information necessary for the Cuban people to make informed judgments on these policies and actions and to try to hold their government more accountable;

-- provide news and analysis as well as a full range of radio programming, including sports, music and entertainment, that is not manipulated by the state but is objective, accurate, credible, relevant and timely.

Radio Marti is <u>not</u> intended to:

-- broadcast propaganda or provocations but to impart the truth;

-- tell the Cuban people about the United States, a service performed by the VOA.

Radio Marti should espouse no single specific political, economic or religious point of view. It should have no relationship to any political party or exile organization; nor should it identify with any opposition group or groups, political party or organization, located inside or outside the broadcast area. Radio Marti should be committed to respect for human rights and to the principles of democracy, including freedom of opinion, the rule of law, and nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, class, or nationality. It should be nonsectarian, defending freedom of religious faith and observance for all creeds. It should be committed to the free movement of people and ideas among nations, and to the peaceful negotiation of international conflicts. The purpose of Radio Marti is not to incite a desire within the Cuban people to leave their country. There is enough provocation already in that society in the way the Cuban government treats its own people. Nor is Radio Marti intended to incite Cubans to revolt against their own society. Radio Marti should subscribe to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as expressed in the United Nations Charter.

Recommended program policy guidelines for Radio Marti, which are modeled on those of RFE, are set forth as an attachment.

5. Oversight: Legislation proposed by the Administration to the Congress specifies the State Department as the temporary grantor of federal funds and supervisory authority for RBC, pending the statutory designation of an appropriate federal granting and oversight agency. The Commission considers this a sensible arrangement until RBC is fully operational. The Commission would prefer to delay recommendation on a permanent oversight agency until RBC has been operational for a full year. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that its term be extended for a period not to exceed one year from the date of Congressional legislation authorizing and funding RBC. This would permit the Commission to make a more informed recommendation concerning RBC parentage.

6. Technical Facilities: Neither FM nor TV transmissions are possible from available U.S. sites to Cuba with adequate reception there. Shortwave receivers are relatively scarce in that country. However, AM transmission with quality reception throughout Cuba is quite feasible. AM receivers are common and widely distributed in Cuba.

Several medium wave transmitters would be required for full coverage of the island with a strong signal, although one transmitter could provide good coverage of western Cuba including Havana, and some island-wide night-time service. The first transmitter should be in south Florida as close to Cuba as possible. Eastern Cuba, the most heavily populated part of the island, cannot be effectively reached by broadcasts from Florida. Consideration should therefore be given to establishing a second transmitter site in the Caribbean.

RBC transmitters located in the continental United States should conform to the domestic 50KW power limit. To avoid interference with existing U.S. or third country stations, and to define its signal as precisely as possible towards Cuba only, RBC should install highly directional antennae.

7. Headquarters: As close policy and operating guidance is essential, RBC's headquarters and main studio should be located in proximity to the oversight agencies. Further, the independent nature of Radio Marti can be enhanced by locating its primary programming operations outside areas identified in the U.S. and Cuban public minds with partisan ethnic groups.

For these reasons, we recommend their location in the Washington, D.C. area. Facilities should first be sought on U.S. Government installations in this area because security will be an important consideration. The Commission is considering locating auxiliary bureau/studios in Miami and New York. The location of auxiliary, regional bureau studios should be determined by RBC later.

8. Frequencies: According to technical studies conducted by the FCC in terms of optimal coverage of Cuba and minimal interference with domestic and other stations, the best standard AM frequency available for Radio Marti is 1040kHz. It would provide good coverage of Cuba and would avoid interference with U.S. stations. Radio Marti itself would not interfere significantly with the U.S. station already assigned the use of this channel in the United States, WHO of Des Moines. The FCC and NTIA have approved this frequency for Radio Marti; in January, 1982 NTIA assigned it to the USG for use by RBC. The frequency assignment had been previously accepted by the ITU in November, 1981.

While recognizing that there is some degree of risk from Cuban interference on any frequency selected for Radio Marti, the Commission believes this contingency should not deter the United States from implementing its plan to put Radio Marti on

the air on 1040kHz. As FCC studies indicate, the use of any other frequency would raise greater problems for other stations. If Cuba persists in interfering with U.S. radio stations, the U.S. may have to consider appropriate action.

The Commission recommends that RBC broadcast on 1040kHz as its principal frequency while considering the possibility of using additional frequencies in order to make Cuban jamming of Radio Marti broadcasts more difficult. The Commission is also considering the use of a wide range of complementary technical facilities for contingency use.

9. Interference: Cuban radio interference with U.S. broadcasting in violation of international broadcast agreements and norms has been going on for years, well before Radio Marti was proposed. This has been made clear in testimony before the Commission by the National Association of Broadcasters and by the broadcaster associations in Florida. In addition, propaganda broadcasts from Cuba by Radio Havana and Radio Moscow have also been directed at the U.S. for some time. Cuba announced plans for a number of new radio transmitters, including two 500 KW stations, in 1979 just when the U.S. was attempting to improve relations. These two large transmitters, one of which may be on the air on 1160 KHz and the other one, which is believed ready for use now or very soon, could cause extensive radio interference on two frequencies in the U.S. Cuba may try to make Radio Marti a scapegoat for continued interference despite the fact that interference existed before the announcement of Radio Marti and would probably continue

without it. The Commission does not believe that suspension of plans for Radio Marti would eliminate or even reduce Cuban radio interference now or in the future.

Problems related to radio interference would normally be addressed bilaterally or through the relevant multilateral channels. But Cuba's withdrawal from the regional AM broadcasting conference last year after its frequency proposals were rejected reveals its lack of respect for established procedures designed to deal with matters related to the use of international frequencies. Cuba has clearly ratified its outlaw status in the field of international telecommunications with its blatant disregard for accepted norms. This does not bode well for an early diplomatic solution to the interference problem. Nevertheless, the Department of State should keep the door open to such negotiations, particularly involving international organizations and efforts by other nations, as well as the U.S.

Should Cuba violate all international norms by launching a radio war of deliberate, aggressive and extensive interference with American broadcasting, the Commission believes the U.S. should consider denouncing this as "an unfriendly act" meriting appropriate U.S. countermeasures.

10. Budget and Personnel: To launch Radio Marti we have recommended a budget for RBC of $10 million in FY 82 and $7.7 million in FY 83. This budget has already been presented by the Department of State to the Congress.

Of the $10 million for FY 82, $4.2 million are recommended for engineering, $3 million for programming, and $2.8 million for administration. Included under engineering expenditures are $1.2 million for one-time acquisition costs for an antenna, transmitter and related equipment at the South Florida transmitter site, and approximately $1 million for headquarters and studio facilities. Nearly one half of the $3 million for programming is for part-year personnel costs, as are $.9 million of the $2.8 million for administration. In FY 83 virtually all of the $7.7 million recommended is for programming and administration, with full-year personnel costs making up nearly $5 million. Of the 168 positions recommended to be filled in FY 82, 148 will be related to programming requirements.

Assuming prompt Congressional action on passage of the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba legislation, these funds will be obligated immediately through a grant to RBC, Inc., a non-profit corporation which will have responsibility for the operation of Radio Marti. Current salary and benefit costs for fiscal year 1982 are based on the assumption that employees would be brought on board progressively beginning April 1, 1982. Based on July 1, 1982 enactment, there would be a reduction of $589,000 in salary and benefit costs to current 1982 estimates. All other costs would remain unchanged.

Because of the need for specialized programming tailored specifically for the Cuban people, RBC will be required to establish a specialized news service and to research and write much of its own material. Programming-related positions include editors, commentators, analysts, writers, correspondents, researchers, translators, technicians, etc. Thus, manpower levels must reflect the needs of a one small station radio "network". Personnel should be drawn from the ranks of professional broadcasters and newspersons, with special emphasis on hispanic, including Cuban, experience. While it will be essential to include staff with knowledge of Cuba, and to use Cuban voice talent, Radio Marti should be perceived not as a Cuban exile activity but rather as an objective non-partisan effort.

RADIO MARTI PROGRAM POLICY GUIDELINES

Radio Marti is an independent radio service broadcasting to Cuba authorized by the Congress of the United States, conducted under private American management, and subject to Federal oversight procedures defined in the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. The mission of Radio Marti is to enhance the Cuban people's knowledge of developments in Cuba itself, in the Western Hemisphere more broadly, and in the world at large. The purpose of Radio Marti is neither to incite nor to propagandize. Rather, the United States considers that the open communication of information and ideas by Radio Marti -- in accordance with high professional standards of accuracy, objectivity, timeliness and relevance to the interests of Cuban listeners -- can assist an orderly process of evolution in Cuba toward domestic and international policies more conducive to hemisphere and international understanding.

Radio Marti shall provide listeners, as accurately and quickly as possible, with knowledge of, and balanced perspective on, both the outside world and developments within Cuba. Specifically, Radio Marti will:

(1) Communicate a broad range of world press reportage, analysis and opinion -- as well as analyses based on Radio Marti's own expert research -- on developments within Cuba;

(2) Provide comprehensive news and careful analysis of international affairs involving and affecting the people of

Cuba, including developments in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere;

(3) Inform Cuban listeners, through news and analysis based on expert research, of developments in other Communist-ruled societies, and of particularities which distinguish various Communist-ruled societies and Communist parties from one another;

(4) Broadcast and critically analyze documents and works of political significance and/or of cultural merit which have been prodcued by citizens of Cuba but have been denied official publication by censorship; and provide as well a full range of radio programming including sports, music and entertainment;

(5) Provide timely, comprehensive coverage of political, economic, social and cultural developments in the domestic societies of Latin America as well as among Cuban-American communities in the United States.

(6) Remind listeners of standards governing basic human rights as outlined in domestic legislation and international agreements which the Cuban government has undertaken to observe, and such internationally accepted documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The essence of Radio Marti's program policy is the practice of independent, professionally competent, and responsible broadcast journalism. Radio Marti shall espouse no single specific, political, economic or religious creed. It has no relationship to any political party or exile organization, nor

shall it identify itself with any opposition group or groups, political party or organization, located inside or outside Cuba. Radio Marti is, however, committed to respect for human rights and to the principles of democracy, including freedom of opinion, the rule of law, and nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, class or nationality. It is nonsectarian, defending freedom of religious faith and observance for all creeds. It is committed to the free movement of people and ideas between nations and to the peaceful negotiation of international conflicts. It subscribes to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as expressed in the United Nations Charter.

Editorial Policy

Radio Marti proceeds from the assumption that informed societies can make more responsible judgements about their own and world affairs, and that the growth of an informed public opinion may contribute to moderating repressive or adventurous official policies. Accuracy and objectivity are essential to maintain listener respect. The ability of Radio Marti to deliver information in balanced as well as timely fashion will encourage Cuban domestic media to report faster, more objectively, and in a more comprehensive context.

Radio Marti seeks to approach both Cuban developments and the world scene from the point of view of thoughtful individuals in the audience who wish to know, understand and form independent personal judgments on what is going on inside

and outside Cuba. This approach requires constant attention to the most up-to-date knowledge of audience concerns, as well as awareness of the gaps and distortions in local media. The use of a variety of program formats -- news, interpretive analysis, surveys of world press reports and comments, roundtable discussions, the verbatum reading of important documents -- broadens the listeners' perspective. Entertainment features, such as popular music and sports programs, should help expose Cuban listeners to the spontaneity, creativity and diversity of free societies in the hemisphere and elsewhere.

Radio Marti newscasts should set the tone for the credibility of the entire program output. The news must be accurate, objective, timely, interesting and relevant to the concerns of Cuban listeners. Materials made available for newscasts should be thoroghly verified by news personnel as to facts and sources, as well as to avoid any suggestin of bias or sensationalism. Confirmation by two independent sources is required when facts appear to be in doubt. Clear attribution to the source is required when the information content clearly constitutes opinion or can be considered partial or self-serving.

Newscasts are supplemented by news analysis, correspondents' reports, and press review programs which reflect a broad variety of Western Hemispheric and, as feasible, world opinion on major international developments and questions of significance to Cuban listeners. Interviews and

roundtable discussions, preferably with the participation of outside experts, provide a useful means of airing the clash of opinions on controversial issues.

In reporting on open societies, Radio Marti programs should reflect their problems and setbacks as well as achievements. It is important to reflect the open political, economic and social processes through which problems are identified and approached, and through which proposed solutions are formulated, criticized, debated and reviewed. The role of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government at national, provincial, and local levels should be stressed. And the part played by public opinin media and by private individuals, civic groups and political parties should also be highlighted. Discussion of economic issues is most effectively related to the welfare of individual citizens and consumers. Factual comparisons between Cuban and other societies may be drawn when required for context or perspective. And judgments should not be imposed on listeners.

Programming on Cuban domestic affairs and on Cuban international activities should concentrate on keeping listeners informed especially of important developments which are unpublicized, distorted or inadequately discussed by official media. Such information may include, when appropriate, the views of Cuban citizens who, denied access to domestic media, seek expression through foreign correspondents or by means of uncensored writings. The content of uncensored

writings or other documents originating in Cuba should be carefully scrutinized prior to broadcast use; the same applies to the content of exile press material and organizational statements. Comment on Cuban domestic affairs and international activities should be calm and reasoned -- based on solid knowledge of the fact and expressed in responsible fashion. Overall, the aim of Radio Marti in discussing Cuban affairs and activities is to provide full and honest information, broader perspective, and a responsible forum for a diversity of views. By observing high standards of accuracy, objectivity and timeliness, Radio Marti programs should seek to earn the respect, if not necessarily the agreement, of potential listeners from all social and political groups in Cuba.

In reporting on political conflict in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere, in which Cuban resources may be engaged, Radio Marti should strive for a comprehensive and balanced approach -- reflecting the thoroughness of hemispheric coverage and the diversity of hemispheric views on difficult internal and international issues. Programs should be careful in distinguishing among various insurgent, revolutionary, Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, and other radical movements, as well as among socialist, social-democratic, Christian Democratic and other traditional parties. Such a balanced and nuanced approach can prove an effective antidote to the bias of official media and enhance the credibility of Radio Marti as a reliable, independent information source.

Through "cross-reporting," Radio Marti should convey to Cuban audiences objective information on developments in other Communist countries, on which officials media coverage has often been inadequate or distorted. Programs should also pay special attention to developments in non-ruling Communist parties and among non-aligned nations. Coverage of Soviet-Cuban political, economic, cultural and military relationships should be thoroughly factual and objective.

Restraints

Tone, language and manner of presentation are as important for Radio Marti's credibility as information content. Therefore, the following restraints will be carefully observed:

1. Avoidance of inflammatory emotionalism, vituperation, vindictiveness, stridency, belligerency, arrogance, pomposity, prentiousness or condescension.

2. Avoidance of sweeping generalization, propagandistic argumentation, or gratuitous value judgments. Radio Marti should correct gaps and distortions in the official media by presenting the facts, avoiding polemics.

3. Avoidance of any comment or broadcast of any material which could be reasonably construed as a direct incitement to revolt.

4. Avoidance of tactical advice, by which is meant recommendations for specific action in particular cases, except in unusual circumstances. The citizens of Cuba, provided they know the relevant facts, are better qualified to judge the

efficacy and consequences of their actions than anyone outside the country.

5. No programs will be broadcast which are based upon or use rumors or unsubstantiated information. If, under unusual circumstances, a constructive purpose will be served by calling attention to a prevalent rumor, it should clearly be identified as such.

6. Editorial opinions, whether by Radio Marti staff, in press reviews, or originating in uncensored documents or exile organizational statements, shall be clearly distinguished from news analysis and the source of the opinion identified.

7. Avoidance of any programming that could be construed as encouraging defection or illegal emigration. No information on "how to defect" will be broadcast. Programs dealing with actual or potential emigration from Cuba to the United States shall unequivocally report the actual laws and policies in force in both countries. Programs on Cuban emigrants abroad should carefully avoid any suggestions that others follow their example.

8. Avoidance of any suggestion that might lead Cuban listeners to believe that, in the event of civil disorder or international crisis, the United States might intervene militarily in Cuba.

9. Avoidance of any material which could be characterized as petty gossip, slander, spiteful reference to or attack on the personal lives or families or Cuban government or party leaders, or on individuals as such. The discussion of the

public acts of public officials shall be conducted in a dignified, dispassionate, responsible manner.

10. Avoidance of indiscriminate use of the first person plural -- "we" -- to suggest that Radio Marti speaks for either the citizens of Cuba or the United States Government.

11. Discussion of relations between the United States and Cuba since 1898 should accurately reflect a complex historical record and be based, to the highest degree, on documentary evidence and internationally acknowledged scholarship. The credibility of Radio Marti can only be enhanced by dispassionate recognition of a diversity of views in both the United States and Cuba, in the past as well as at present, regarding controversial episodes in their common history. The view of the United States which Radio Marti listeners are enabled to form should be accurate and comprehensive, free of prejudice or exaggerated expectations.

Implementation

Radio management is fully responsible for the day-to-day supervision of program content in accordance with these guidelines and with oversight procedures prescribed by law. Spanish and/or English language texts shall be distributed to each employee prior to employment. Management shall develop appropriate contracts to assure that compliance with these guidelines is a condition of employment for broadcast personnel, and that deliberate violation of these standards shall be, under appropriate procedures, cause for termination of such employment.

Radio Marti Staffing Pattern

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Corporate Administration (5)	President Vice-President Special Assistant Secretaries (2)
General Counsel's Office (2)	General Counsel Secretary
Fiscal Accounting Office (4)	Chief, Accounting Accounting Officers (2) Secretary
Personnel Office (4)	Chief, Personnel Personnel Officers (2) Secretary
Security Office (2)	Chief, Security Security Officer
Mail Room (3)	Mail Clerks (3)

PROGRAMMING STAFF

Program Director's Office (3)	Program Director Deputy Program Director Secretary
Newsroom (50)	Chief, News Programs Shift Chiefs (3) Commentators/Analysts (9) Correspondents (3) Anchors/Editors (9) Writers (8) Adapters/Broadcasters (17)
Sports Bureau (3)	Chief, Sports Programs Writers/Broadcasters (2)
Features Programs (23)	Chief, Features Programs Editors (4) Writers/Adapters (18)
Music Unit (4)	Chief, Music Programs Writer Music Librarians (2)

PROGRAMMING STAFF (cont'd)

Policy Office (3)	Chief, Policy Policy Officer Secretary
Research Office (23)	Chief, Research Research Analysts (8) Research Librarians (3) Monitor Technicians (6) Transcribers (4) Secretary
Production Service (12)	Chief, Production Producers/Directors (8) Tape Librarians (2) Production Assistant
Technical Operations (14)	Chief, Technical Operations Technicians 12 Secretary
Miami Bureau (6)	Correspondents (3) Technicians (2) Secretary
New York City Bureau (4)	Correspondents (2) Technician Secretary
Midwest Office	Correspondent
West Coast Office	Correspondent
Southwest Office	Correspondent

TRANSMITTER ENGINEERING STAFF (FY-83)*

Second Transmitter (14)	Transmitter Manager
	Technical Supervisor
	Technicians (7)
	Local Support Staff (5)

FY-82 TOTAL POSITIONS: 168
FY-83 TOTAL POSITIONS: 182

*Management of the first transmitter is on contract. No staff positions are involved.

INTERAMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION

XXXVII GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RIO DE JANEIRO, OCTOBER, 1981

C U B A

WHEREAS

1. since the rise to power of the Communist government of Fidel Castro, all media have been confiscated and consolidated into a few official organizations, giving the government absolute control of public information under conditions leading to massive indoctrination

WHEREAS

2. the journalists Fernando Rivas Porta of the newspaper Bohemia and Luis Rodríguez Rodríguez, of the newspaper El País have been imprisoned for over twenty years

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLVES

1. to request its members to continue by all means at their disposal the struggle which the Inter American Press Association has been carrying on for twenty years to obtain the freedom of all those who have been jailed in Cuba for defending the principles of freedom of expression

2. to encourage free journalists of the continent, especially members of the Inter American Press Association, to make every effort to bring about the end of the news blackout for the people of Cuba, and support any means that would help achieve that objective.

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 637-5000

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Barbara Hutchinson
Gerald W. McEntee

August 3, 1982

The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman
Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Zablocki:

On behalf of the AFL-CIO, I am writing to urge your support of Radio Marti.

American workers stand behind this effort to inform the people of Cuba of the costs they pay for Castro's international military troublemaking, just as they support Radio Free Europe's support to the Solidarity movement in Poland. The U.S. should respond to Castro-Soviet radio propaganda, which exceeds U.S. broadcasts to Latin America by a ratio of 5 to 1.

H.R. 5427 should be passed without amendment, as a peaceful means for projecting U.S. policy in the Caribbean.

Sincerely,

Lane Kirkland

President

DEMOCRATS '82

NATIONAL PARTY CONFERENCE

RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF RADIO FREE CUBA

WHEREAS, the people of Cuba deserve to have an accurate, timely, and unbiased source of news and information about significant events in relation to the activities of their neighboring peoples and governments, in the Americas and the world; and,

WHEREAS, radio broadcasting, in a peaceful manner consistent with international law, has proven effective in furthering communications between peoples divided by political boundaries as demonstrated by the experience of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Hispanic Caucus of the Democratic Party in Conference in Philadelphia on June 25, 1982, that,

We support the establishment of a Radio Free Cuba (Radio Marti) for broadcasting to the people of Cuba.

Submitted by Luis Lauredo

Philadelphia June 25-27

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
202/797-5900

Charles T. Manatt, Chairman

1421 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102
215/569-2727

A copy of our report is filed with the Federal Election Commission and is available for purchase from the Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C.